

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

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

YONG DENG examines Chinese perceptions of and reactions to the U.S. global power status and grand security strategy after the cold war. He shows that conflict between the United States and China is structural and has been on the rise. The author believes there is a real danger of an escalation of balancing and counterbalancing unless a mechanism of peaceful change is devised.

RALPH NUNEZ examines the recent rise in family homelessness in New York City and details the underlying causes and characteristics of family homelessness and its effect on children. He discusses political trends affecting affordable housing and new strategies for transitional housing.

DANIEL BRUMBERG offers alternative concepts of state building, ideological change, and transitions in Islamic polities. Dissonant states, he argues, institutionalize competing visions of political community in ways that promote interelite competition, bargaining, and ideological innovation. He illustrates his argument by exploring the evolution of dissonant politics in Iran and Indonesia.

KATHERIN ROSS PHILLIPS examines demographic differences in knowledge about the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) among parents. Using data from the National Survey of America's Families, she finds that almost two-thirds of low-income parents have heard about the EITC, but low-income Hispanic parents are less than half as likely as low-income non-Hispanic parents to know about the tax credit.

REGINA G. LAWRENCE and W. LANCE BENNETT offer an alternative interpretation of public opinion during the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Rejecting the "prosperity" explanation, they explore four dimensions of public reactions to the Clinton impeachment that are not well explained by simpler models.

MYRON J. ARONOFF discusses social, economic, cultural, and political changes that have dramatically transformed Israel. He critically evaluates recent publications on the relationship between the liberalization of the economy and the peace process, public policy and electoral reform, and consensus and dissent on central issues relating to democracy and peace.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

Responding to September 11, 2001

It is for us the living . . . to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us . . . that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain — that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

From Abraham Lincoln's *Gettysburg Address.*
November 19, 1863

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Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy

YONG DENG

An authoritative text published by China's National Defense University defines international strategy as "a sovereign state's relatively long-term, comprehensive stratagems within the realm of its foreign relations, namely, the plans and guidelines for a sovereign state to use its capabilities to pursue national interests in the international struggle. . . . [By necessity, the strategy becomes] "the fundamental guidelines and principles for the state's foreign relations." A state's power position in the international system defines its strategic situation and is in itself an integral part of the state's strategic thinking.[1] Chinese analysts believe that U.S. China policy follows and serves U.S. global strategy. Thus interpretations of U.S. global strategy provide the framework through which Chinese analysts interpret Sino-American relations.

U.S. hegemony invokes amazingly variegated emotions, images, and perceptions across the world depending on the individual state's perspective.[2] This article examines Chinese perceptions and responses to U.S. global strategy after the cold war. To highlight the perceptual gap separating the two countries, Chinese views are preceded with a brief sampling of American analysts' debate over their own country's global position and strategy. The findings here belie any pretense of strategic partnership between China and the United States. On the contrary, strategic conflict has been on the rise. Since the cold war, assessments by Chinese analysts and officials have shifted from a prediction of immi-

[1] Gao Jindian, ed., *Guoji Zhanluexue Gailun* [Introduction to International Strategy] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1995), 7–9.

[2] Francois Heisbourg, "American Hegemony? Perceptions of the U.S. Abroad," *Survival* 41 (Winter 1999–2000): 5–19.

YONG DENG is assistant professor of political science at the United States Naval Academy. He recently co-edited *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World.*

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nent U.S. hegemonic decline to a view that U.S.-dominated unipolarity will likely last well into the twenty-first century. Except for a brief period when China's mainstream strategy analysts, with some wishful thinking, contended U.S. hegemonic intentions could not be matched with its capability, they have overall perceived a consistent and malign U.S. strategy of global domination. The views on the enduring and predatory nature of the U.S. hegemony were reinforced after the NATO military intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999.

In response, China has tried to balance against U.S. power through developing a strategic partnership with Russia, building new ties with its neighbors and beyond, and increasing its comprehensive national power. Beijing's countermeasures do not amount to a robust balancing strategy explicitly designed to dislodge the U.S. hegemonic position. So far, Beijing's balancing has been overall hesitant, low-key, and inconsistent. China has not completely succumbed to the structural pressure to balance. Prevailing bandwagoning by other powers, acute domestic insecurity, and perceived high costs of open confrontation with the United States combine to explain Beijing's hesitancy. But if strategic conflict continues to escalate, China will be more tempted to step up its balancing against the United States. To dissuade China from embarking on such a path, a mechanism of peaceful change through enhanced strategic dialogue and necessary adjustments for mutual accommodation must and can be found. The U.S. unipolar international order cannot afford to be oblivious to China's concerns and discontent. The first step is to dispel any illusions about "strategic partnership" and the wishful thinking that economic and institutional engagement will automatically bring about a democratic and peaceful China.

U.S. Power and China's Utopian Multipolar World

After the cold war, the United States became the sole superpower. But how preponderant is the U.S. power? To what extent do capabilities translate into control? How long can the United States stay on top? American analysts, using traditional and mostly realist criteria for measurement, conclude that the post-cold war world is a U.S.-dominated unipolar system.[3] But others, who are more aware of the changing nature of power, argue that power is actually more dispersed beyond the military level. Globalization and the growing web of subnational and transnational relations are eroding the power of traditional sovereign states, making the U.S. position much more complex and uncertain than the notion of unipolarity would suggest.[4] Analysts, who are skeptical of the tra-

[3] See, for example, Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21 (Spring 1997): 49–88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24 (Summer 1999): 5–41.

[4] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (July/August 1999): 22–35; Richard Haass, "What to Do with American Primacy," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (September/October 1999): 37–49.

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ditional definition of power in terms of polarity, also note that U.S. power preponderance does not always translate into U.S.-dominated outcomes, especially when it concerns second-tier major powers.[5]

Realism predicts balancing from other states to counter the concentration of power in an anarchic, self-help international system.[6] However, by the late 1990s, many American scholars and strategic thinkers alike were surprised that the U.S. preponderance of power had confronted no counter-balancing from other secondary powers. None of the second-tier powers has vigorously tried to undermine U.S. power by internal balancing (through domestic armament and force restructuring) or external balancing (through alliance formation) explicitly directed against the sole polar state. For some American scholars, this simply proves that U.S. unipolarity can be both enduring and peaceful.[7] Clearly by the late 1990s, the view that U.S. power preponderance is unquestionable and can last has gained important ground among scholarly circles.[8]

In the first half of the 1990s, views that suggest that the U.S.-dominated unipolar moment would be of short duration were widespread in China. Such a view was nearly universally held in China except for a brief interval, while it was more contested in America. By the late 1990s, both countries witnessed a growing acceptance of the view that U.S. unipolar status could endure. But China's official protestations still insist that multipolarization continues, even though they admit that it will be a drawn-out process.

Starting with the mid-1980s, Chinese policy elites began to believe that the evolution toward multipolarity had accelerated.[9] This view was interrupted during the period of 1989–1991, as the Tiananmen incident and the collapse of communist regimes in East Europe heightened Chinese fear of strategic isolation. All other powers, including Russia, seemed to have joined the United States to gang up against China. Only after late 1991 and early 1992 did Chinese analysts breathe a sigh of relief as they witnessed President George Bush, Sr. abandon his attempt to translate the vision of a "new world order" into reality. China officially declared the end of its post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation in 1993.[10] Chinese analysts now argued that having won the cold war, the United

[5] See, for example, David Wilkinson, "Unipolarity Without Hegemony," *International Studies Review* 1 (Summer 1999): 141–172.

[6] For the classic formulation, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979), esp. chap. 6.

[7] Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World."

[8] Even Kenneth Waltz, while insisting balance of power will occur "tomorrow," has to concede that full-scale balancing is not happening "today." And he admits his inability to say when that "tomorrow" will be. See Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 5–41.

[9] Michael Pillsbury attributes the conception of multipolarity to Deng Xiaoping's top security adviser Huan Xiang, who put forth this characterization in 1986. See Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2000), 9–12.

[10] "1993: China Established Advantageous Position in the Current World," *Liaowang* [Outlook] 52 (1993): 33.

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States had also been badly weakened by years of overextension and exhaustion. Rampant global turbulence and America's growing rifts with allies and Russia, persistent U.S. economic woes, debilitating social problems, and rising isolationist domestic public opinion all imposed important constraints on U.S. power. Chinese analysts began again to emphasize the irreversible decline of the U.S. relative influence and the inevitable trends of multipolarization.[11]

From the Chinese perspective, concentrated power without counterbalancing is both dangerous and unnatural. A balance of power underpinned by the five principles of peaceful coexistence (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) should represent the basis for a new world order. While American international relations literature posits that traditional sovereignty is responsible for competitive power politics, Chinese views hold that a more rigid adherence to sovereignty actually constitutes the key ingredient for a truly new world order of equality, peace, and justice. They contend, unlike the Western concept of balance of power that presupposes monopoly among great powers, the Chinese notion of multipolarity entails an equally determining role of the Third World countries. It also means that China constitutes a pole with much freedom to act internationally.

It had become clear by the mid-1990s that the world was not marching quickly toward multipolarity as the Chinese analysts had hoped for. Other great powers had not narrowed their power disparity with the United States. Nor had they acted independently in the world arena. Chinese analysts now characterized the world power configuration as "one superpower (the United States), many great powers" (Europe, Japan, China, and Russia). In 1996–1997, they concluded, according to Wang Jisi, director of the Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "the superpower is more super, and the many great powers are less great."[12] The United States had established firmly its power superiority over other second-tier powers. The resultant uncertainties and anxieties concerning the new reality of U.S. power prompted a quiet but unprecedentedly forceful debate among China's policy analysts "about the pace of the decline of the United States and the rate of the rise of 'multipolarity.'"[13] There was some disagreement over the staying power of the U.S. hegemony, the nature of the competition among Europe, Japan, and the United

[11] Jin Canrong, "The U.S. Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations: The Chinese Perspective" (paper presented at the conference, "New Generation, New Voices: Debating China's International Future," sponsored by the Stanley Foundation, San Francisco, 13–15 August 1999); Zhang Yebai, "An Overview of Studies on Sino-American Relations in the 1990s" in Zi Zhongyun and Tao Wenzhao, eds., *Jiaqi Lijie De Xin Qiaoliang* [Building a New Bridge of Understanding] (Hefei: Anhui University Press, 1996), 196–98.

[12] Wang Jisi, "Building a Constructive Relationship" in Morton Abramowitz, Funabashi Yoichi, and Wang Jisi, *China-Japan-U.S.: Managing the Trilateral Relationship* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), 22.

[13] Pillsbury, *China Debates*, 14.

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States, and the extent of the U.S. relative decline. But mainstream Chinese analysts still believed the contradictions between the United States and its allies could intensify.[14] Like some of their realist counterparts in America, they envisioned a prevalence of balancing behavior from other major powers. They believed that from the confusion and disorder a multipolar world would somehow emerge. The official line still maintained that the world was evolving toward multipolarity.

The apparent gains in U.S. power at the expense of Japan, Russia, and Europe in the mid-1990s might have sown doubt in the Chinese policy elite's belief in a precipitous U.S. decline, but it had not fundamentally dampened their enthusiasm for the trend toward multipolarity. Toward the late 1990s, however, both the description and prognosis about imminent multipolarity became increasingly untenable. Neither Europe nor Japan had made a credible attempt to become independent poles. Instead, Chinese analysts noted that the U.S. "comprehensive national power" had surged. Yao Youzhi, head of the Department of Strategic Research in the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (the most important research arm of the People's Liberation Army [PLA]) writes that to maintain its unipolar dominance, the United States has pursued varying strategies to "contain, control, incorporate, and suppress those countries and regions that might become one of the multiple poles." It "has controlled and incorporated Europe and Japan, and suppressed and contained Russia and China." Yao's colleague at the same academy, Hong Bing, concurs by acknowledging the vast disparity between the United States and other "weak poles," some of which have joined the U.S. strong pole.[15] Chinese analysts concluded, "The forces on the international arena were out of balance, and the process of multipolarization was seriously challenged."[16] China's call for multipolarization sounds increasingly hollow and has become, according to reported Chinese leaders' own private concession, "out of touch with reality."[17]

After the Kosovo war in 1999, reflecting a pent-up frustration with the official protestation of multipolarization, an outspoken Chinese commentator asked: Why maintain the charade of the "many great powers" if none of them can do anything to check U.S. behavior? China would be better off simply to recognize the reality of the U.S. unipolar dominance.[18] Mainstream official ana-

[14] Ibid., chap. 2.

[15] Yao Youzhi, "U.S. Strategic Orientation in the 21st Century as Viewed from the Kosovo War," *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* (Beijing), 20 May 1999, 11–14 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter cited as FBIS)-China, 5 August 1999, 2; Zhao Yiping, "World Security and U.S. Global Strategy," *Guangming Ribao*, 16 February 2000 in FBIS, 23 February 2000.

[16] Xu Hongzhi and Huang Qing, "Advancing Toward Multipolarization Amid Turbulence," *Renmin ribao*, 16 December 1999, 7 in FBIS-China, 16 January 2000, 2.

[17] Wei Ming, "Jiang Zemin's Pragmatic Diplomacy," Hong Kong *Kuang Chiao Ching*, 16 October 1999, 16–19, in FBIS-China, 20 November 1999, 2. This Hong Kong source on the Chinese leadership's rethinking is validated by my own discussions with over a dozen Chinese scholars and think-tankers based in Beijing and Shanghai that took place in San Francisco, August 1999 and Seattle, July 2000.

[18] Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong, Song Qiang, et al., *Quanqiuhua Yinying Xia De Zhongguo Zhilu* [China's Road Under the Shadow of Globalization] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1999),

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lysts concede "the complexity, twists and turns and protracted nature" of the process of multipolarization. And the formulation of multipolarity itself may have much less practical relevance to present reality than was previously believed. But Beijing still claims that multipolarization continues, as promoting multipolarization now means opposing a single country "acting unilaterally" and dictating international affairs.[19]

The Hegemon on the Offensive

American analysts disagree over whether there is a grand strategy guiding U.S. foreign policy after the cold war. While most American scholars agree that tendencies toward a strategy of primacy exist, they tend not to believe that the Clinton administration had a clearly defined grand strategy.[20] Instead, they argue that U.S. foreign policy overall has been characterized by contradictions, ambiguities, and inconsistencies. For example, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross contend that the Clinton administration adopted a hybrid strategy that combined elements of power aggrandizement, opportunistic maneuvers, and liberal impulse. Stephen Walt characterizes Clinton's strategy as that of a "half-hearted hegemon," "hegemony on the cheap," based on realpolitik calculation but under the rhetoric of global public good.[21] Inconsistencies in the U.S. strategic vision have prompted attempts to prioritize the U.S. national interest in the post-cold war era. But even those who try have to concede the extreme difficulty in sustaining a foreign policy based on a pre-determined priority of interests.[22]

Prescriptive analyses too reflect a wide range of views that fall in the whole spectrum between neoisolationism and unmitigated pursuit of global primacy.[23] Robert Art lists seven alternative strategies open for the United States—"dominion, global collective security, regional collective security, cooperative security, containment, isolationism, and selective engagement." He rejects ei-

20. The author, Wang Xiaodong, was an editor of the influential *Zhanlue yu Guanli* [Strategy and Management], a journal with backing from high-ranking Chinese civilian and military officials. First appearing in 1993, it became a major forum for nationalist views and bold strategic analyses. For more information, see Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Intellectuals' Quest for National Greatness and Nationalistic Writing in the 1990s," *China Quarterly* 152 (December 1997): 725–45.

[19] Xiao Feng, "Views on Some Hot-Spot Issues in International Situation" in *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, 20 December 1999, 1–5 in FBIS-China, 12 February 2000.

[20] There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Michael Mastanduno argues that the United States has "followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective—the preservation of the United States' preeminent global position." Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment," 51.

[21] Stephen M. Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (March/April 2000): 63–79.

[22] See, for example, Ashton B. Carter, "Adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs," *Survival* 41 (Winter 1999/2000): 101–123; Nye, "Redefining the National Interest."

[23] See Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21 (Winter 1996/97): 5–53.

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ther global domination or withdrawal, but prefers a strategy of selective engagement, by which the United States determines its international commitment based clearly on its priority of interests.[24] Barry Posen and Andrew Ross list four strategies—"neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and primacy," but express no preference as to which strategy best suits the United States.[25]

The foregoing sampling of views suffices to demonstrate the diversity in strategic descriptions and prescriptions in the United States. Strategic debate is to be expected in a democracy that wields such overwhelming power as the sole superpower sitting atop of the world. While the United States gropes for a coherent strategy, Chinese analysts attribute to it a highly cohesive master plan designed to strengthen and expand its global domination. By the mid-1990s, emerging consensus on the preponderance of U.S. power allowed and compelled Chinese analysts to pay closer attention to U.S. global strategy than ever before.[26] They took notice of the fact that the United States had experienced significant growth in its comprehensive national power in economic, scientific, technological, and military arenas. By contrast, throughout the 1990s, Japan, Russia, and to a lesser extent the European Union were mired in economic stagnation and had shown no determination to challenge the U.S. global position. This presents the United States with what Chinese analysts call a period of "strategic opportunity" to further enhance its international primacy. The Chinese commentators pointed to the continued increase in U.S. military spending, exceeding $305.4 billion in the 2001 fiscal year (FY), an increase of $16.5 billion over the previous year. In FY 1999, U.S. defense expenditure amounted to $276.2 billion, which was 1.67 times the combined military expenditures of the second-tier powers—Britain, Japan, France, Germany, Russia, and China. For Chinese observers, the U.S. intention in maintaining such a spectacularly high military expenditure was to ensure U.S. superiority over its potential competitors by a vast margin.[27]

From the Chinese perspective, the United States has taken advantage of this rare window of strategic opportunity "to step up its global strategic deployment," "to complete a global strategic layout" before other powers are prepared to balance the U.S. power. In the words of one Chinese analyst, "The United States will contain, besiege, and even launch preemptive military strikes

[24] Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," *International Security* 23 (Winter 1998/99): 79–113.

[25] Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions." For the isolationist strand of thinking, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," *International Security* 21 (Spring 1997): 5–48; Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22 (Summer 1997): 86–124.

[26] Jin Canrong, "The U.S. Global Strategy."

[27] Editorial, "Hegemonism Can Hardly Last Long After All," *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong) (Internet version-WWW), 10 February 2000, A2 in FBIS-China, 10 February 2000. These figures on the U.S. defense budget were reported by the Chinese news media.

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against any country which dares to defy the U.S. world hegemony or which has constituted a latent challenge to the United States. Among its main targets are a number of countries in Eurasia, including Russia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and China."[28] Chinese analysts invariably see the NATO expansion and its air war in Kosovo as designed to weaken and encircle Russia. The Kosovo war was to defeat the defiant Milosevic regime, remove an obstacle for NATO enlargement, and further encroach upon Russia's traditional sphere of influence. On the Asian front, the United States revitalized its security alliance with Japan, proceeded with the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) program, and maintained large forwardly deployed troops in the west Pacific to keep an eye on China.

After Kosovo, many Chinese commentators conclude that the United States has adopted an offensive-oriented, "neo-imperialist," "neo-interventionist" strategy geared toward expanding, perpetuating, and imposing its worldwide hegemony.[29] To them, this means that the United States has been highly inclined to interfere in other countries' domestic affairs, to use force if necessary, and to cynically manipulate international rules or institutions—at times flouting them outright, at other times seeking self-interest under the pretext of upholding world order. Missile defense would further abet U.S. unilateralism and offensive use of force.

According to Chinese analysts, the United States has advocated a view of "limited sovereignty" and human rights over-riding sovereignty. The ulterior motive is to justify its aggressive interference in other countries' domestic affairs, to demonize certain countries that defy its will, and ultimately to provide a pretext for power politics. In search for reasons to oppose U.S. hegemony, one Chinese scholar contends that the U.S.-dominated unipolarity by necessity threatens freedom. Just like domestic totalitarianism, an unchecked unipolar hegemony is prone to abusive power.[30] From Beijing's perspective, U.S. human rights policy toward China and its so-called humanitarian intervention over Kosovo in 1999 proved the danger of dictatorship by the U.S. democracy in the international arena.

Strategy analysts in China maintain that to pursue absolute supremacy, the United States has acted unilaterally and disregarded the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Missile Technology Control Regimes in an attempt to de-

[28] Wang Jincun, "New Changes in International Situations as Viewed from NATO's Aggressive War against Yugoslavia," *Qian Xian* (Beijing), 5 July 1999, 21–23 in FBIS-China, 9 August 1999, 2.

[29] Shi Yukun, "An Analysis of New Interventionism: Interviews with Researchers of the Academy of Military Sciences," *Zhong guo junshi kexue*, 20 May 1999 in FBIS-China, 2 August 1999; Peng Guangqian and Shen Fangwu, "'Humanitarian Intervention' Is Inhumane," *Zhongguo Guofang Bao*, 29 May 2000 in FBIS-China, 29 May 2000.

[30] Fang Ning, et al., *China's Road*; Wang Xiaodong, "On Liberalism and Hegemony," *Jianchuan Zhishi* (Internet version), 14 June 1999 in FBIS-China, 17 July 1999. American realist theorists seem to share this view with their Chinese counterparts. For example, Kenneth Waltz asks, "Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics?" His answer is: no. See his "Evaluating Theories," *American Political Science Review* 91 (December 1997): 915.

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velop its own national and theater missile defense. Ostensibly the U.S. missile defense is directed against "rogue countries," but the primary motive is to ensure absolute security against potential adversaries such as Russia and China, thereby to "acquire an absolute freedom of actions in the international affairs and to firmly establish its overlordship in the world."[31] As the United States now can act with impunity, it is more tempted to use coercive measures against other states. It has pursued a comprehensive, offensive neointerventionism that utilizes all means available, including the use of force to strengthen U.S. global domination. Suffering from a "Gulf War syndrome," the United States has lowered the threshold for the use of violence, launching high-tech wars against small countries that would incur few casualties to its own troops.[32]

Chinese commentators often use two ancient Chinese idioms to illustrate what they believe is U.S. cynicism toward international institutions. The first is *Xie Tianzi Yiling Zhuhou* (Hijack the emperor to order the dukes about in his name), which refers to the U.S. control of international organizations to legitimize its aggressive acts against other countries. The other phrase is *Zhi Xu Zhouguan Fanghuo, Buxu Baixing Diandeng* (The magistrates are free to burn down houses, while the common people are forbidden even to light lamps), which attacks the double standards in the U.S. approach to international principles. Chinese writers maintain that the United States has leveraged its normative power to set the agenda, weaken and isolate its adversaries, and mobilize international support for its policy of hegemonic control. All of U.S. hegemonic behavior is now undertaken in the name of achieving some global public good. Since the Kosovo war, even Chinese international relations scholars known for their previous liberal inclinations have pointed out that U.S. hegemony takes the traditional form of "gunboat policy," but also is manifested in its manipulation of international regulations, rules, and norms.[33]

In sum, Chinese commentators point to the American spectacularly high defense spending, strong tendency to use coercive measures in its foreign pol-

[31] Qian Ton, Li Mingjiang, "Sha Zukang Says ABM Treaty is Cornerstone for Global Strategic Balance and Stability," Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service, 8 June 2000 in FBIS-China, 8 June 2000; Zheng Yuan, "Egoism and Overbearing Attitude," *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily] (overseas edition), 7 July 2000, 7; "U.S. Nuclear Proliferation Threatens Global Security—Sha Zukang on Ways China Should Handle It, Stressing Needs to Ensure the Effectiveness of Retaliatory Capacity" in *Wen Wei Po*, (Hong Kong) 11 July 2000, A5 in FBIS-China, 11 July 2000.

[32] Pillsbury, *China Debates*, 45.

[33] Wang Yizhou, "A Warning Issued at the end of the Century," *Shijie Zhishi* (Beijing) 16 May 1999, 7–10 in FBIS-China, 23 June 1999; Wang Yizhou, "Warning at the End of the Century: Hegemonism Characterized by 'Human Rights Exceeding Sovereignty,'" *Liaowang*, no. 21, 24 May 1999, 3–6 in FBIS-China, 14 June 1999. Wang is vice-director, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. His earlier writings presumably represented the most respectable, albeit nascent liberal voice in the first half of the 1990s. His retreat from an earlier liberal orientation is illustrative of the collateral damage of the Kosovo war on China's overall liberal strain of international thinking. For a discussion of liberal-oriented ideas in China, see Yong Deng, "The Chinese Conception of National Interests in International Relations," *China Quarterly* 154 (June 1998): 308–29.

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icy, wanton disregard of international institutions and rules when deemed inconvenient, aggressive liberal agenda in promoting Western values, unilateral decisions to build a shield and spear through national and theater missile defense, growing control over high-tech information in the age of globalization, arrogant violations of other countries' sovereignty, unprovoked expansion of traditional alliances in Europe and Asia, determined containment of emerging powers, etc. The list adds up to a U.S. strategy of global domination similar to "the strategy of primacy" outlined by Posen and Ross and "a strategy of dominion" explained by Art. Few American analysts would argue that the United States is actually pursuing such a "maximal realist strategy."[34] But Chinese assessment sees the United States as a hegemon on the offensive for power aggrandizement.

Beijing's predilection to attribute to the United States a highly coherent global strategy bent on power expansion defines how Beijing perceives American China policy. Such a perception breeds a conspiratorial view, which in turn predisposes China to see ill intentions and sinister motives in every U.S. act. That's why it is almost universally believed in China that the NATO bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 was a deliberate, calculated attack to punish China's opposition to the war, to destabilize and humiliate China, and to probe Beijing's external reaction and domestic response to the outburst of nationalism that the bombing was bound to ignite.[35] Conspiratorial views explain why Chinese commentators believe the U.S. human rights concerns and humanitarianism in its foreign policy are nothing but camouflage for hegemony and brute power politics. Some Chinese analysts even warn that globalization itself is a "trap" set by the United States to keep China weak and to reinforce U.S. primacy.

The United States and China: Structural Conflict

Does the United States have a global strategy? After the cold war, American debate over U.S. global strategy is unsettled. Rather than guided by a coherent strategy, American China policy is often a result of domestic politics involving many actors, including Congress, interest groups, public opinion, Taiwan lobbies, and key personalities. The *Economist* flatly declared, after Tiananmen, "every American household seemed to have a China policy."[36] However, Chi-

[34] Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions."

[35] Fang Ning, et al., *China's Road*, 6; Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al., *Yaomo Hua Yu Meiti Hongzha* [Demonization and Media Bombardment] (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Press, 1999), 82–4.

[36] *Economist*, 22 May 1999, 95. For new dynamics in America's China policy after the cold war, see Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); David Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister," *China Quarterly* 139 (September 1994): 597–621; James Mann, *About Face* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall* (New York: A Century Foundation Book, 1999); Robert Sutter, *U.S. Policy Toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

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nese analysts clearly attribute a highly coherent, largely malign strategy to the United States. As the United States seeks to maintain its superior power position, it logically wants to contain a rising power like China. Seen in this light, the revitalization of the U.S.–Japan security alliance is evidently targeted primarily against China.[37] During the short period prior to the Taiwan crisis in 1995–1996, having survived the negative fallout of Tiananmen, China, with some trepidation acquiesced to the U.S. military presence in west Pacific. The United States appeared to be playing a stabilizing role to maintain regional peace, check Japanese power, and prohibit an arms race in East Asia.

But after the Taiwan crisis, China's strategic planners began to have second thoughts about their earlier assessment of the U.S. regional role. They feared that their worst nightmare could come true and that China might become the target of containment through a U.S.–led security alignment in Pacific Asia. Beijing has become increasingly worried about signs that the United States now may be abetting rather than checking Japanese remilitarization to limit rising Chinese power.[38] Beijing is particularly wary of TMD's impact on its national security, as such a regional missile defense umbrella would undermine its minimum nuclear deterrent capability and effectively encourage Japanese militarism.[39] Chinese strategists also worry that, even if Taiwan is presently not included in TMD, once the missile defense is in place, it can be easily extended to the island, effectively restoring a political and military alignment between the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.[40]

What is life like under U.S. hegemony? For Chinese strategy analysts, it is not pleasant, to say the least. They complain that Americans do not bother to appreciate China's concerns over domestic stability, economic growth, and national reunification. They are particularly frustrated by the apparent unfairness in American media reports on China, bordering on deliberate distortion, slandering or even demonizing of China.[41] For many Chinese analysts, the record shows that America does not respect China's vital security interest, particularly on Taiwan. Chinese commentators believe that one critical consideration behind the growing U.S. support for Taiwan is the strategic importance that the

[37] Chinese perception on this may be correct. Yoichi Funabashi has shown that the revision of U.S.–Japan security treaty in 1995–1996 clearly had China in mind. See his *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).

[38] Thomas Christensen, "China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23 (Spring 1999): 49–80.

[39] Shi Yukun, "An Analysis of Neo-interventionism"; Xu Xingci, "Theater Missile Defense Causes Trouble in East Asia," *Xiandai Bingqi*, 2 February 2000, 10–12 in FBIS-China, 17 April 2000.

[40] Thomas Christensen has argued against the inclusion of Taiwan under TMD for the "wrong" message that it would send to both Taipei and Beijing. See his "Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan's Security," *Orbis* 44 (Winter 2000): 79–90.

[41] Qingguo Jia, "Frustrations and Hopes: Chinese Perceptions of the Engagement Policy Debate in the U.S.," *Journal of Contemporary China* 10 (June 2001): 321–330. See also, Li Xiguang, Liu Kang, et al., eds., *Yaomohua Zhongguo de Beihou* [Behind the Demonization of China] (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1996); Li Xiguang, et al., *Demonization and Media.*

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United States attaches to it in containing China. The United States has played and will continue to play "the Taiwan card."[42] From the Chinese perspective, China has not challenged any U.S. critical interest, but this is not reciprocated with American sensitivity to China's vital security interests. At the international level, through its treatments of Iraq and Yugoslavia, the United States has demonstrated a strong tendency to use force to impose its will on other sovereign countries. Based on their experiences, many Chinese analysts ask: How can they expect a benevolent peace under U.S. hegemony?

Between 1992–1995, Chinese policy elites shared a view that their country's security environment was the best since the Opium War (1839–1842). But since 1995, sober assessment of its security environment started to set in. Frustration with a perceived U.S. containment strategy to deny China's entry into the great power club fueled anti-American nationalism. In May-June 1995, the influential *Chinese Youth Newspaper* conducted an unprecedentedly large-scale, truly nationwide readers' survey on how "Chinese Youth View the World." Among the over one-hundred thousand young respondents, 87.1 percent thought of America as the least friendly country to China; 57.2 percent rated America as their most disliked country; and at the same time, 74.1 percent deemed America as wielding the greatest influence on China.[43]

Popular anti-Americanism prevailed, effectively silencing and sidelining more objective analyses. Professional America watchers now emphasized that U.S.–China policy had an important element of containment.[44] Those anti-American sentiments reflected the public's emotional reactions at the time to the perceived American heavy-handedness on human rights, attempts aimed at obstructing China's national unification with Taiwan, rejection of China's membership in the World Trade Organization, denial of China's right to host the 2000 Olympic Games, and growing arrogance in its treatment of China. These perceptions fueled a public fear that, despite its avowed engagement policy, the United States was maliciously containing China. The leading architects

[42] This is a common view with little dissent in Chinese writings. See, for example, Li Jiaquan, "Cross-Strait Relations from the Perspective of Clinton's Visit to China," *Taisheng* [Taiwan Voices], August 1998, 10–11; Su Ge, "Sino-American Summits and the 'Strategic Partnership,'" *Shijie Zhengzhi Yu Jingji* [World Politics and Economics], August 1998, 20–23; Wang Haihan, "Thoughts on Present Developments and Prospects of Sino-American Relations," *Guoji Guancha* [International Survey] 4 (1998), 7–11; Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions" in Suisheng Zhao, ed., *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the United States* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 143.

[43] Yang Yusheng, *Zhongguoren De Meiguo Guan: Yige Lishi De Kaocha* [Chinese Views on America: A Historical Perspective] (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1996), 301–302. For a comprehensive discussion of the negative turn in the 1990s in Chinese popular perceptions of America from a largely positive image in the 1980s, see Ming Zhang, "Public Images of the United States" in Yong Deng and Feiling Wang, eds., *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), chap. 7.

[44] Philip C. Saunders, "China's America Watchers: Changing Attitudes Towards the United States," *China Quarterly* 161 (March 2000): 41–65.

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of this survey, Wang Xiaodong and Fang Ning, interpreted these anti-American feelings as a result of "U.S. pressures toward China–not just on the Chinese government, but on the Chinese nation as a collectivity."[45]

Has China defined its place under U.S. hegemony? The answer is no. That's why official media still insist that the trend in the world power configuration is multipolarization. For China's strategy analysts, the United States has attempted to build a post-cold war world order to exclude China at the expense of China's security interests. According to one authoritative account, China's own international strategy consists of the following: first, create a peaceful international environment so that China can concentrate on its economic development; second, bring about national reunification with Taiwan; third, "strengthen China's comprehensive national power to enhance the Chinese pole in a future multipolar world"; finally, build a new international political and economic order with less inequity of power and wealth between the rich and poor and a more rigid adherence to the principle of sovereignty.[46] Clearly, American and Chinese strategic interests do not always coincide; they conflict over Taiwan, over the vision of global order, and over views on the desirability of the existing international structure.

Both China and the United States support peace in the Asia-Pacific region. But they differ on what "peace" means and what a regional order in East Asia should look like. From Beijing's perspective, American's belief that regional security can only be maintained under U.S. unrivaled hegemony over East Asia—as manifested in its antagonism toward the rising China, forward military presence in the west Pacific, and traditional security bilateral alliances—conflicts with China's vital interests. Since the mid-1990s, China has increasingly seen U.S. military presence as less of a stabilizer and more as a threat to "China's [own] independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security," especially over Taiwan.[47] China's power aspiration in East Asia and its current territorial claims over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands are fundamentally at odds with the U.S.–led regional security structure.

After the Kosovo crisis, China's strategic analysts have become even more pessimistic about U.S.–China relations. Wang Weiguang of Beijing University recently argued that the success of China's economic reform and opening up to the outside world has moved China's critical national interests eastward toward its Pacific coastal regions. As a result, China is ever more vulnerable to threats in the forms of economic sanctions, naval blockade, and military challenge along China's coasts from "the United States and its military alliances in

[45] Fang Ning, et al., *China's Road*, 94.

[46] Gao Jindian, *Introduction to International Strategy*, 321–23.

[47] Chu Shulong, "Bilateral and Regional Strategic and Security Relationship between China and the United States after the Cold War," *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, 20 May 2000, No. 5, 7–14 in FBIS-China, 1 June 2000.

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the Asia-Pacific."[48] Chu Shulong, chair of the Division of North American Studies at one of China's leading think tanks, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argues that the two countries fundamentally differ over issues concerning the architecture of the post-cold war global order, the continued relevance of sovereignty, the emerging role of the UN and NATO, the legitimate use of force, and the place of humanitarian interventionism in world politics.[49]

Strategic rivalry will likely increase with the ascension of Chinese power. Yan Xuetong, former director of CICIR's Center for Foreign Policy Studies, contends that after incorporating and coopting Japan and Europe and weakening Russia, by the mid-1990s the United States had begun to view China as a primary potential strategic adversary. If "the U.S. strategic pressure on China in the 1990s was mainly political, in the next ten years, the United States may possibly exert more military pressure on China. . . . Regardless of who is in power in the United States, the strategic element of encircling and containing China will not diminish." Sino-American conflict is "structural," as China is on the rise and the United States wants to maintain its unipolar dominance. China and the United States clash on virtually every level—strategic, political, and economic, as well as over global institutional designs. Among all the great power relationships, the U.S.–China one is by far the most conflictual, twice as much as the next most tension-ridden U.S.–Russia relations.[50]

These Chinese perceptions underscore the structural conflict driving the U.S.–China relationship, which is characterized by competitive power politics wherein the logic of security dilemma and relative gains still prevails. The vital security interests defined by the two sides are fundamentally at odds with each other at bilateral, regional, and global levels. None of these conflicts is amenable to an easy solution; all have a tendency to escalate as the power distribution shifts in China's favor. Such strategic antagonism imposes significant limitations on functional cooperation between China and the United States. The countries may share some interest in "certain specific issues or in certain realms such as trade, environmental protection, cracking down on terrorists' activities and international crimes, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."[51] But without relatively stable mutual strategic understandings, differences in these issue areas, where high cooperative potential exists, can easily escalate.

[48] Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options—China's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy toward the United States," *Zhanlue yu Guanli*, 1 June 2000 in FBIS-China, 23 June 2000.

[49] See Huangpu Pinglun, "Sino-U.S. Relations: Today and Tomorrow," *Liaowang*, 8 May 2000, 54–55 in FBIS-China, 15 May 2000.

[50] Ibid.; Yan Xuetong, "China's Strategic Security Environment," *Shijie Zhishi*, 1 February 2000, No. 3, 8–9, 10 in FBIS-China, 16 February 2000; "Post-Cold War Continuity," *Zhanlue yu Guanli*, 1 June 2000, 58–66 in FBIS-China, 23 June 2000. After carefully reviewing Chinese military analysts' assessment of China's security environment, David Shambaugh also concludes that there is rising "strategic competition" between China and the United States. See his "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," *International Security* 24 (Winter 1999/2000): 52–79.

[51] Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options."

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HESITANT BALANCER: BEIJING'S RESPONSE TO U.S. HEGEMONY

In American international relations literature, balancing is understood to be a state's attempt, either by relying on its own capabilities or alliance with others, to dislodge the position of the preponderant power. Bandwagoning refers to a state joining the most powerful side. For Kenneth Waltz, balance of power is certain to recur so long as international relations remain an anarchic, self-help system wherein rational nation-states regard survival as the highest value.[52] Consequently, "in international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to balance against it."[53] Many critics of the Waltzian structural realism take issue with its exclusive focus on the distribution of power as the sole independent structural variable to explain states' behavior and its law-like statement that states always balance predominant power. They argue that diplomacy, policy elites' perceptions and calculations, and domestic factors drive the state's response to predominant power, sometimes more than does the structural pressure to balance.[54]

Some critics may have gone too far in discounting the structural pressure. Waltz insightfully calls our attention to the tendency that "structures shape and shove" driving states to balance predominant power.[55] But nonstructural factors do lessen or strengthen, sharpen or modify structural pressure. Structural forces alone cannot explain the vastly different reactions of Europe, Russia, Japan, and China to U.S. power after the cold war. In assessing Chinese response to U.S. hegemony, one must recognize the potency of structural pressures for China to balance. One must also consider how Chinese strategists' and leadership's calculation and assessment of their policy options, their domestic concerns, and the U.S. threat shaped China's response to U.S. unipolarity.

According to conventional alliance theories, China could opt to join the U.S. side to bandwagon with the predominant power. But Chinese strategists and policy makers have long rejected this option as unrealistic and unpalatable. Apart from the intractable conflict in interest and lack of strategic foundation in Sino-American relations, another explanation has to do with the novel post-cold war distribution of power. From the Chinese perspective, North America, the European powers, and Japan have coalesced into a grand alliance underpinned by common political values and foreign policy outlook as well as

[52] See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, "Evaluating Theories," and "Structural Realism." See also Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment." For a summary of realist views on why balance of power recurs, see Michael Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), chap. 5.

[53] Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 916.

[54] For a critique of structural realism and review of literature along this line, see John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *American Political Science Review* 91 (December 1997): 899–912.

[55] Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," 915.

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shared interests.[56] Jin Junhui, for example, writes, the United States has led the way to "build up a new world order guided by the Western values with the alliance formed with the United States and other developed nations in the West at the core."[57] There is now a rough congruence of economic, political, military, and normative frameworks shared by a cluster of Western powers. Consequently, aligning with the United States does not seem just to entail a shift of alliance policy, but a sea change in China's foreign policy outlook, state character, and national self-identity, which China is not ready to embrace. Moreover, from the Chinese perspective, judgment of such in-group identity is as uncertain as it is arbitrary.

Given China's growing objection to U.S. hegemony, conventional balance-of-power theories would expect vigorous balancing from Beijing. Indeed, China's latest defense white paper, "China's National Defense in 2000," declares that in response to U.S. "neo-interventionist," "neo-gunboat policy" and the fact that the prospect of peaceful reunification with Taiwan "is seriously imperiled, China will have to enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty and security by military means."[58] After the cold war, China has not just rolled over in face of what is perceived as step-by-step U.S. encroachment upon China's strategic breathing space. Rather, it has made attempts to balance against the United States. Beijing has taken omnidirectional initiatives to cultivate new ties in Asia and beyond to improve its security environment, to ward off threats, and to protect its critical interests. It hopes that other powers—Japan, Europe, Russia, and even Third World countries—would rise to help curb U.S. power and move the world toward greater multipolarization. Since the Gulf War in 1991, internal balancing has taken the form of higher priority being given to defense modernization than in the 1980s through foreign acquisitions and indigenous production. Beijing is also preoccupied with improvement of its domestic institutions and economy essential to shore up sagging legitimacy of the party-state and to strengthen its comprehensive national power.

Forging strategic ties with Russia represents Beijing's most important step directly aimed at balancing against the United States. According to Yan Xuetong,

[56] See Wang Yizhou, "Rethinking the Kosovo Crisis," *Renmin Ribao* (Internet version-WWW), 23 May 2000 in FBIS-China, 23 March 2000; Li Bin, "China's Security Environment in the Early 2000s," *Beijing Review* (Internet version-WWW), No. 2, 10 January 2000 in FBIS-China, 13 January 2000. Western scholars have similarly argued that since the cold war, power is determined by material and ideational factors. For a vision of post-cold war international power redistribution based on values, see John Goldgeir and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992): 467–91. In the context of Chinese foreign policy, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy" in Samuel S. Kim, ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).

[57] Jin Junhui, "Overcome Obstructions and Constantly Push Forward Sino-U.S. Relations," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* No. 3 (July 1999), 26-29, 30 in FBIS-China, 5 August 1999, 5.

[58] The Information Office of China's State Council, "China's National Defense in 2000," Beijing Xinhua in English, 16 October 2000 in FBIS-China, 16 October 2000.

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"Chinese and Russian leaders reached a consensus in 1994 on opposing U.S. hegemony" through a "strategic cooperative partnership," which was officially started two years later.[59] Russia has been the most important source of Beijing's high-tech arms acquisitions. Both China and Russia are opposed to NATO expansion, U.S. national and theater missile defense programs, and the NATO air war in Kosovo. They both advocate "multipolarization of world politics," support each other's policy in defending territorial integrity (Chechnya for Russia, Taiwan for China), and share a commitment to crack down on "ethnic separatism, international terrorism, religious radicalism, and transnational crimes" in central Asia.[60]

Up to the mid-1990s, Beijing's multipolar diplomacy had focused on the "great powers" (the European Union, Russia, and Japan) to bring about a more dispersed distribution of power. Beijing has since realized the limitations of its great power diplomacy and the impracticability of swift multipolarization in terms of the distribution of material, hard power. Now Beijing quietly but determinedly expends more diplomatic resources on building ties in the Third World to promote greater pluralism and relativism in terms of nonmaterial, soft power. In Beijing's calculations, its solidarity with some of the smaller countries would help curb the U.S. neoimperialist unilateralism and the U.S. attempt to impose its own values and standards on other countries.

These initiatives notwithstanding, Beijing has not opted for an all-out, comprehensive balancing strategy against the United States. Its balancing has been hesitant, low-key, and inconsistent. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping put forth a *Taoguang Yanghui* strategy, which roughly means that China must lie low, "conceal capacities and bide our time."[61] In the early 1990s, the Chinese leadership put in place a nonconfrontational guideline regarding China's America policy. In that spirit, post-cold war Chinese foreign relations, pattern of military expenditures, and policies toward the United States do not indicate a determined Beijing aiming to comprehensively balance against U.S. hegemony. Even the generally more aggressive PLA has not actually matched its rhetorical attack against U.S. hegemony with actual arms buildups or belligerent foreign behavior.[62]

Since the mid-1990s, China has publicly identified itself to be a cooperative, peaceful, and responsible power, and Beijing has taken such an image quite

[59] Yan, "Post-Cold War Continuity," 6.

[60] *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*, overseas edition], 19 July 2000.

[61] Deng Xiaoping personally intervened to rein in hardliners' advocacy of an aggressive nationalist foreign policy in the aftermath of Tiananmen. See Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," *China Quarterly* 142 (June 1995): 295–316. For an interpretation of Deng Xiaoping's lie-low strategy, see Wang Taiping, ed., *Deng Xiaoping Waijiao Shixiang Yanjiu Lunwenji* [An Anthology of Papers on Deng Xiaoping's Thinking on Diplomacy] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1996).

[62] Johnston, "International Structures," 60–65; Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World."

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seriously in its foreign policy.[63] The main reason for the shift is that the United States had insisted that China could be treated as a great power only if and when it acted responsibly. Moreover, the earlier lie-low strategy seemed overly defensive, while a self-identity as a responsible power sounds more assertive and proactive in constructively safeguarding China's national interests. Chinese policy elites never specify what "responsibility" means. Clearly, China and the United States differ vastly over the meaning of international responsibility. For example, the United States disputes the Chinese belief that it is both its right and responsibility to reunify with Taiwan even with the use of force and to maintain domestic stability even by resorting to a political iron fist if necessary. China no doubt questions the U.S. claim that the war against Yugoslavia and continued coercion against Iraq were for the global public good of humanitarianism and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In any case, these differences do not matter for Beijing, as rhetorical identification as a responsible power constitutes a scheme to defuse the "China threat" so that China does not become the target. Like its lie-low strategy, protestations of responsibility represent Beijing's nonconfrontational approach to U.S. hegemony.

No serious analysts in China advocate a confrontational policy toward, or "edging away from," the United States.[64] In fact, they believe "avoiding military confrontation with the United States conforms with China's long-term strategic security interests."[65] Even on the most sensitive Taiwan issue, Beijing has not sought a military confrontation. The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis did not reflect Beijing's attempt to provoke the United States. The war game was intended to send a strong message to deter Taiwan independence. Chinese military and civilian leaders did not anticipate such a potent U.S. naval presence in response to Beijing's missile firings.[66] China has since focused its military strategy on Taiwan, which Beijing considers as an internal affair, a rightful self-defense of territorial integrity. Its goal is to prevent the United States from abandoning the one-China principle and Taiwan from establishing de jure independence.

As Randall Schweller reminds us, "Balancing is an extremely costly activity that most states would rather not engage in, but sometimes must to survive and protect their values."[67] Given the overwhelming U.S. power, one would expect

[63] Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., *China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).

[64] According to conventional, realist understanding, "edging away" from the hegemon is an important part of balancing. The quoted term is Kenneth Waltz's and is discussed thoroughly in Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment."

[65] Yan Xuetong, *Zhongguo Guojia Liyi Fengxi* [Analysis of China's National Interests] (Tianjin: People's Press, 1996), 158.

[66] For Beijing's calculations, see Suisheng Zhao, *Across the Strait.* For Beijing's surprise at U.S. response, see Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, 370–73.

[67] Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances," *American Political Science Review* 91 (December 1997): 929.

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that China would be more tempted to balance only if the costs and dangers of doing so can be shared by reliable and strong allies. Thus Beijing's assessment of its potential allies impinges on its strategic choice vis-à-vis the United States.

From the Chinese perspective, Beijing's alliance options are much more limited after the cold war than under the previous bipolar system under which it could ally with one superpower against the other. China is well aware of the limitations of its ties with Russia. For one, strategic cooperation rests on a shaky economic foundation: despite political attempt to solidify economic ties, Sino-Russian trade through the rest of the 1990s hovered below the level of U.S.$7.7-billion registered in 1993. Even though trade picked up in 2000, reaching the record volume of U.S.$8billion, it still fell well short of the target U.S.$20billion by the year 2000 set in the mid-1990s by Presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin. During 1993–1995, Beijing tried to play its market card to pit the European Union against the United States in a few high-profile business deals, particularly involving the purchase of Airbuses from European companies. It soon became clear that China could do little to undermine the overwhelming concentration of power with the U.S.–led global center. None of the secondary powers could be counted on to robustly balance U.S. power.

After the cold war, while having to contend with the U.S. hegemonic threat, the Chinese Communist party-state confronts probably even more dire threats that stem from domestic difficulties in maintaining economic reform, political legitimacy, and social stability. Besides, in Beijing's views, China's external security and international status ultimately rely on a secure domestic base and a more developed economy. China's ability to play its market card to compensate for its political-military vulnerabilities hinges upon a healthy economy. Thus "the Chinese government insists that economic development be taken as the center, while defense work be subordinate to and in the service of the nation's overall economic construction." Through an integrated approach, China's defense industries and technologies strengthen its economy, which in turn enhances national defense.[68] In the post-cold war era, not to lose out on the international competition, China must enhance its comprehensive national power in which economic and technical prowess take the center stage.

The 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis and 1999 Kosovo war further underscored the importance to its security of keeping its own house in order. Several Chinese analysts have noted that the financial disaster in Indonesia was no less destructive than the NATO war against FRY. The Kosovo war heightened Chinese fear of a U.S. threat. But it also strengthened Beijing's commitment to reform its economy, maintain domestic stability, prevent ethnic, religious, and human rights problems from becoming an excuse for external intervention, and enhance comprehensive national power that includes greater loyalty to the party-state. These are daunting, if not impossible tasks, for the communist party-state.[69]

[68] The Information Office of China's State Council, "China's National Defense in 2000."

[69] For discussions of Beijing's challenge in balancing these conflictual domestic agenda, see Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms* (Cambridge,

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According to Beijing's calculations, confrontational balancing against the United States would be counterproductive and would only isolate China. Thus U.S. unquestioned dominance in maritime power has persuaded Beijing to stay away from an aggressive armament program in augmenting its blue-water naval power.[70] Similarly, despite fear of superpower nuclear blackmail that the U.S. theater and national missile defense could incur on China,[71] Beijing has so far forsworn engaging in a full-scale arms race with the United States. Chinese strategy analysts have warned not to fall into the trap of an arms race set by some hostile forces in America to destroy China.[72]

To avoid an outright containment policy pursued by the United States and its allies, China could pursue its own policy that eschews confrontation. For most Chinese analysts, the United States has made strategic readjustments directed against Russia and China, but has also sought engagement to assure the two countries. Although China must be alert to the ominous trends of U.S. hegemony, the U.S. strategy is still somewhat in evolution. An "all-round confrontation" of cold war-style containment against China is unlikely and is not at all inevitable.[73] After all, the United States still opposes Taiwan unilaterally pushing for de jure independence.

In sum, China has not engaged in vigorous and consistent balancing intended to dethrone the U.S. hegemonic power, thanks to the lack of strong allies, inadequate capacities, preoccupation with domestic improvement, and the immeasurable costs of confrontation with the United States. As one Chinese scholar puts it, its limited capacity means that China only poses "a challenge to the U.S. ability to administer hegemonism, not to its hegemonic position."[74] China's internal and external balancing is geared to protecting its core security interests, while refraining from unduly antagonizing the United States. Beijing has engaged in nonconfrontational balancing by forging a strategic partnership with Russia, in diffuse balancing by cultivating new ties in Asia and beyond, and in long-term balancing by enhancing comprehensive national power.

MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Minxin Pei, "Will China Become Another Indonesia?" *Foreign Policy* 116 (Fall 1999): 94–109.

[70] Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," *International Security* 23 (Spring 1999): 81–118.

[71] For Beijing's fear of nuclear blackmail by the superpowers during the cold war, see John Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 70–74; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). For Beijing's fear in the context of the latest U.S. missile defense, see Michael McDevitt, "Beijing's Bind," *Washington Quarterly* 23 (Summer 2000): 177–86.

[72] Lu Ren, "Can China Be Dragged Down into Collapse by $60 Billion?" *Jiefangjun Bao* (Internet version-WWW), 28 June 2000, 9 in FBIS-China, 28 June 2000. Some Chinese analysts argue that the downfall of the former Soviet Union was due to the U.S. "strategic misdirection," by which Moscow was "tricked" into an arms race that ultimately bankrupted its economy. Similarly, in order to find an excuse to attack Iraq, the United States "lured Sadam into invading Kuwait" by signaling to Iraq that its invasion would not incur U.S. intervention. See Pillsbury, *China Debates*, xlv, xlvi.

[73] Xiao Feng, "Views on Some Hot-Spot Issues"; Yang Chenxu, "It Is Possible to Keep the Peaceful Environment for the Next Ten Years," *Liaowang*, 22 May 2000, no. 21, 22, 23 in FBIS-China, 31 May 2000.

[74] Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options," 11.

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Conclusion: Negative Strategic Cooperation and Peaceful Change

China has not engaged in a sustained, all-out balancing against the United States despite Beijing's growing discontent with the U.S. global strategy. Balancing may escalate when China attains enough material strength to rival that of the United States or when strong allies become available. Neither seems likely to happen any time soon. Of immediate concern is that if Beijing is convinced that the United States has adopted a systematic containment strategy against China by explicitly supporting Taiwan independence, completely neutralizing China's minimum nuclear deterrent, or unambiguously rearming Japan, structural pressure will be reinforced for China to balance. Beijing vows to go to war to prevent the "loss" of Taiwan. Although Beijing has stated that it won't form an alliance with any other country and has no intention to engage in a nuclear arms race to counter the U.S. missle defense, it also makes it clear that it won't "sit idle" (*zuo shi*) to allow its nuclear deterrent to be threatened. Despite hesitation, China may be compelled to embark on an arms race to counter U.S. missile defense programs, particularly if TMD mutates into a pretext for Japanese remilitarization or for the creation of a de facto U.S.–Japan–Taiwan security alliance.

As the foregoing analysis shows, fear that the United States is increasingly leaning toward containing China has been on the rise after the cold war, particularly since Kosovo. Within China's policy and scholarly circles, the credibility of the nonconfrontational approach is increasingly being questioned, as it has apparently failed to improve China's overall security and reduce tensions in Sino-American relations. From the Chinese perspective, the Russian case is illustrative. One Chinese analyst writes: "Although Russia has attempted to pursue a strategy of joining the Western world, it failed to win the latter's confidence. Instead, it has been treated as a potential opponent of the Western world."[75] Even if China continues to behave responsibly, the U.S. sense of cultural superiority and "potential racial exclusionism" may have predisposed the United States to view China, "a non-Western power," as a threat.[76]

There are growing signs that Chinese commentators are contemplating various approaches deviant from the nonconfrontational policy toward the United States. After the Kosovo war, many strategy analysts have questioned Deng Xiaoping's theory enunciated in the 1980s that peace and development are the twin dominant themes of contemporary international politics. They argue that war may not be as remote a possibility as was previously believed.[77] Extreme

[75] Yao Youzhi, "U.S. Strategic Orientation."

[76] Niu Jun, "China and the United States—A Very Particular Bilateral Relationship" in *Shijie Zhishi*, 1 February 2000, 30–32 in FBIS-China, 16 February 2000; Wang Xiaodong and Fang Ning express similar views in their *China's Road*; Shan Min, "What Is the United States Intending to Do with Its China Security Strategy," *Liaowang*, 30 April 2001, no. 18, 31 in FBIS-China, 30 April 2001.

[77] He Fang, "Revisiting the Theory on the Era of Peace and Development," *Taipingyang Xuebao* [Pacific Journal], June 2000, 3–9.

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views have advocated a more offensive-oriented Chinese response on military and political fronts rejecting international rules, laws, and norms, which are controlled by and serve the strong.[78]

For mainstream realist theory, states balance predominant power because unchecked power is prone to abuse and overextention; and secondary states by necessity feel threatened by any concentration of power in a state-of-war, anarchic world.[79] This logically leads to a belief in the inevitability of conflict accompanying major shifts in the distribution of power, a view undergirding containment policy prescriptions against China in the United States. Neorealist perspectives usefully highlight the danger of escalating hostility driven by the structural pressure for balancing and counter-balancing. They rightly reject simplistic liberal beliefs that engaging China through international institutions and economic ties will automatically bring about a democratic and peaceful China.

But neither does this mean we should embrace a doomsday view of the China threat. E. H. Carr, who was widely credited as one of the first and foremost theorists in the academic discipline of international relations to treat power as the centerpiece of inquiry, also believed that "changes in the equilibrium of political forces" can be managed with an "alternative device of war." Such a mechanism of peaceful change lies in a regularized, mutually accepted procedure whereby necessary bargaining, negotiation, and "conciliation would come to be regarded as a matter of course, and the threat of force, while never formally abandoned, recede further and further into the background."[80] Carr also reminded us over half a century ago, peaceful change under the "bargaining process can be enforced only by the power of the complainant."[81] The morality of peaceful change rings ever more true now in the nuclear age. To bring about peaceful change, it is imperative to take seriously neorealism's warning of the structural pressure for balancing and counterbalancing. It is equally important to heed Carr's advice that the dominant power can bring its influence to bear in peacefully managing changes in power relations.

The preceding analysis underscores that peace cannot last if the United States and China cannot arrive at a mutual accommodation at the strategic level. The importance of managing Sino-American strategic relations could not be more dramatically demonstrated by the 1995–1996 Taiwan crisis. Strategic conflict between the United States and China stems from both a mutual perceptual gap and genuine differences in interests. Vast power asymmetry in this bilateral relationship is compounded by Beijing's perpetual victim consciousness,

[78] For a sampling of these views, see Zhang Ming, "War without Rules," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December 1999, 16–18; Fang Ning et al., *China's Road*; Staff Reporter, "Unrestricted War," *Liaowang*, 13 March 2000, No. 11, 55–56 in FBIS-China, 22 March 2000.

[79] For Waltz's latest restatement of these propositions, see his "Structural Realism."

[80] Edward H. Carr [1946, 2nd ed.], *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939* (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1961), chap. 13. The quotes are from 214, 219.

[81] Ibid., 218.

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thereby generating a dynamic for conflict escalation.[82] As China grows stronger, it becomes more imperative to diminish Beijing's dissatisfaction with U.S. hegemony. To reverse the logic of structural pressure to balance, secondary powers like China must be convinced that "any geopolitical challenge to the United States is futile."[83] Meanwhile, the United States can help lessen the structural pressure by defusing Beijing's fear of U.S. containment through strategic dialogue and necessary policy adjustments.

The structural conflict highlighted in the foregoing analysis effectively belies any pretense of a strategic partnership between China and the United States. But if nothing else, the two countries can still rest their relationship on "negative strategic cooperation," insofar as they share a common interest in preventing war with each other.[84] For Carr, it is exactly such a shared commitment in averting a mutually destructive military showdown that makes it possible for both sides to seek peaceful adjustments and changes sufficient to manage structural conflict.*

[82] In this light China's opposition to the U.S. missile defense can be better understood. One leading Chinese arms control expert contended, China's minimum nuclear deterrent arsenal means that "Even if the United States says the system is not aimed at China, the capability is aimed at China." Quoted in Erik Eckholm, "What America Calls A Defense China Calls an Offense," *New York Times*, 2 July 2000.

[83] Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," 40.

[84] On "negative strategic cooperation," see Wang Weiguang, "Predicament and Options"; Yan Xuetong, "Post-Cold War Continuity."

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Family Homelessness in New York City: A Case Study

RALPH NUNEZ

Much has been said of the prosperous times and unprecedented growth that our nation has enjoyed over the last few years. New York City was no stranger to these good times, surpassing the nation in job growth and benefitting from lower crime rates. Yet there is increasing inequality of incomes and a widening gap between the rich and the poor. This tale of two cities is nothing new. In New York City and other urban areas around the world, extreme poverty and extreme wealth have always coexisted. What has changed is the scope of the problem. As New York City approaches welfare time limits, family homelessness is exploding. Today, the city's family shelter system is at capacity. Over 16,000 men, women, and children spend their nights in shelters on a regular basis. Another 500 families crowd into the Department of Homeless Services' Emergency Assistance Unit (EAU) each evening awaiting placement in shelter. Sometimes, their wait can be days or even weeks.

In light of these facts, the Institute for Children and Poverty performed a survey of 350 families, including over 600 children, living in shelters in New York City. What surfaces is not a story of two cities, but of two children—one with a prosperous and bright future, the other with poor health, sporadic education, and little social stability. With a rising number of families becoming homeless over the past twenty years—a 500 percent increase since 1980—the latter child's story has become the poverty standard (see Figure 1).

Prelude to Homelessness: The History of Homeless Parents

The story of a homeless child begins with the story of his or her parent. Homeless children today are typically raised by a single mother who receives no support from the child's father.[1] She is twenty-seven, eight years younger than the

[1] Institute for Children and Poverty, *Multiple Families: Multiplying Problems* (New York: Institute for Children and Poverty, 2000), 1.

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FIGURE 1
The Increase in Number of Homeless Families in New York City: 1980–2004 Projection



Source: NYC Department of Homeless Services

From 1980 to 2001, there has been a 500 percent increase in the number of homeless families residing in New York City shelters. In 1998, what appears to be a drop in family homelessness is, in fact, a result of stricter eligibility requirements. There were still record numbers of families living doubled-up with friends or relatives. In fact, the numbers have again begun to rise, increasing 10 percent in the last year. If this trend continues, by 2004, there will be close to 8,000 homeless families in New York City each day.

typical homeless parent a decade ago.[2] In all likelihood she is unemployed, and is almost as likely to have completed high school as not. She may also be one of the 47 percent of homeless parents who report a history of abuse. She has probably been receiving public assistance as her primary source of income—84 percent are currently receiving welfare and 57 percent have relied on it for more than one year. She is also likely to have had her benefits reduced or cut in the last year; 52 percent have had their welfare benefits reduced or cut, 42 percent have had their food stamps reduced or cut, and 27 percent have had their Medicaid benefits reduced or cut in the last year (see Figure 2). Strikingly, of those losing benefits, 21 percent became homeless as a result. Ten percent reported finding a job as a result of welfare reductions, yet less than half of those individuals (40 percent) are still working (see Figure 3).

Many homeless parents can probably sympathize with their child's early exposure to the social service system: 8 percent of homeless parents were homeless as children themselves and 13 percent were in foster care (see Table 1). Eleven percent of these parents have remained linked to the foster care system—they currently have at least one of their own children living in foster care or with a friend or family.

[2] Institute for Children and Poverty, *The New Poverty* (New York: Institute for Children and Poverty, 1992), 3.

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FIGURE 2
Percent of Homeless Parents Whose Public Assistance Benefits Have Been Reduced or Cut in the Last Year



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty

Different Families, Different Stories

The Working Homeless

The story of the typical homeless family in New York City does not provide the complete picture. There are segments of the population who have very different histories. For example, 15 percent of the homeless population is em-

FIGURE 3
Impact of Benefit Reductions on Homeless Parents



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty

One-fifth of parents who had their benefits reduced or cut in the last year report becoming homeless as a result, while only 10 percent report finding a job as a result. Of those who report becoming employed, less than half are currently working.

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TABLE 1

Homeless Parent Profile

Gender		**Education Level**	
Female	97%	≥High school	48%
Race		**Employment**	
African American	59%	Currently employed	15%
Hispanic	32%	**Public Assistance**	
Other	9%	Currently receiving welfare	84%
Average Age	27 yrs.	**Social Indicators**	
≤21 Years	23%	Foster care as a child	13%
Marital Status		Homeless as a child	8%
Single	88%	**Average Time Homeless**	9 mos.
Average No. of Children	2	**Homeless More than Once**	33%
			N=350

ployed. In comparison to unemployed homeless parents, those who are employed were significantly less likely to be welfare recipients (67 percent vs. 88 percent). Moreover, these employed parents cannot be characterized as long-term welfare dependents: 40 percent have received welfare for less than one year. Instead, they appear to have moved rapidly from stability to homelessness and public assistance.

In addition to a relatively short history of welfare receipt, working homeless families were more likely to have completed high school than were their unemployed counterparts (65 percent vs. 45 percent). Working homeless parents were also more likely to have been living in their own apartment or house (54 percent vs. 39 percent) and were 53 percent more likely than unemployed parents to have been living in the same residence for more than one year prior to becoming homeless (75 percent vs. 49 percent) (see Figure 4). By all accounts, they do not appear to differ significantly from other low-income working families. The question then becomes, why are they homeless?

The answer to this question may lie in welfare reductions. Sixty-nine percent of working homeless families report that they had at least one of their public assistance benefits cut in the last year. Compared to unemployed homeless parents, they were significantly more likely to have faced benefit reductions or cuts (69 percent vs. 60 percent). Not surprisingly, 44 percent of families report that their public assistance benefits were cut or reduced because of their employment. The logic of welfare reform is that employment earnings should replace families' public assistance benefits. However, rather than gradually making a transition to independence, many working homeless parents lost the support systems that they needed to maintain their families. Their new wages are not enough to sustain them. On average, employed homeless parents earn only $200 per week, or $10,400 per year, holding them well below the poverty

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FIGURE 4
Differences in Stability Indicators Between Working and Non-Working Homeless Families



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty

line for a family of three ($14,150).[3] Rather than achieving the self-sufficiency that welfare reform demands, these working families became homeless.

Younger Parents

Nothing more clearly exhibits the ill effects of foster care and homelessness on a child's life than an examination of the youngest members of the adult homeless population. Those who are twenty-one years of age or younger are three times as likely as those who are over twenty-one to have been homeless as a child (see Figure 5). In fact, these parents are young enough to have been swept up in the rising tide of homelessness in the early 1980s. For them, coming to a shelter is like coming home.

Additionally, homeless parents twenty-one years of age or younger are twice as likely to have a history of foster care (14 percent vs. 7 percent). Their early acquaintance with the shelter system is easily explained. Parents who were in foster care as children were less likely to have lived independently prior to becoming homeless (30 percent vs. 43 percent), and even though they are younger than the average homeless parent, they are significantly more likely

[3] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *The 2000 HHS Poverty Guidelines* (Washington, DC, 2000).

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FIGURE 5

Percent of Homeless Parents Experiencing Homelessness as Children by Age Group



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty

Young heads-of-household were more likely to have experienced homelessness as children.

than those who have no history of foster care to have been homeless more than once (50 percent vs. 31 percent). These parents have moved from a group home for youth in the foster care system to a group home for adults in the shelter system. In short, a childhood history of homelessness and foster care becomes a strong predictor of homelessness later in life.

A Child's Road to Shelter

Before they found themselves at the doors of the EAU, homeless children in New York City had been traveling the road to homelessness for some time. Prior to their current residence, over half of homeless families (56 percent) lived with friends or relatives, sleeping on couches or floors and trying to carve out a normal life in a crowded space (see Figure 6). When an argument inevitably ensued, they were forced to piece together new accommodations. In fact, over half of those who lived doubled-up (55 percent) left their last residence because of overcrowding or disagreements.

Another 42 percent of families lived in their own apartment or house before becoming homeless. These families were twice as likely as those who were living doubled-up to be employed (20 percent vs. 12 percent) and less likely to have experienced frequent moves (67 percent vs. 79 percent)—both indicators of stability. However, their lives are filled with their own struggles to remain independent, such as trying to piece together enough income and benefits to make ends meet. Ultimately, 49 percent left their homes because they were unable to pay rent or were evicted. The road to homelessness is marked by frequent moves and long periods of time living in shelters. Whereas the typical

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FIGURE 6
Homeless Families' Previous Living Situation



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty

family in America moves once every six years, the typical homeless family in New York City moves twice every year.[4] And one third of the families (35 percent) relocated three or more times in the last year. As for the children, on average, they are homeless nine months at a time, or an entire school year, and one third (33 percent) have been homeless at least once before.

The nomadic life that results from homelessness has a dramatic effect on homeless families. In the parent's struggle to obtain the necessities—shelter, food, and clothing—a child's emotional, physical, and educational needs are neglected. What is worse, these children are situated to repeat the same cycle of poverty and homelessness that traps their parents.

The Homeless Child's Failing Health

Whereas a sick child living in prosperity would be taken to his or her family doctor when ill, a homeless child is afforded no such luxury. Instead, homeless children receive sporadic care—usually in an emergency room or clinic—and almost no preventive care. This occurs despite the fact that they are likely to have serious illnesses that require consistent treatment, to be sick more often since becoming homeless, to have their poor health exacerbated by hunger and poor nutrition after becoming homeless, and to have been born under conditions that encourage illness. Compounding these facts, they may have experienced Medicaid cuts. One-fifth of homeless parents in New York City (20 percent) report that their children go to emergency rooms for medical care and

[4] Sheridan Bartlet, "The Significance of Relocation for Chronically Poor Families in the USA," *Environment and Urbanization* 9 (April 1997):122.

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FIGURE 7
Where Homeless Families Seek Medical Care



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty

another 53 percent go to walk-in clinics (see Figure 7). This occurs in spite of homeless children in New York City being four times as likely as nonhomeless children nationally to suffer from asthma (29 percent vs. 7 percent)[5] (see Figure 8). Homelessness also leads to higher rates of general illness: 54 percent of these children become sick more often after becoming homeless.

Moreover, whether because of appetite changes or the inconsistent quality of available food, nearly half of these children (47 percent) eat less after becoming homeless. This and other factors—such as a 13 percent occurrence of low-birthweight among this population—predispose these children to poor health, yet they are not immune to Medicaid cuts. Twenty-seven percent of families have had this benefit reduced or cut in the last year, despite remaining eligible.

Violence in the Lives of Homeless Children

Violence, common in both their homes and their communities, pervades the lives of homeless children. Nearly one-third of all children (31 percent) have witnessed domestic violence, one-fifth of school-aged children (20 percent) have witnessed violence in their community, and one in ten school-aged children (10 percent) have been threatened or hurt with a weapon (see Figure 9).

The effects of this violence overwhelm children, affecting both their emotional and physical health. School-aged children who have witnessed either domestic or community violence were 44 percent more likely than those who have

[5] National Center for Health Statistics, *Number of Selected Reported Chronic Conditions Per 1,000 Persons by Age: United States, 1995* (Washington, DC, 1999).

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FIGURE 8
Asthma Rates Among Children



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty; National Center for Health Statistics

not (91 percent vs. 63 percent) to suffer emotional distress since becoming homeless. Additionally, they were more than twice as likely as those who had not witnessed such violence to be more fearful and anxious (36 percent vs. 14 percent) and were significantly more likely to become ill more often since becoming homeless (66 percent vs. 45 percent).

FIGURE 9
Percent of Homeless Children Experiencing Violence



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty

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Educational Deprivations of Homeless Children

Homeless parents express the hope that their children will have the opportunity to build a more prosperous future in this city of countless opportunities. Yet, as a result of their homelessness, many of these children are denied access to the quality education that would help them prepare for a successful adulthood.

Half of homeless children in New York City (51 percent) are under the age of five. Because the instability in their lives can affect the development of their cognitive and social skills, they have perhaps the greatest need for early childhood education. However, 41 percent are not in preschool. New York City's older homeless children face educational troubles of their own. A recent national study found that roughly three-quarters of homeless children perform below grade level in reading and spelling (75 percent and 72 percent, respectively), and half (54 percent) perform below grade level in math.[6] Considering these facts, it is not surprising that one in four homeless school-aged children (25 percent) in New York City repeats a grade in school—more than twice the national rate for all children.[7] Children who repeat a grade are more likely than those who are not left back to develop a negative self-image, drop out of school, and get into trouble with the law.[8] To be sure, children who continually experience homelessness are prime candidates to repeat grades and eventually drop out of school completely.

Frequent school transfers are another common cause of problems in school. In the last year, almost two-thirds of New York City's homeless children (57 percent) changed schools. Researchers estimate that it takes a child four to six months to recover academically from such transfers.[9] Despite federal provisions requiring schools to immediately enroll all homeless children, barriers still exist. Today, 11 percent of those who are school-aged are not enrolled in school. In New York City, over one quarter of parents (27 percent) have problems enrolling or keeping their children in school once they become homeless. They report residency complications, lack of records, lack of immunizations, and guardianship issues as common barriers to enrollment (see Figure 10). Parents who are victims of domestic violence—one of the largest populations in City shelters today—tend to have even more difficulty. They are almost twice as likely as other homeless parents (36 percent vs. 19 percent) to have problems enrolling their children in school. Additionally, parents who were in foster care

[6] David H. Rubin et al., "Cognitive and Academic Functioning of Homeless Children Compared with Housed Poor Children," *Pediatrics* 97 (March 1996): 289.

[7] National Center for Education Statistics, "Grade Retention, by English Language Usage and Proficiency, and Disability Status" in *The Condition of Education 1997* (Washington, DC, 1997).

[8] Yvonne Rafferty and Marybeth Shinn, "The Impact of Homelessness on Children," *American Psychologist* 46 (November 1991): 1175.

[9] Laurene M. Heyback and Patricia Nix-Hodes, "Reducing Mobility: Good for Kids, Good for Schools," *The Beam: The Newsletter of the National Association for the Education of Homeless Children and Youth 9* (July 1999): 5.

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FIGURE 10
Barriers Homeless Parents Faced Enrolling Their Children in School



Source: Institute for Children and Poverty

as children were twice as likely as those who were not to have problems enrolling their children in school (52 percent vs. 24 percent).

Creating Communities of Opportunity

While family homelessness has become a common denominator of poverty in New York City, it is important to recognize that New York has some of the most homeless-friendly laws in the nation. Nowhere else in the United States are citizens guaranteed the right to shelter. Moreover, the city has committed hundreds of millions of dollars in resources to shelter families and to provide them with everything from food, health care, and clothing, as well as the necessary support services of education, job training, and employment. Still, there appears to be no end to the number of families in need of shelter in New York City. In fact, a recent Tier II Coalition plan for ending homelessness notes that there are currently over 300,000 applicants on the city's waiting list for subsidized housing.[10] In addition, the plan calls for $10 billion to provide 100,000 affordable units over the next ten years. Although Mayor Rudolph Giuliani recently approved spending $1.2 billion over the next four years to build an estimated 10,000 units, very few are slated for low-income renters. Consequently, the coalition reports that many families who have already entered the shelter system are languishing in transitional housing for years because of the lack of affordable permanent housing.[11] However, it does not have to be that way.

[10] Supporting Housing Network, Tier II Coaltion et al., "A Blueprint to End Homelessness in New York City," New York, 6 March, 2001; Tier II shelters are New York City's version of transitional housing. Practically every shelter in New York City is of the Tier II variety. Tier I shelters are congregate facilities.

[11] Ibid.

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Families residing in shelters must come to recognize that their stays are going to be longer and, in many cases, without alternative; shelter operators must do the same. And with the majority of the homeless families residing in shelters without work, employability must become their immediate goal. As for those in need of supportive services, participation in programming must be the norm. Without building individual responsibility and independent living skills, shelters will indeed become permanent warehouses for the poor. However, if we view them as homes where people become employable and continue their education, we can reduce their permanency, since life skills and work foster opportunity and independence. This in essence is the goal of "work plus housing"—shelters transformed into homes where families get the support and skills they need, where going to work is expected, rewarding, and leads to self-sufficiency, where children are nurtured, and where families feel a sense of community.[12]

"Work plus housing" can be financed in several ways: housing assistance vouchers could be targeted to these homes, residents who work could pay some form of rent, and partnerships could be formed to enhance services. Such partnerships might include New York City Department of Youth Services targeting after-school program dollars and community health clinics linking preventative care services to these settings. And this is only the beginning. The more comprehensive the network of services and the more effective the "work plus housing" community, the more successful will be the reduction of family homelessness.

Much of the groundwork for this has been set. In New York City, "work plus housing" already exists.[13] Many family shelters have been transformed into communities where parents return to their education while children begin and enhance theirs, where parents are job-readied, trained, and employed; and where young mothers gain independent living skills—eliminating dependence on public assistance. "Work plus housing" is a community that offers employment, education, and support resulting in responsibility, initiative, and independence. For children, it is an oasis of educational support.

But, even in New York, the job is not complete. Too many people continue to view shelters as temporary or emergency centers. Unfortunately, that is no longer the case. With very little affordable housing currently being produced and no sign of massive production on the horizon, shelters are—at least for the time being—the low-income housing of today. What we know, given the current social and political environment, is that many of New York's poorest families will at some point call a shelter their home. Today, we have the ability to transform shelters into communities of opportunity and change the lives of homeless families forever. The purpose of this article has been to profile what

[12] Institute for Children and Poverty, *A Shelter is Not a Home—Or Is It?* (New York: Institute for Children and Poverty, 2001).

[13] For an example, see http://www.homesforthehomeless.com and Ralph Nunez, *The New Poverty: Homeless Families in America* (New York: Plenum, 1996) for information about American Family Inns.

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family homelessness looks like in New York City today and to suggest a potential strategy for reducing it as we approach tomorrow. If every shelter in New York City were to move towards "work plus housing," we would deal a decisive blow against homelessness and poverty. And more important, we would give families, and especially children, the dignity they deserve by transforming shelters, creating new homes, and removing the stigma of being homeless.*

* I would like to thank Institute for Children and Poverty researchers Carmen Tomshack and Aditi Mehta for their assistance with this project.

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Dissonant Politics in Iran and Indonesia

DANIEL BRUMBERG

The election of Mohammad Khatami in May 1997 surprised Westerners and Iranians alike. Khatami's assertion that Islam would be strengthened by getting the state out of the business of imposing religion defied the most sacred premises of the Islamic Revolution. That Iran's new president, himself a cleric, argued for the rule of the people while affirming the right of Khomeini's heir, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamanei, to serve as the "Supreme Leader," suggested the sudden emergence of a profound ideological divide at the very pinnacle of the state.

Yet such anomalies were hardly new, nor unique to Iran. In Teheran, as much as in Rabat, Amman, or Jakarta, politics pivots around the institutionalization and strategic manipulation of symbolic contradictions. That this dynamic has received so little attention reflects an abiding conviction, particularly among students of Islamic politics, that authority systems must ultimately be based on one dominant form of legitimacy or domination.[1] Thus John Esposito and John Voll argue that by reinterpreting "core concepts . . . central to the political positions of virtually all Muslims," Islamists have forged notions of "Islamic democracy" that are as coherent and legal-rational as any secular vision of democracy.[2] Similarly, scholars who hold that Islam's quest to link politics

[1] This conviction is central to Weber's own concept of domination. As Reinhard Bendix has noted, while "in Weber's view every historical relation between rulers and ruled contains heterogeneous elements" (or bases of authority), "the predominance of one or another of these elements in the organization and rule . . . is related to certain more or less enduring historical configurations." See Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 297.

[2] John Esposito and John Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 23. While the authors acknowledge that the "Western experience continues to have great influence on the Islamic debates," they believe that the "older modernist approach to Islamic democracy" is now giving way to "coherent theories and structures of Islamic democracy that are not simply reformulations of Western perceptions in some Muslim idiom."

DANIEL BRUMBERG is associate professor of government at Georgetown University and author of *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran.* He has published widely on issues of political and socioeconomic reform in the Middle East.

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to religious norms precludes democracy nevertheless argue that efforts to blend democracy and Islam will either provoke a backlash from conservatives determined to protect Islam from Western encroachment;[3] or by forcing a choice between tradition and modernity, will inadvertently legitimate secular ideologies.[4] Viewed through this linear prism, one can only predict that the struggle for political reform in Iran will either fail, or as one Iranian scholar suggests, "open the gates of the secular city."[5]

This article challenges such conventional wisdom by investigating the dissonant institutionalization of symbolic contradictions in Islamic polities. This dynamic invites forms of political change that have often been misunderstood or unanticipated precisely because they are messy and indeterminate. To grasp this nonlinear dynamic requires a paradigm shift in how we think about authority structures, the states that support them, and the various forms of political change and ideological innovation that such states promote or hinder. I begin by sketching a theory of dissonant politics. Taking a cue from new institutionalist analysis, I highlight the tendency of dissonant states to bequeath multiple legacies or paths.[6] These competing paths create institutional and symbolic space through which elites redefine contending visions of political community. This dynamic hardly makes democracy or pluralism inevitable; the manipulation of institutional and ideological legacies often facilitates the survival strategies that autocrats use to undermine pressures for a substantive transition to competitive democracy. Yet, this same dynamic can also create space for inter-elite accommodations that can slowly transform politics in ways often unaccounted for in the conventional transitions literature.

To explore these changes I trace the genesis and evolution of institutional and symbolic legacies in Iran and Indonesia, and then consider how recent struggles to redefine these legacies have facilitated the efforts of regime and opposition elites to discredit, challenge, or renegotiate the rules of the game. In Iran, the struggle of the Islamic left to reinterpret Khomeini's legacy in a more pluralistic light helped set the stage for a reform movement. But because this movement has clashed with a rival institutional-ideological path that was controlled by the Supreme Leader and his allies in powerful state institutions, efforts to liberalize the political system have been stymied. In contrast to this example of bipolar dissonant conflict, Indonesia provides an example of multi-

[3] See Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt 1804–1952* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

[4] Albert Hourani held that by equating Islam with those ideas and institutions that secured the public interest (*maslaha*), the reformists inadvertently invited a "*de facto* separation of the sphere of civilization from that of religion" that opened "another door to secular nationalism." Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 344.

[5] Ahmad Sadri, "Reintroducing the Wheel," *The Iranian*, September 1996, (www.iranian.com/Sep96/Opinion/Democracy).

[6] See Kathleen Thelen and Seven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics" in Kathleen Thelen, Steven Steinmo, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1–33.

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polar competition between and within competing Islamic and secular groups. I focus particularly on the competition between two of the most important Islamic groups, one of whose leaders—Abdurrahman Wahid—played a key role in forging a contentious experiment in confessional power sharing virtually unprecedented in the Islamic world. My conclusion contrasts politics in dissonant states with their conceptual opposite: harmonic states. By narrowing the space for regime-opposition accommodations and by glorifying the notion of the state as the sole voice of the community, harmonic states invite a fight to death between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. While Algeria offers the most dramatic example of this destructive zero-sum logic, it may not be the last one to pay the high costs that ensue from a legacy of harmonic authoritarianism.

Dissonant Institutionalization: A Theoretical Sketch

This article is informed by Theda Skocpol's assumption that "various sorts of states . . . give rise to various conceptions of the meaning and method of 'politics' itself, conceptions that influence all groups and classes in national societies."[7] I push this famous observation one step further by conceptualizing how particular types of states facilitate particular types of political and ideological change. For this purpose, Joel Migdal's work provides a useful point of departure. Spurning all linear theories, he argues for an "anthropology of the state" that investigates how the organizational and symbolic ties that link state and society promote distinctive patterns of political change. Migdal assumes neither that the state is a coherent entity that creates and enforcers preferences, nor that it is a prisoner of society's competing social forces. Instead, he argues that different levels of stateness affect the goals and strategies that regimes and oppositions pursue. Migdal suggests that political change depends on whether the balance of power between state and society produces "total transformation" of the second by the first, "state incorporation" of existing forces, "societal incorporation" of the state, or a total failure of the latter to penetrate the state.[8]

The above typological map elaborates upon Migdal's earlier analysis of "strong societies and weak states." Politics in many Third World countries, he argued, is structured by the presence of well entrenched religious, ethnic, or cultural groups.[9] Their use of organizational and symbolic resources limits the kinds of strategies and techniques that weak states can employ to mobilize, control, or contain strong societies. Constrained by their societies, weak states are

[7] Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research" in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 22.

[8] Joel S. Migdal, "The State in Society" in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kholi, and Vivienne Shue, eds., *State Power and Social Forces, Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 7–36.

[9] Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

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better at dominating than transforming, controlling than changing, surviving than innovating.

The notion of dissonant institutionalization that I shall now outline turns this argument on its head. Whereas Migdal holds that competing sociopolitical forces often constrain ruling elites, I see the prevalence of such forces as a spur not only to regime survival, but within limits, to regime innovation and controlled change. Migdal's "state incorporation" hints at this dynamic but is not equivalent to dissonant institutionalization. When state incorporation occurs, the state retains a measure of autonomy sufficient to achieve domination, but it is still compelled by societal forces to act in some ways and not in others. By contrast, dissonant institutionalization obtains when the state has abetted the institutionalization of contradictory visions of authority in organizations, parties, or groups that maintain a degree of autonomy or at the least some capacity to define preferences independently of the state. These groups can be structured along corporatist lines, but corporatism is one of many institutional mechanisms found in dissonant states.[10] What makes the concept of dissonant politics useful is that it highlights a dynamic that can unfold in traditional monarchies such as Morocco, in populist authoritarian regimes such as Egypt, or in revolutionary or postrevolutionary states such as Iran.

Dissonant politics pivots around the institutional and ideological space that distances contending societal organizations both from the state and from one another. The competition by the leaders of these organizations for popular support hinders the efforts of any one group to impose ideological hegemony, while relative autonomy and elite competition facilitate both the state's manipulation of competing elites and the latter's efforts to manipulate the state. Still, it is usually the state that prevails. By encouraging contending elites to constantly negotiate particular policy questions or to debate this or that symbolic issue, the state enhances its room for maneuver and thus benefits from the specter of institutionalized conflict.[11] Divide and rule and elite accommodation are thus two sides of the same coin. Some of the most dissonant states in the Middle East are ruled by monarchs whose staying power stems from their ability to play off traditional and modern groups. The result, as the cases of Morocco and Kuwait suggest, is a game in which negotiations over particular sociocultural issues (such as women's rights) give competing groups a sense that their positions count without allowing them to pose a serious threat to the ruling powers.[12]

[10] A notion of dissonant politics informs Robert Bianchi's *Unruly Corporatism, Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[11] See Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956). It should be noted that Coser's analysis focused on Western, pluralistic democracies.

[12] On the Gulf states, see Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). On Morocco, see Guilan Denoeux and Abdelslam Maghraoui, "King Hassan's Strategy of Political Dualism," *Middle East Policy* 5 (January 1998): 104–30.

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Dissonant politics is a product of many factors, three of which bear particular comment. First, it is an outgrowth of strategies of indirect rule through which colonial powers promoted indigenous political elites. Thus in Morocco the French not only tolerated Sufi (mystical) religious orders, Islamic reformist movements, and Westernized elites; they also supported a well respected monarch.[13] The king's role as master arbiter was enshrined in the 1962 Constitution, which sanctioned the politically useful myth that the "Commander of the Faithful" stood above the political fray.[14] Second, dissonant politics is a product of sharp socioeconomic and cultural discontinuities between modern elites and the wider population. Because modern elites govern societies in which traditional religious, tribal, or ethnic groups retain influence, the former have often had to accommodate the latter.[15] Finally, globalization has played a key role in promoting dissonant systems. Said Amir Arjomand addressed this point in a seminal study that shows how the diffusion of Western constitutional models encouraged modernizing elites in Islamic polities to imbibe both legal-rational and traditional notions of authority. The resulting "inconsistency of . . . principles and the appositeness of the relative weight then given to them in a particular constitution . . . set the parameters for the constitutional politics of the subsequent period."[16]

Over the last two decades this dissonant dynamic has been manifest in parliaments, the press, and even in the discourse of political elites. New media such as the Internet and the satellite dish have accelerated this process by beaming contending visions of community to a growing audience.[17] In turn, this dynamic has shaped the "multiple imaginations" of Islamist elites. Exposed to competing concepts of authority, some Islamic leaders have come to view ideological eclecticism as natural and even useful.[18] For a Khatami in Iran or an Abdurrahman Wahid in Indonesia, the challenge is not so much to produce a coherent synthesis of Islam and democracy, or pluralism and piety, as it is to find ways to make competing notions of political and religious community coexist.

[13] See Michel Le Gall, "The Historical Context" in I. William Zartman and William Mark Habeeb, eds., *Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 3–18.

[14] J. Aveille, "Le Moroc se donne un monarchie constitutionelle," *Confluent* 27 (1963). Cited in Abdeslam Maghraoui, "Morocco: From Symbolic to Democratic Legitimacy?" (unpublished manuscript), 13.

[15] See Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States" in Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 254–310.

[16] Said Amir Arjomand, "Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order," *Archives of European Sociology* 33 (Winter/Spring 1992): 39.

[17] See Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, "Islam in the Age of Postmodernity" in S. Ahmed Akbar and Hastings Donnan, eds., *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 1–20. This dynamic is not entirely new. In *An Islamic Response to Imperialism, Political and Religious Writing of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), Nikki Keddi examined the efforts of this nineteenth-century Islamic reformer to address competing visions to different audiences.

[18] See Ronald Glassman, "Legitimacy and Manufactured Charisma," *Social Research 42* (Winter 1975): 621.

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Renegotiating and Redefining Dissonant Legacies

In dissonant systems, elites, institutions, and ideologies are in a state of constant competition and contention, but absent a system-threatening crisis this discordant dynamic is unlikely to produce a major renegotiation of the rules of the game. Such a crisis can be economic or ideological. While the first has been widely studied, the second merits close attention.[19] Controlled ideological dissonance can support an authoritarian system so long as rulers prevent disaffected elites from using symbolic fissures as a foundation for mass mobilization. This effort to "transform the institutional relations of society by exploiting . . . contradictions" is blocked not merely by repression, but also by the unifying influence of charismatic leaders.[20] By virtue of their personal allure, they intentionally or inadvertently obscure symbolic anomalies.[21] But when charismatic leaders are discredited by economic or political crises, or when they die or fall prey to a coup, such momentous events can provoke sharp struggles over contending ideological legacies.

To grasp this phenomenon we must move beyond the deterministic and one-dimensional notion of "path dependency" that animates some new institutionalist analyses. The view that "once a critical choice has been made it cannot be taken back"[22] fails to account for the fact that different authoritarian states are more or less path dependent. Dissonant states create multiple institutional-ideological paths that in turn create unintended opportunities for path innovation. By housing competing visions of authority in diverse arenas such as the press, founding constitutions, parliaments, universities, or religious institutions, they create windows of opportunity that competing elites can exploit to discredit, redefine, or renegotiate the prevailing political order.

What are the likely consequences of such contests? First, by inhibiting efforts to impose ideological hegemony, states that are substantially dissonant—those that maintain considerable symbolic and institutional distance from society's competing sociocultural groups and promote a *multipolar* symbolic field—create more space for renegotiating the rules of the game. Conversely, states that are moderately dissonant—those that narrow the symbolic and institutional distance between state and society and constrain the degree of ideological and institutional dissonance by limiting competition to a bipolar ideological field—create less space for renegotiating the political/symbolic order. In short,

[19] See Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[20] Robert Friedland and Robert Alford, "Bringing Society Back In: Symbolic Practices and Institutional Contradictions" in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 232.

[21] See Daniel Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). See also Michael Fischer, "Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of Understanding" in John Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 150–74.

[22] Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984): 223–46, 240.

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the chances for a more dramatic renegotiation of the political field will be greater in the first case than in the second. Second, the particular institutional mechanisms that regimes use to manage dissonance also affect struggles to renegotiate the rules of the game. States that rule through centralized control organizations such as single party systems will be relatively more constrained than those that use corporatist, monarchical, or other institutions to distance themselves from the process of ideological or symbolic reproduction.

The above model suggests a counterintuitive dynamic: the more dissonant an institutional and ideological legacy, the more opportunities there are for "regime survival strategies" through which rulers encourage interelite accommodations that prevent a full transition to multiparty democracy.[23] In short, the phenomenon of "semi-autocratic regimes" is hardly an anomaly.[24] On the contrary, the extent to which it is manifest in the Islamic world can be explained theoretically—by reference to a shared set of institutional and symbolic structures. Yet there is no guarantee that survival strategies will succeed. Some dissonant states will create conditions advantageous to sustaining liberalized autocracy, while others might engender dynamics that eventually allow regimes and oppositions to negotiate a "contingent institutional compromise" or political pact.[25] What I want to emphasize, however, is the indeterminancy of dissonant systems. Although they create space for change, a comprehensive causal theory that correlates particular types of dissonant legacies with particular types of political reform must await a fuller analysis of dissonant politics in a myriad of states, including Bangladesh, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Iran, and Indonesia. By focusing on the latter two cases, this article offers a modest yet crucial first step toward a comprehensive theory of dissonant politics.

Bipolar Dissonant Institutionalization in Iran

Iran's 1978–1979 Islamic revolution was led by an alliance between two overlapping socio-ideological forces. On the Islamist left was a disparate movement

[23] Daniel Brumberg, "Reform Strategies in the Arab World" in Rex Brynen, Baghat Korany, and Paul Noble, *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Vol. 1* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 229–60; and Daniel Brumberg, "Survival Strategies vs. Democratic Bargains: The Politics of Economic Stabilization in Contemporary Egypt" in Henri Barkey, ed., *Economic Crisis and Political Response: The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992). Well before I wrote these two articles, Joel Midgal had used a similar term—"strategies of survival"—but in a much broader sense. As I became familiar with his work only much later, I was not able to incorporate a comparison of the similar and different ways we each conceive of "survival." See Migdal's *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 26–7.

[24] One of the few comparative studies of this phenomenon can be found in Martha Brill Olcott and Marina Ottaway, "The Challenge of Semi-Authoritarianism," Working Papers, (Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999) (http://www.ceip.files/publications/wp7.asp). It is no coincidence that Iran and Indonesia are both primary cases in the working paper, given the extent to which regime-opposition accommodation and competition defined politics in both states.

[25] Adam Przeworski, "The Games of Transitions" in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo McDonald, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 136.

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of university students, professors, independent intellectuals, and some radical clerics, all of whom to various degrees had been exposed to Western notions of politics.[26] Their leader was Ali Shariati—a political essayist and aspiring Iranologist. During years of study in Paris, he had absorbed a multiple vision of revolutionary politics that combined Marxism, existentialism, and Shi'ite-Islamic utopianism. Although no democrat, Shariati advocated a radical, instrumentalist, and rationalist approach to Islam. He held that it was the mission of the lay intelligentsia to remold Islamic symbols into a total ideology that could mobilize the masses against the Western powers and their local allies.[27] While this nativist ideologization of Islam paradoxically echoed revolutionary and totalitarian traditions rooted in the West,[28] it was also inspired by the messianic symbols that animate Twelver Shi'ism, a branch of Islam holding that the Prophet Mohammad's message will only be fully revealed upon the return of the Mahdi or twelveth Imam. To the right of Shariati and his allies was a group of clerics who had little exposure to the West and who believed that they alone grasped Shi'ism's verities. Led by Khomeini, the "clerical right" borrowed many of Shariati's symbols and ideas while assailing Shariati's radical instrumentalism and his implicit affinity for Western notions of mass participation.[29]

During the 1960s and early 1970s, this alliance between Islamic left and clerical right gained a foothold in many religious seminaries and universities. That it did so owed much to the legal, moral, and charismatic authority that Shi'ism accorded to the leading interpreters of the law.[30] Because Shi'ites gave financial support to different "sources of emulation" (*maraje'-e taqlid*), sometimes referred to as "Grand Ayatollahs," contending visions of Shi'ism sunk institutional roots outside of the state. The support given by the British, Russians, and Americans to secular autocrats such as Shah Reza Pahlavi did little to undermine such pluralism. Thus, even though Khomeini effectively silenced the Grand Ayatollahs—all of whom opposed his theory of *velayat-e faqih* (Rule of the Jurist)—and repressed many leaders of the Islamist left, he did not completely dispense with the competing visions of authority he had inherited in 1979. Instead, Khomeini and his allies absorbed these visions into a system whose contours were laid out in the 1979 constitution.

This document provided for a *faqih* (ruling jurist) whose nearly unlimited powers derived from the people's embrace of Khomeini and his messianic mes-

[26] I use the term "left" because of the influence that Marxist ideology had on these Islamists, particularly Marxist notions of collective versus individual rights.

[27] Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New York: New York University Press, 1993). See also Ali Shariati, *An Approach to the Understanding of Islam*, transl. Venus Kaivantash (Houston: Free Islamic Literatures, 1980).

[28] See Mehrzad Boroujerdi, *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 52–76.

[29] For an analysis of Khomeini's use of leftist terms, see Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism, Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[30] Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany: State University Press, 1980).

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sage; a judiciary and Council of Guardians controlled by the conservative clergy; and a Majles (parliament) whose members were elected every five years.[31] Although the Constitution held that the Council of Guardians could veto any legislation it deemed "un-Islamic," the Majles played a crucial role by providing the central arena through which leaders of the Islamist left and the clerical right voiced ideologies and negotiated differences. Khomeini stood at the pinnacle of this institutional mess. His charismatic and constitutional authority gave him the means and right to referee Majles conflicts. By both encouraging and limiting such conflicts, he displayed his utopian vision of Islamic unity while enhancing his authority as the master arbiter. Thus, Khomeini himself became a vehicle of dissonant institutionalization. In his speeches and edicts, he communicated competing notions of authority, sometimes upholding his revolutionary notion of clerical rule, sometimes resorting to a more traditional approach that called for limiting the clerics' role in politics, sometimes taking refuge in mystical visions, while on other occasions singing the praises of the Majles as representative of a presumably united entity called the "people." Khomeini was a contradictory leader of a contradictory system, but his own charisma hid and thus perpetuated ideological dissonance.

Dissonant Politics: The Battle over the Revolution's Multidimensional Legacy

The death of Khomeini in July 1989 changed everything. Henceforth, the gates were open for a battle not only over his multiple legacy, but also over the contending visions of authority that had been institutionalized in the constitution and even in Khomeini's rhetoric. The clerical right immediately went on the offensive, as was demonstrated by the alliance that was forged between the new President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khomeini's heir, Ayatollah Khamanei. When these two men pushed for an economic reform program that sought to undermine the Islamist left's quasi-socialist policies, leaders of the left in the Majles attacked Rafsanjani directly while implicitly defying the authority of the new *faqih*, Ayatollah Khamanei. But note how this battle was fought: Islamic leftists invoked Khomeini's repeated insistence that "the center of all law and power is the Majles. It guides all and it should do so"[32] to defend the principle of popular sovereignty and constitutional rule, while the clerical rightists invoked Khomeini's notion of *velayat-i faqih* to bolster their claim that Khamanei's word was final and absolute.

Rafsanjani and Khamanei responded to the Islamist left's assaults by conducting a purge of the Majles in advance of the May 1992 elections. Invoking its right to supervise these elections, the Council of Guardians disqualified over

[31] Albert P. Blaustein and Gisber H. Flanz, "The Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979," *Constitutions of the Countries of the World* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1980). On the Majles, see Bahman Baktiari, *Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996).

[32] *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, South Asia* [hereafter *FBIS-SAS*], 27 May 1980, 80–103.

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1,000 radicals from running for office. In retrospect, it is clear that this purge set the stage for today's reform movement. Accused of being insufficiently Islamic, several prominent Islamist leftists began rethinking basic questions such as the relationship between mosque and state or the question of individual versus collective rights. That such revisionism unfolded on the floor of the Majles magnified its effect. After all, here were men with impeccable revolutionary credentials invoking, as one deputy put it, "Montesquieu and other political and social thinkers" to legitimate their assertion that the regime should "not violate the Constitution."[33] Moreover, Islamist leftists defended their constitutional rights over (and implicitly against) the traditional authority of the *faqih* by again invoking the very name of Khomeini, giving credence to criticisms that went far beyond mere politics. A key feature of the 1991 to 1992 Majles debates was the implicit defense of ideological pluralism that some deputies articulated.

Such maneuvers were not born out of pure principle. Islamist leftists had often invoked their constitutional rights to block the right's attacks. But the intensity of the Islamist left's criticisms of the regime's autocratic behavior and its focus on questions of individual freedoms as opposed to the collective (and thus qualified) freedoms that Islamic leftists had long advocated, suggested that by 1992 some Children of Revolution (as they were called) were moving from Islamic Bolshevism to Islamic Menshevism. This trend was an outgrowth of dissonant institutionalization; it stemmed from a redefinition from within one ideological path that had been shaped by the very elites who were now trying to redefine it. And it was precisely because they had charted this path that transforming it proved tricky. For apart from the other imposing path that Islamist leftists had to contend with—the clerical right's control of powerful institutions such as the Office of the *Faqih*, the Judiciary, and the Council of Guardians—Islamic leftists faced an imposing dilemma: how to advance notions of political participation, the rule of law, and rational political dialogue without appearing to betray the very revolutionary principles of Islamic government and cultural independence that Khomeini had championed.

Two Children of the Revolution played key roles in addressing this dilemma: Mohammad Khatami and Abdolkarim Soroush. Although the first was a cleric and the second a lay intellectual, both were Islamic leftists whose multiple political imaginations had been shaped by their exposures to Western political thought. Although they had occupied key positions in the ideological apparatus of the state, these leftists were eventually persecuted by the very state they had once defended. In August 1992, Khatami resigned his post as minister of Islamic Culture when the new Majles prepared to impeach him for failing to defend Islamic values. Soroush—an academic who had once been close to Shariati and who had helped to reorganize the universities during the first years of the revolution—was forced in 1996 to resign his post at Teheran University after

[33] *FBIS, Near East South Asia (NES)*, 92-098-S, 17 June 1992, from *Resalat*, 23 April 1992.

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his writings provoked a violent response from regime hard-liners and their thugs in the paramilitary Hezbollah.

While there were significant differences between Khatami and Soroush, both men held that the most effective way to prevent young people from becoming disaffected from Islam was to get the clergy out of the business of imposing Islamic ideology.[34] Faith and politics had to be distanced to prevent the second from corrupting the first.[35] This implicitly reformationist stance allowed each to argue that religious freedom would secure rather than undermine religious authenticity—that Khomeini's quest for cultural independence would be served by more rather less pluralism. That such pluralism might invite Western influence was a dilemma that both men addressed, although in different ways. Khatami argued that when confronted by a global revolution in technology and communications, the only way to instill in the young a sense of dignity was to give them the critical and rational faculties to address the West. This goal, he argued, could not be attained by "building fences around people's consciousness."[36] Soroush echoed but went far beyond Khatami's thesis. Touching a raw nerve, he reminded his fellow Islamist leftists that much of the existential language they had used to vilify the West was hardly Islamic. "In their zeal for opposing the West," he noted, "they want to denounce modernism . . . with reasoning taken from foreigners themselves!"[37] Moreover, Soroush took the idea of "saving Islam by distancing cleric and state" much further than Khatami could, given that the latter was a cleric. Soroush did this not only by making the classic Weberian argument that religious knowledge was distinct from the scientific knowledge and thus could not provide a basis for modern politics; he also reached into Shi'ite mystical tradition to argue that God was a divine mystery whose "essences" could never be expressed in man-made ideologies.[38] By redefining the mystical aspects of Khomeini's (and Shariati's) ideology in ways that pointed toward individual rather than mass charismatic experience, Soroush tried to forge a vision of political reform that was both spiritually inspiring and politically rational.

The Limits of Path Innovation in Post-Khomeini Iran

The revisionist ideas advanced by Khatami and Soroush were echoed by a growing body of lay intellectuals and by several leading clerics such as Ayatol-

[34] See Soroush's controversial article on the clergy in *Kiyan*, April–May 1995, as translated in *FBIS-NES*, 95-241-S.

[35] Mohammad Khatami, *Hope and Challenge: The Iranian President Speaks* (Binghamton, NY: Institute of Global and Cultural Studies, 1997). "The West," Khatami wrote, "has . . . cast aside the deification of repressive thinking that had been imposed on the masses in the name of religion."

[36] Ibid., 47.

[37] Abdolkarmin Soroush, "Knowledge Seen as Basis of Modernism" *Kiyan*, 22 June–August 1994, in *FBIS-NES*, 95-109-S, 7 June 1995.

[38] See "Soroush on Meaning, Foundation," *Kiyan*, August–September, 1995, 4–13, in *FBIS-NES*, 96-022-S, 1 February 1996.

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lah Mohammad Montazeri and his student Mohsen Kadivar. This lay-clerical alliance directed its message to the colleges and universities. By 1996, the two offered a mass arena through which the reformists could mobilize nearly one million students. Moreover, despite the state's efforts, it had failed to completely purge the universities of Western-trained academics, or to remove social science and humanities curricula, which included significant doses of Western political theory.[39] Thus, Khatami's victory in May 1997 was not fortuitous. On the contrary, he won 70 percent of the nearly 30 million votes cast because he articulated the disaffection of both the children and grandchildren of the revolution.

Despite this progress, the struggle that Khatami and his allies waged from the spring of 1997 through the spring of 2000 demonstrated that dissonant institutionalization was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Khatami and his allies had reinterpreted a major path of the revolution to legitimate a pluralistic agenda. That they did so through, rather than against, Khomeini's eclectic vision showed that a state which had aspired to ideological hegemony had bequeathed a dissonant legacy. But that same state had also generated a competing institutional-ideological legacy that was quintessentially path dependent. This dependency took the form of powerful organizations and constituencies, which sought to defend the institutional and ideological prerogatives of the new *faqih*, Ayatollah Khamanei. A clerical elite that had invested political and social capital in powerful organizations such as the Council of Guardians, the Judiciary, and wealthy charitable foundations (for example, the Martyrs' Foundation) would not give up such sunk costs without a fight.

How would this battle be waged, and what would be its outcome? To answer these questions we must compare the constitutional powers of the *faqih* and the president. In 1989 those powers had been redefined in revisions of the constitution that in some ways undercut the Supreme Leader's authority while bolstering that of the president. By holding that the *faqih* no longer had to be a *marja* (religious source of emulation), the 1989 Constitution created the possibility that a popular cleric might emerge as a rival to the *faqih.* Moreover, by abolishing the post of prime minister, the 1989 constitution left the president as the sole national representative directly elected by popular mandate. The *faqih*, by contrast, was indirectly elected by a clerical body known as the Council of Experts. The Council's central role in choosing the Supreme Leader signaled that henceforth the *faqih's* legitimacy derived in the main from traditional authority and institutions.[40] In short, the 1989 constitution set up a poten-

[39] Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut, "Political and Social Transformations in Post-Islamist Iran," *Middle East Report* 29 (Fall 1999): 12–16.

[40] I write "in the main" because the *faqih's* authority, as defined in the 1989 constitution, also has legal-rational foundations. Among his qualifications, not only must he be a man of "scholarship, as required for performing the function of *mufti* in . . . fields of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence); but he must also possess the "better jurisprudential and political perspicacity." By contrast, Article Five of the 1979 constitution stated that Khomeini had been "recognized and accepted by the majority of the people as . . . leader," thus giving ultimate legal sanction to the charismatic foundations of Khomeini's authority.

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tial conflict between a president whose authority derived from modern, legal-rational procedures and principles and a *faqih* whose formal authority emanated from a traditional office and ideology. The potential for a "*faqih* versus president" conflict seems to have been anticipated in the 1989 constitution. By expanding the institutional powers of the *faqih* over bodies such as the military and the police, it gave the Supreme Leader the means and right to limit the president's authority.[41] That this strengthening of patrimonialism occurred in tandem with increased democratization within one wing of the revolutionary family, and that this dynamic was partly abetted by the very same constitution that reinforced the *faqih's* formal powers is precisely the point: this dissonant arrangement helps to explain the contradictory political contest that unfolded during the three years following Khatami's May 1997 election.

Power Sharing/Power Struggle: Khamanei and Khatami

That contest can be summarized as one of fragile and limited power sharing at the zenith of the state and an open-ended power struggle within and between that state and society. Following his election, Khatami tried to increase his leverage by forming a cabinet that offered Islamic leftists significant posts and by encouraging a boisterous reformist press. The mission of the press was to compensate for a Majles that was still controlled by conservatives. An "Islamic" civil society, as Khatami called it, would mobilize the youth and thus help set the stage for a reformist victory during the winter 2000 Majles elections. Yet Khatami had to be careful; if this process proceeded too quickly, it would not only provoke a backlash from the conservative clerical elite judiciary and security establishment, but might also compel the *faqih* to turn against the president. Since such a development would probably result in the political demise of one or both of these leaders, Khatami and Khamanei had a shared incentive to restrain their militant allies and build an effective entente while at the same time maintaining their credibility as spokesmen for contending wings of the Islamic revolution.

This balancing act worked fairly well during the first two years of Khatami's presidency. While Khatami promoted the opposition press; called for a "dialogue of civilization"; and made speeches in favor of Majles "rights," freedom of opinion, and the rule of law; Khamanei attacked the West; issued periodic threats against the reform movement; and condoned the judiciary's periodic closures of opposition newspapers and the arrests of their editors. But when such acts encouraged their most militant followers to push the proverbial envelope, Khatami and Khamanei would draw together. For example, after a July 1999 attack by security forces on a dorm at Teheran University, Khatami called for restraint from the students while Khamanei praised the president and

[41] See Mohsen M. Milani, "The Transformation of the Velayat-e Faqih Institution: From Khomeini to Khamanei," *The Muslim World* 82 (July–October 1991): 175–90.

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warned his hard-line allies that they should not take the law into their own hands.[42] For both Khomeini and Khatami, the peaceful coexistence of Iran's increasingly contentious forces had to be maintained.

Yet it soon became clear that this fragile entente had succeeded in part because Khamanei's conservative allies still controlled the Majles. Because they could be depended on to pass draconian legislation (such as a press law that sparked the July 1999 student riots at Teheran University), Khamanei's militant allies remained confident that they could block the reform movement. Thus, in the run up to the February 2000 Majles elections it was widely expected that the Council of Guardians would again disqualify a large number of reformists from running. Although the Council failed to do so (in part because the reformists had flooded the election arena with thousands of candidates), in the aftermath of the first round—during which the reformists won 180 out of 290 seats—the conservatives regrouped. Within two months all seventeen opposition newspapers were closed down, and the Council of Guardians reversed ten reformist victories on various pretexts. Moreover, given that by April the Council had still not validated the crucial Teheran results, where nearly every one of the thirty available seats had been won by the pro-reform Iran Participation Front (IPF), it seemed that the popular will might still be thwarted. It took Khamanei's direct intervention to assure that the second round of elections was held and that most of the Teheran seats were awarded to the IPF. While this dramatic act allowed the reformists to take control of the Majles in May 2000, it also reminded reformists that their fate hung on the *faqih's* words and good will. This point was driven home two months later, when Khamanei blocked the attempts of the Majles to revise the draconian press law and implicitly supported the arrest of many prominent editors and writers in the reform movement. In one form or another, dissonant politics had recreated itself, thus limiting the ability of Iran's reformists to move from ideological innovation to political power.

Indonesia: Recognizing and Institutionalizing Multipolar Diversity

"Indonesia," Fred von De Mehden writes,"is a nation of Muslims divided in their understanding of what is entailed in being an adherent to that faith."[43] By itself, this statement would not distinguish Indonesia's Sunni Muslims from Iran's Shi'ites, whose lay and clerical leaders also advanced contending visions of religion and politics. The key difference is that Indonesia's Islamists established *mass* organizations, which articulated contending visions outside the

[42] See Charles Kurzman, "Student Protests and the Stability of Gridlock in Khatami's Iran," (http://www.sba.widener.edu/zang/default.html.), 5 November 1998. The author was present during this speech by Khamanei.

[43] Quoted in Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 15.

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gambit of the state. President Sukarno (who ruled from 1945 through 1965) and President Suharto (who ruled from 1966 to 1998) institutionalized the principle that domestic peace in Indonesia required a distancing of church and state, and state and society. This factor makes Indonesia a case of substantial, multipolar dissonance.

The distancing of culture and state that unfolded during the 1950s and 1960s was impelled by Indonesia's plural nature. Quite apart from the obvious and sometimes violent cleavages that divide Indonesia's Muslims—who constitute 90 percent of the country's 200 million citizens—from its Christian and Chinese minorities were divisions between Muslims. Indonesia has 300 ethnic groups and 250 distinct languages spread across some 3,000 islands.[44] Within this rich quilt, a key symbolic divide exists between Muslims who favor blending indigenous Javanese-Hindu and mystical or Sufi traditions with Islam, and those who spurn such syncreticism in favor of a unitary vision of Islam. In 1960 Clifford Geertz described this division in terms of *santri* (devout) versus *abangan* (nominal) Muslims. The authority of the *abangan*, he argued, stemmed from a pre-Islamic symbolic system whose patrimonialist ethos was deeply rooted in rural Java.[45] Although decades of urbanization and increased education have blurred the *santri/abangan* distinction, a sociocultural and ideological divide remains between traditionalist and modernist Muslims. Much of Indonesian politics was shaped by the efforts of Presidents Sukarno and Suharto—as well as their allies and opponents inside and outside the state—to institutionalize and manipulate these two visions of Islam.

These manipulative strategies were abetted by the legacy of Dutch colonialism. The Dutch reached a *modus vivendi* with the *kiai* (traditional clerics), which allowed the latter to maintain control over local bureaucratic and religious organizations so long as they accepted the authority of the secular government.[46] Although Indonesia's Japanese occupiers tried to unify Islamic organizations by creating the Masyumi party, the latter was always a loose alliance of competing groups, the most important of which were the *Nahdlatul Ulema* (The Renaissance of the Ulema or NU) and the *Muhammadiya* (followers of Mohammad). Created in 1926, the NU was led by a coalition of rural clerics from East and Central Java and urban politicians from Java's cities. The NU was traditionalist in that its leaders held that the *Sunna* (example) of the Prophet Mohammad as codified in the *mazhab* (four orthodox schools) of Sunni Islam provided *the* authoritative foundation for political life. But NU's vision was syncretic in that many of its rural adherents—some 30 million by the late 1970s—maintained heterodox Javanese-Hindu and quite possibly Sufi mystical prac-

[44] See Karl D. Jackson, "Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia" in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, eds., *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 3–22.

[45] See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

[46] See Karel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam, Contacts and Conflicts 1596–1950*, transl. Jan Steenbrink and Henry Jansen (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993).

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tices. By contrast, *Muhammadiya*, established in 1906, was led by politically active clerics and lay Islamic thinkers who opposed the "non-Islamic" practices of NU's members. These men were influenced by the ideas of Mohammad Abduh, the turn of the century Egyptian Islamic reformer. Although a liberal, many of Abduh's disciples such as Rashid Rida were authoritarian. Like Iran's Shariati, Rida strove to transform Islam into a comprehensive mobilizing ideology that could compete with the "ideologies" of the West.[47] It was this reformist example that inspired *Muhammadiya's* leaders and earned the movement the label "modernist," an ambiguous term that obscured the movement's illiberalism.

Although *Muhammadiya* and NU were competitors, their differences were at times obscured by their competition with the secular-nationalist parties. Yet in as much as NU sought to prevent the state from becoming a vehicle of Islamization, its leaders often felt more comfortable supporting the ruling Indonesian Nationalist party (PNI) and its various successors and rivals, such as the Indonesian Democratic party (PDI) and Golkar—the official ruling party established in 1967. By mediating between *Muhammadiya* and the nationalist parties, NU helped sustain a multipolar ideological field that encouraged inter-elite competition, negotiations, and accommodations.

After Indonesia won independence in 1945, Sukarno attempted to accommodate (and control) this multipolar field by using several devices, one of which was an eclectic ideology known as "Pancasila."[48] A Sanskrit term meaning "five principles," the first principle of Pancasila was belief in God. While all Indonesians were expected to follow one of the monotheistic religions, it was understood that all religious practices would issue from society rather than the state. This principle was favored by the nationalists, communists, and the NU. The second principle, a just and civilized humanity, articulated the desire of socialists and nationalists (i.e., *abangan* Muslims) to align Indonesia with the international community. The third principle, Indonesian national unity, emphasized the desire of Sukarno and his allies in the nationalist and NU camps to forge a common identity that would coexist with other religious and ethnic identities. The fourth principle, an Indonesian style-democracy based upon the ideals of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* (consultation and consensus), addressed the sensibilities of both traditionalist and modernist Muslims. Derived from the *Quran* (Koran), these two terms symbolized a cooperative vision of political community in implicit opposition to what many Muslims deemed to be the conflictual foundations of Western liberal democracy. Pancasila's fifth principle, one dear to nationalists and communists, but which had widespread support, called for social justice.

[47] "Alfian," *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization Under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989), 134–79.

[48] On Pancasila, see Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia*, 10–22.

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It has been noted that Pancasila was not "meant to be internally consistent."[49] For Sukarno and his allies, it offered a symbolic compromise that Indonesians could interpret in various ways, providing they accepted the unifying principle that implicitly animated Pancasila, namely that no group could use the state to impose its culture, religion, or ideology on society. Thus, Pancasila served a function similar to that of the Iranian constitutions of 1979 and 1989 or to that of Khomeini's eclectic ideology. By inviting and institutionalizing contradictions, it created a medium of symbolic competition that could be harnessed to reinforce or renegotiate public order.

To sustain such order, Sukarno used two additional instruments. First, he deployed his charisma to both legitimate and control symbolic anomalies. Unlike Khomeini, who exhibited but could hardly tolerate contradictions, Sukarno thrived on them. "I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies," he declared. "I have blended . . . them until they finally became the present Sukarno."[50] Second, Sukarno created a presidential regime that gave the executive almost unlimited powers. Although this development was preceded by a chaotic experiment in multiparty politics, during the "Guided Democracy" of 1958 to 1965, the lower and upper houses of parliament—the Representative Council (DPR) and the Consultative Council (MPR)—were replaced by a body whose members were appointed by the president. Backed by the military, Sukarno created a "bureaucratic polity," whose essential features—a strong presidency, military control, and bureaucratic centralism—endured during the ensuing four and a half decades.[51]

The emasculation of the legislature meant that henceforth Indonesia's parliament would never provide an arena of controlled ideological contest comparable to that of Iran's Majles. Yet under Sukarno and Suharto, political parties did play a role in sustaining dissonant politics. In one incarnation or another, they articulated the "distinctive visions of polity" that contending sociocultural communities espoused by maintaining shifting degrees of institutional and ideological distance from the state.[52] Relative autonomy facilitated an elaborate game by which Indonesia's presidents and their allies tried to divide or coopt their opponents, while the latter tried to use state bodies such as the Ministry of Religion to advance their agendas. In the resulting confluence of party and elite politics it became "all too easy for rival claimants to power to conclude that the only rational way to engage in politics is to work behind the scenes, forging alliances with ascendant factions in the ruling elite and taking care not to push for broader political participation."[53]

[49] Mochtar Pabotinngi, "Indonesia: Historicizing the New Order's Legitimacy Dilemma" in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 234.

[50] Ibid.

[51] DPR stands for Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat and MPR stands for Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. On the workings of Indonesia's "bureaucratic polity" see Jackson, "Bureaucratic Polity," 2–22.

[52] R. William Liddle, "Participation and Political Parties" in Jackson and Pye, *Political Power*, 187.

[53] Robert W. Hefner, "Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia" in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich eds., *Islam in an Era of Nation-States* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 12.

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Conflict and Accommodation Under Sukarno

While we cannot analyze this game in detail, we must highlight how three of its central features eventually facilitated a transition to power sharing and democratic reform. First, the modernist and traditionalist Islamic parties competed to defend their constituencies and ideologies by using the state while at the same time trying to maintain distance from it; second, the ruling and opposition elites made various attempts to reappropriate the dissonant legacy bequeathed by Sukarno; and third, Suharto and his allies sought to divide or coopt opposition elites in a manner that enhanced the regime's autonomy and defused calls for political reform.

From the early 1960s until the late 1970s, Indonesia's leaders pursued a strategy designed to divide and coopt the opposition and to isolate Islamic leaders who espoused radical changes or the establishment of an Islamic state. NU leaders facilitated these efforts. While paying lip service to the notion of an Islamic state, they feared that establishing such a state would give their modernist rivals in *Muhammadiya* a vehicle through which to "purify" NU's eclectic view of Islam. During the 1950s Islamic separatist revolts reinforced the perception among NU leaders that an open democratic system would empower their modernist rivals. This concern led NU to quit the Masyumi Federation (in which *Muhammadiya* played a leading role) and to back Sukarno's Guided Democracy. In short, given the absence of credible alliance alternatives,[54] and animated by a conservative ideology that valorized the quest for political order, NU's clerics sought the protection of an authoritarian state.[55] The state paid NU back by awarding it's chairman control over the Ministry of Religion and by excluding NU's leaders from periodic reorganizations of the political parties. Still, the NU could not halt a descent into ideological and ethnic conflict to which Sukarno himself contributed by trying to imbue Pancasila with a Javanese and thus implicitly anti-Islamic interpretation.[56] Islamic leaders retaliated by assailing Pancasila, a dangerous development that prompted Sukarno to rely on the Indonesian Communist party (PKI). Such miscalculations set the stage for the September 1965 coup engineered by Suharto and a wing of the military.

Rationalizing Dissonant Politics: State/Society Dynamics Under Suharto

Suharto attempted to succeed where Sukarno had failed by repudiating the latter's quasi-socialist economic policies, by further centralizing the system of bu-

[54] In the 1955 elections, Masyumi obtained 57 seats (23 percent), NU, 45 seats (18.4. percent), the Indonesian Nationalist party (PNI), 27 seats (21 percent), and the Indonesian Communist party, 39 seats (16.4 percent). Since the NU spurned both the communists and Masyumi, it could offer the PNI a credible ally. See Liddle, "Participation and Political Parties," 174–75.

[55] Greg Fealy, "'Rowing in a Typhoon' Nahdlatul Ulama and the Decline of Parliamentary Democracy" in David Bourchier and John Legge, *Democracy in Indonesia, 1950s and 1990s* (Monash, Australia: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 31, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994), 88–97.

[56] Ramage, *Democracy, Politics in Indonesia*, 17.

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reaucratic control, by enhancing the power of the military, and by purging both communist and Islamic militants. This purge was accomplished by a cynical maneuver: in 1965 and 1966, Sukarno's allies mobilized Islamic groups—particularly the student wing of the NU (*Ansar*)—in an anticommunist campaign. When the bloodletting ceased with some 500,000 dead, NU leaders were rewarded; whereas nearly every ministry was reduced in scope and power, the Ministry of Religion was expanded. Moreover, although Suharto revived the lower and upper houses of parliament, he imposed controls that not only assured the government of a majority, but also gave the regime almost unlimited powers to select candidates for both the ruling Golkar party and the opposition parties. In the run up to the 1971 elections, Suharto used these powers to conduct a purge of Islamists from which NU emerged virtually unscathed.

Yet while the state became more autocratic, dissonant politics endured as each faction within the ideologically eclectic elite tried to repackage the ideological legacies of the previous era. A key element in this contest was the battle to reappropriate Pancasila. In the late 1960s Suharto, as well several leading intellectuals and military officers, began advocating the view that Pancasila constituted an organic ideology that reflected the intrinsic personality of the Indonesian people. Retaliating against this apparent effort to impose Javanese-Hindu identity, the Islamic parties (including the NU) called for reintroducing a controversial section of the Jakarta Charter—a statement of principle that called upon Muslims to follow *Shariah* (Islamic law). Its insertion in the 1945 Constitution had been rejected by Sukarno. The attempt to reintroduce the Charter's *Shariah* section demonstrated that the recent banning of the Masyumi Party had not silenced the Islamic issue. Pressed by their followers, the leaders of *Muhammadiya* and NU had to join forces.[57] This development again put the NU in the awkward position of allying with its modernist foes. NU tried to skirt this dilemma by endorsing a compromise calling for Islamic parties to affirm that the "Jakarta Charter 'inspires' the 1945 Constitution . . . without attempting to further define or modify it."[58] But this solution pacified neither the government nor its radical Islamist opponents. As a result, NU found itself on the receiving end of hostility from both. In late 1971 the government ended NU's eighteen-year control of the Ministry of Religion by appointing an intellectual technocrat as minister.

Path Innovation in the NU: From Traditionalism to Liberalism?

These events had a transformatory effect on NU that was similar to changes that would unfold within Iran's Islamic left twenty years later. By the early 1970s, the politicization of NU's leadership had provoked a profound process of rethinking among a group of students and political activists. Known as the

[57] See Allan Samson, "Conceptions of Politics, Power, and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam" in Jackson and Pye, *Political Power*, 221–22.

[58] Ibid., 221.

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"Generation of 66," they had expected to benefit from their implicit alliance with the New Order. Instead, they found that Muslims had been drawn into a morass of political conflict that was deflecting NU from promoting its cultural and ethical goals. Seeking to remedy this problem, several intellectual/political activists began to redefine NU's traditionalist ideology. In the ensuing decade, they showed that the symbolic-institutional path that had long played a central role in Indonesian's dissonant politics could be pushed in new directions.

This movement's chief theorist was Nurcholish Madjid, the former leader of the Islamic Student Association.[59] Madjid sought to create an inspiring alternative to the totalistic ideologies advanced by militant Islamists. The latter legitimated such ideologies by arguing that the doctrine of the transcendent unity of God (*tauhid*) demanded total political, social, and ideological unity. As *Muhammadiya* leader Amien Rais put it, because in Islam there can be "no differentiation between worldly and other-worldly," there can be no "contradictions." *Tauhid*, Rais insisted, demands "a society . . . free from . . . exploitation, feudalism and rejection of differentiation among class, race . . . and so forth."[60] Fearing that this intolerant vision would sap Islam of its spiritual force, Madjid tried to discredit it by standing the concept of *tauhid* (and secularism) on its head. *Tauhid*, he held, was *not* about politics. On the contrary, because "absolute transcendence pertains *solely* to God," it should "give rise to an attitude of 'desacralization' towards that which is other than God, namely the world, its problems and values. . . . To sacralize anything other than God is, in reality, *shirk* [polytheism]." To make this case for desacralization Madjid turned to mystical ideas that were rooted deeply in Indonesian society. Invoking a central tenet of mysticism, he argued that "because God is the Ultimate Absolute . . . beyond the ken of human comprehension," it was a sacrilege to assume that man could transform God's mysteries into mundane ideology. The remedy was to embrace a form of secularization that would strengthen Islamic piety by "temporalizing . . . values which are . . . worldly, and . . . freeing the *umma* [Muslim community] from the tendency to spiritualize them."[61]

Madjid's choice of words may have been unfortunate. For most Muslim Indonesians, secularism connoted an attack on, rather than a defense of, religion. Yet if he did not anticipate this reaction, it was because Madjid was a man of multiple imaginations. While he celebrated the particularities of Indonesian Islam, his exposure to the ideas of American Protestant thinkers such as Harvey Cox led Madjid to make arguments in terms that most Indonesians could not

[59] Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia" in Hefner et al., eds., *Islam in an Era of Nation-States*, 75–127.

[60] Howard M. Federspeil, *Indonesia in Transition: Muslim Intellectuals and National Development* (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1998), 75–6.

[61] From a talk given by Madjid in January 1970. See "Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and Reinvigorating Religious Understanding" in Charles Kurzman, ed., *Liberal Islam, A Sourcebook* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 286, 209. (Emphasis added.)

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easily grasp.[62] Nevertheless, because his overall message found a receptive audience among NU's traditionalist followers, it began to stick. In the 1980s traditionalism and modernism were grafted to produce what one scholar called "neo-modernism."[63]

The man most responsible for institutionalizing this ideological shift was Madjid's colleague, Abdurrahman Wahid, also known as "Gus Dur." The grandson of NU's founder and son of its second leader, Wahid Yasyim, Wahid too was a man of multiple imaginations. After pursuing Islamic studies at Egypt's Al-Azhar University during the 1960s, he moved to Iraq where he studied Arabic literature and European philosophy at Baghdad University. He then lived in Western Europe for a time before returning to Indonesia. Wahid's affinity for Western European liberal thought, his gritty feel for the syncretic culture of Javanese Islam, and his intimate knowledge of NU's politics made him an ideal candidate for linking the ideas of Indonesia's liberal Muslim intelligentsia to NU's mass base.[64] But his decision to pursue this challenge was also motivated by Suharto's renewed campaign to impose a "Javanized" version of Pancasila. This campaign reached new heights in 1982, when the government proposed legislation requiring that all social and professional organizations adopt Pancasila as their sole guiding ideology (*asas tunggal*). When this policy provoked a vitriolic response from Muslim politicians and anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta in 1984, it appeared that irreparable harm had been done to Pancasila's ability to symbolize interconfessional compromise.

The dilemma facing Wahid was how to revive Pancasila's dissonant spirit without appearing to endorse Suharto's efforts to monopolize the ideological field. NU's 1984 Congress not only provided a chance not only to address this dilemma, but also to secure support for Wahid's neomodernist vision. Seizing upon the disenchantment of NU's clerics with the old guard of NU politicians, Wahid and his colleague Achmad Siddiq mounted a successful campaign to be elected general chairman and executive director of NU. They then convinced their followers to endorse two decisions: first, that NU would stop all participation in the state-controlled party system in order to focus its energies on promoting social and cultural reform on a grassroots level; and second, that NU would formally accept Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the final bases of state authority. But NU's leaders also stipulated that they were adopting Pan-

[62] Hefner, "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia," 85. See also Madjid, "In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The Indonesian Experiences" in Mark. R. Woodward, ed., *Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought* (Tempe, AZ: Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 92.

[63] Greg Barton, "The Impact of Neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: The Emergence of a New Pluralism" in Bourchier and Legge, *Democracy in Indonesia*, 143–50.

[64] Greg Barton, "The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurahman Wahid's Thought" in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton, eds., *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity* (Monash, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1998). This book is also available on the Internet at www.muslims.net/KMNU/pustaka/baku1/utama.html.

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casila because it provided a framework in which *all* groups could pursue their religious faith. As Siddiq put it in a famous formula that echoed Madjid's mystical liberalism, in so far as Pancasila was a "philosophy created by human beings" whereas Islam was "a revelation," the former could provide the foundation for freely pursuing the latter.[65]

By design or default, Siddiq's formula served the interests of both the government and NU. In the ensuing two years, the government adopted his distinction between philosophy and revelation to convince other Islamic organizations that there was no contradiction between Islam and Pancasila. That Suharto decided at the same time to cease the campaign to Javanize Pancasila and to declare it instead an "open ideology" encouraged other Islamic leaders to renounce the notion of an Islamic state in favor of a society-based movement for "cultural Islam." As for NU, by withdrawing from a political arena that had been manipulated by the state, it was now free, in Wahid's words, to develop "an alternative view of Pancasila" that was both nonsectarian and democratic.[66]

NU: Between Autocratic State and Autocratic Islamists

Wahid and Siddiq pursued this goal with considerable success. Their efforts were facilitated by the growth of Indonesia's urban middle class, which provided a new cadre of activists, and by the creative ways in which Wahid introduced the use of *ijtihad* (free interpretation) of the Quran to enlist the support of maverick clerics. This push for a more liberal Islam was also abetted by a countervailing Islamic trend that took its cue from populist-fundamentalist Islamic movements in the Middle East.[67] Led in part by Rais, and partly housed in *Muhammadiya*, because this movement was based in the urban middle class, it competed with NU's attempts to broaden its following. Unlike NU, *Muhammadiya* had remained active in the political system through its affiliation with the United Development party (PPP), the sole Islamic party remaining after the 1973 reorganization of the party system. NU had quit the PPP in 1983—a move that caused great bitterness between the two because it undercut PPP's ability to compete in subsequent elections. This distrust also reflected the deep personal and ideological divide between Rais and Wahid. The latter denounced the former's xenophobic attacks on "Western civilization" and his verbal assaults on Indonesia's Christian and Chinese minorities, while Rais accused Wahid of "exaggerating differences among Muslims."[68]

One might assume that having benefited from NU's official endorsement of Pancasila as the sole basis of the state, the regime would now support Wahid

[65] Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia*, 54–5.

[66] Ibid., 56.

[67] On this dynamic, see Fred R. von de Mehden, *Two Worlds of Islam Interaction Between Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (Gainesville: University Of Florida Press, 1993).

[68] Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). Wahid also discussed these points with me during a 7 June 1999 interview.

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rather than his Islamist rivals. But because Suharto remained committed to authoritarian rule, he was hardly inclined to back Wahid. Their relationship worsened in 1990, when Suharto endorsed the creation of the government-sponsored Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). Chaired by Vice President B. J. Habibie, the ICMI's unstated purpose was to create a de-facto alliance between the regime and Islamists that gave the former control over the latter. But the entrance of Rais and other Islamists into the ICMI raised fears within NU that advocates of an illiberal Islamic vision might seize control of the state. These concerns were fed by radical Islamic groups such as the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council, whose leaders readily admitted: "After 1990, Soeharto became more conducive to Muslim wishes so we supported him."[69] As for the ICMI, several of its members who came from the PPP and *Muhammadiya* openly stated that the "purpose of the ICMI is to establish a new Masyumi"—an organization that would control all Islamic movements.[70] Thus, when *Muhammadiya* endorsed Suharto for a fifth term, Wahid grew alarmed. Although the government had pressured NU to follow suit, during its 1992 congress NU refused to do so, choosing instead to reaffirm its commitment to Pancasila. Still, if during the ensuing six years the relationship between the two leaders had its ups and downs, Wahid avoided actions that would irrevocably antagonize Suharto—a strategy that echoed his commitment to power sharing and ideological inclusiveness.[71]

The 7 June 1999 Elections: Dissonant Politics and Power Sharing

Wahid may have succeeded in transforming NU into a more liberal organization, but as was the case with Iran's Islamic left, such path innovation took place in a highly constraining institutional and ideological context. Although there was no Council of Guardians in Indonesia, Wahid's efforts were hindered by the state's authoritarian institutions. Thus, for example, in 1994 the regime tried to unseat Wahid by supporting a rival candidate for the position of NU chairman. Yet Wahid and his allies enjoyed one advantage that Iran's Islamic leftists lacked: the NU could be rapidly transformed into an organized political party. Thus, when the economic and financial crisis that swept through Asia in 1998 provoked violent riots and the burning of Jakarta's China Town, Suharto resigned in May. After the new acting president, B. J. Habibie, promised to hold democratic elections, NU came out of its political hibernation by forming the National Awakening party (PKB).

[69] Interview of Ahmad Soemargono, August 1998, in Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability*, rev. ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 26.

[70] Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia*, 93.

[71] In March 1991 Wahid, together with forty-four prominent intellectuals, established the Forum Democracy, an association that was largely made up of secular intellectuals. The Forum was created in part to provide a counterweight to the ICMI.

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Joining the PKB in the 7 June 1999 Representative Council (DPR) elections were the following: the ruling Golkar party, whose leader was Habibie; the Struggling Democratic party of Indonesia (PDI-P), led by the avowedly secular Megawati Sukarnopoutra (who was Sukarno's daughter and thus very popular); PPP, the official Islamic party; and Amin Rais's National Mandate party (PAN), whose support came mostly from *Muhammadiya.* In addition, there were a myriad of smaller parties such as the Crescent Start and Justice parties, both of which were Islamist groupings whose ideologies echoed the more fundamentalist orientation of the PPP.

The above line-up reflected the two most important divisions in Indonesian politics: between secularists and Islamists on one side and Islamists and Islamists on the other. Given this dissonant legacy, it appeared that an effective challenge to Golkar required alliances that transcended the secular-Islamist divide. Yet this outcome was hardly preordained. Indeed, Suharto's previous courtship of Islamists suggested an alternative: a conservative alliance between Golkar and PPP (and perhaps PAN) that would block a PDI-P/PKB alliance. But such a combination would certainly provoke a harsh response from the military, which opposed Suharto's efforts to coopt Islamists. Given that the military had seventy-five preassigned seats in the Consultative Assembly (MPR) (which was slated to elect the president in the fall of 1999), its position could not be ignored. Moreover, all of the above actors had to consider the main force pushing for immediate and broad democratic reforms—the students. Their daily demonstrations in front of the MPR showed that they were ready to do battle with the police and military to thwart any effort to block or water down political reforms.

For the PKB, this messy political field offered opportunities. While it had never won more than 18.7 percent of the vote, NU's moderate credentials put the PKB in a position to chart a midway course between the secular PDI-P and the Islamic parties. Although a stroke had left Wahid half blind and weak, he tried to secure a "contingent institutional compromise" (or political pact) that would advance democratic reforms without ceding the field to exponents of radical or precipitous changes. Thus, in November 1998 Wahid convinced Megawati and Rais to sign a manifesto that called for a package of moderate reforms. When student leaders then rejected the changes proposed by the MPR (which included reducing the military's DPR seats to thirty-eight but left intact that much discredited system for indirectly electing the president), Wahid tried to defuse the situation by calling for a "national dialogue" between all the main players, including Suharto. Similarly, during the campaign PKB leaders declared that so long as Islam remained separate from politics, they wanted "all components in society [to] participate in government."[72] The broad appeal of this inclusivist approach may explain why Wahid's nemesis—Rais—then signed a vague communiqué in which he, Megawati, and PKB chairman Alwi Shihab

[72] "PKB Promises 'National Reconciliation' if Elected," *The Jakarta Post*, 9 May 1999, in *FBIS-East Asia*, 8 May 1999.

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promised to "unite . . . to continue reform."[73] Since PAN's creation, Rais had worked hard to secure a more moderate and ecumenical image for himself and his party. But such efforts could not hide the close ties between PAN and *Muhammadiya*, many of whose members despised Megawati's secular policies. Trying to walk this tightrope, Rais then signed a separate alliance agreement with the PPP. This move only alienated Wahid and Megawati while encouraging *Muhammadiya's* supporters to vote for the PPP. As a result, PAN only won 7 percent of the vote, whereas the PDI-P prevailed with 34 percent, Golkar took 22 percent, PKB secured 13 percent, and PPP reached 11 percent.

The next order of business was for the 700-member MPR to elect a president. A body that met once a year, it consisted of the 462 recently elected DPR members, the DPR's thirty-eight appointed military officers, and 200 additional deputies chosen by a murky system of provincial and functional councils. Given Megawati's victory, she should have been the first choice for president, but two obstacles stood in her way. First, many Islamic leaders including some in PKB opposed electing a female president. The leaders of the PPP and PAN in particular feared that Megawati would pursue her father's anti-Islamic alliances and policies.[74] This fear was fed in part by Megawati's overtly secular orientation and also by what many Indonesians held was the over-representation of Chinese politicians in the PDI-P. Second, the existing election system gave Golkar's candidate, Habibie, an unfair advantage. The gerrymandered election system was not only designed to reward Golkar with more seats than was justified by its percentage of votes; it also gave Golkar disproportionate influence over choosing the MRP's 200 additional deputies. Thus, while Golkar won only 21 percent of the vote, it obtained 120 or 26 percent of the DPR's 468 elected seats. Along with the support from many of the 200 local and functional deputies, it was in a good position to forge a pro-Habibie alliance with Islamic parties, particularly the PPP, whose leaders were hardly advocates of liberal democratic reforms. Given that Habibie had continued to court Islamic leaders during the previous year, such a conservative alliance was not inconceivable.

But this was not to be. The military's pogrom in East Timor and the resulting insertion of United Nations troops in September 1999 forced Habibie to renounce his candidacy while it bolstered the authority of Golkar reformists who favored genuine democratic reform. Moreover, by discrediting the army, the East Timor debacle compelled the military to abstain from using its thirty-eight votes. Meanwhile, Rais secured the support of the major Islamic parties (known as the "Central Axis") for Wahid's candidacy, a development that Wahid actively encouraged. Rais's decision to back a man he so disliked is easily explained: at that moment Wahid was the only leader who could bring Indo-

[73] "No problem for Amien-Megawati Partnership," interview with Amien Rais, *Kompas Cberymedia* (www.compas.com/kompas-certak/9905/03English), 3 May 1999.

[74] The disproportionate role of Chinese in PDI-P's leadership ranks fed this fear. Although Wahid publicly supported Megawati, he privately feared that her candidacy would polarize the MPR and even the entire country. Interview with the author, 11 June 1999.

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nesia's contending voices around one table. But Rais was not out of the game. Having previously engineered his election as Speaker of the DPR, he was well positioned to influence Wahid's future moves.[75] Thus the table was set. On 20 October 1999 Wahid was elected president and Megawati vice president. He then assembled a government that included politicians from Golkar, PAN, PPP, PDI-P, and PKB. With the possible exception of Lebanon, this consociational arrangement was unprecedented in the Islamic world.

Communal Violence Versus the Art and Ethos of Power Sharing

From the outset, Wahid's cabinet was beset by three problems: a severe economic crisis, escalating demands in the Outer Islands for independence or autonomy, and Muslim-Christian bloodletting in the Maluccas Islands, where some 2,000 people had died since August 1999.[76] The latter two fires were constantly stoked by the economic crisis: demands for autonomy in Aceh (located on the northern tip of Sumatra), West Papua (previously known as Irian Jaya), and Riau echoed long-standing perceptions that Java had exploited the mineral and agricultural wealth of the Outer Islands.[77] Separatist sentiments were further inflamed by communal loyalties. For decades Aceh's Muslims, who were far more orthodox than those of Java, had struggled for autonomy from Jakarta. As for West Papau, some two-thirds of its population were Christian Melanesians who resented Muslim-Javanese domination. Yet, however vexing these two problems were, it was intercommunal bloodletting in the Maluccas Islands that presented Wahid with an immediate political problem. By inflaming Muslim public opinion in Java itself, the violence put pressure on the main Islamic parties to adopt a more sectarian stance towards the Christian and Chinese minorities.

Amien Rais of PAN and Hamzah Haz of PPP exploited such pressures. As leaders of the Central Axis parties that had backed Wahid, they apparently expected the new, and seemingly enfeebled president to do their bidding. Wahid disappointed them. He not only refused to blame Christians for the killings in the Moluccas; in the ensuing months he proposed several controversial ideas, such as lifting the thirty-four-year-old ban on the Communist party. The December 1999 resignation from the cabinet of PPP leader Hamzah Haz, Coordi-

[75] See Sangweon Suh and Jose Tesoro, "Maneuvering to the Top Amid Chaos," (http://www.conn.com/AsiaNow/asiaweek/magazine/99/1029/cover.1/html.), 29 October 1999.

[76] During the 1998 East Asian financial crisis real GDP fell by 20 percent in 18 months as the economy contracted by some 13 percent. In 1999 the economy remained stagnant, with average annual incomes holding at about $600.00. See "Survey Indonesia, Gus Dur's Second Chance," (http://www.economist.com/editorial/freeforall/20000708/su4532.html), 8 July 2000.

[77] Aceh has natural gas, Riau oil, East Kalimantan oil and timber, and Irian Jaya copper, gold, and timber. As Adam Schwarz has noted, in both Irian Jaya and Aceh, "the wealth produced per inhabitant . . . is among the highest in the Indonesia. But in both provinces income and consumption per person . . . fall much lower in the national ranking." See Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting* [1994 ed.], 63.

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nating Minister of People's Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, underscored the growing gap between Wahid and the Islamic parties. After Haz was replaced by Basri Hasanuddin, who had no ties to PPP, Haz declared that without PPP's help, there was "no way" that Wahid "could have been elected president."[78] Haz's allies were more direct. One PPP leader insisted that "Gus Dur's move is for the purpose of destroying PPP," while Rais warned his rivals not to "provoke the Central Axis into a fight, otherwise we would certainly retaliate."[79]

That retaliation came a month later, when at a Jakarta rally marking the end of Ramadan, Haz suggested to an audience of some 80,000 that the Central Axis parties should reconsider their support for Wahid. Rais agreed. After disclosing that PPP, PAN, the Crescent Star, and Justice parties had signed a pact that called for uniting the four parties into one single party in advance of the 2004 elections, Rais turned to the situation in the Moluccas Islands. "Thus far," he warned, "Muslims have been quiet patient, but even that has limits." The president, he demanded, had to resolve the fighting "in one or two weeks," or otherwise the Muslims might be "wiped out." Amien and Haz then endorsed a proposal made by several leading clerics that unless the government quickly halted the violence, a *jihad* would be launched against Christians.[80]

Haz and Rais surely knew that even the slightest hint of carrying out this threat would provoke a coup. While Wahid's decision in January 2000 to retire General Wiranto—and thus remove him from the cabinet—made such a move less likely, the military retained the means to intervene. That it failed to do so may be attributed not only to Wahid's bold actions (which were wisely applauded by the United States), but also to the fact that despite their differences, the Central Axis parties had little choice but to cooperate with Wahid and Megawati. Wahid himself often undermined such cooperation by making unilateral decisions that dismayed cabinet members from both secular and religious parties. For their part, the Islamic parties continued to make life difficult for Wahid. Thus in April 2000, after Wahid again suggested that the ban on the Communist party be lifted, Rais briefly threatened to initiate impeachment proceedings against the president. Several months later, PPP leaders backed a controversial proposal (which *both* Rais and Wahid rejected) to reintroduce the portion of the Jakarta Charter that called for the application of Islamic law.

However disconcerting, such developments have unfolded in a multipolar symbolic-institutional field that has made it hard for any one faction to impose

[78] "Why Only That One," *Gatra*, Number 4/VI, 11 December 1999 (http://www.gatranews.net/_english/VI/4/NAS3-4.html), 3 March 2000.

[79] "The Honeymoon Will Soon Be Over," *Gatra*, Number 4/VI, 11 December 1999 (http://www.gatranews.net/~english/VI/4/NAS1-4.html), 8 March 2000.

[80] *Suara Merdeka*, 17 January 2000 and 13 January 2000. (http://www.suaramerdeka.org/harian/0001/11/eng/2/html and 0001/13/eng2.html), 9 March 2000. Wahid bitterly denounced the call for *jihad*, as did other leaders of PKB. Moreover, Muslim leaders repeatedly insisted that the call for *jihad* meant merely that Muslims should wage a political struggle to defend their rights. Nevertheless, such a call was obviously irresponsible and dangerous.

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its will. Despite the push to introduce the Jakarta Charter's *Shariah* section, the leaders of PDI-P, PKB, and PAN continued to support the principle of keeping religion and state at arms length. Thus, it is unlikely that Indonesia will follow the sad example of Algeria, where the effort by militant Islamists to use democracy as a vehicle for imposing a counter-hegemonic project provoked a military coup and civil war. In Indonesia, political liberalization and power sharing are not Trojan horses for radical Islamization; rather they express a legacy of dissonant politics whose enduring logic is manifest in a politics of confrontation, brinkmanship, and negotiation among forces that have long advocated contending visions of community.

In July 2001, Wahid was forced out of office by the parliament. Megawati was then elected president, and Hamzah Haz vice-president. Given the latter's previous support for a more fundamentalist line, it is far from clear that this new chapter in power-sharing can succeed absent a critical role for the NU and its party, the PKB. Wahid may have made many efforts, but he was one of the few politicians who could mediate between secularists and Islamists. In time he may be missed.

Conclusion: Dissonant Versus Harmonic Politics

In this article I have used the concepts of multiple "paths" and "imaginations" to illuminate patterns of political change and negotiation that are not readily revealed by conventional analyses of regime transitions. But this has merely been a first step. Further studies of other dissonant states, such as Lebanon and Kuwait, must now be undertaken. If analyses of other dissonant states substantiate the central hypothesis—namely, that the institutionalization of multiple symbolic-institutional paths not only creates the space for regime-opposition accommodations, but also encourages ideological innovation within Islamic movements—then we will be on our way to forging a comprehensive middle-range theory of dissonant politics.

Three important lessons for the future study of comparative politics in general, and dissonant "Islamic" politics in particular, are suggested by this study. First, dissonant politics generates patterns of political change which do not move forward (or backwards) along one clear line. The notion that transitions involve the negotiation of a "bargained equilibrium" that allows political leaders to either move forward to democracy, or back to a more coherent and stable form of authoritarianism, does not readily apply to dissonant states.[81] Yet if their politics are messy and indeterminate, dissonant states are hardly unique or "exceptional." The seamless transition—from authoritarian crisis, to political liberalization, and finally to competitive democracy—that many scholars once hoped would become a universal trend has not materialized. In a world

[81] See Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 59.

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in which there is no end of history, accounting for different political systems and the different types of transitions they generate remains a key challenge for students of comparative politics.

Second, while the multiple legacies bequeathed by dissonant states are never static, they are not the mere handmaidens of a wider economic logic that can be arbitrarily molded by political entrepreneurs. In Indonesia, the ongoing economic crisis has certainly weakened the urban middle class and and discredited President Wahid, thus facilitating the efforts of the PPP to mobilize support for a more sectarian vision of Islam. By contrast, in Iran economic crisis has strengthened support for the Khordad Front, although efforts to impose economic reforms may provoke a backlash against the reformists. Yet while the ideological legacies inherited by the leaders of Iran and Indonesia have been affected by socioeconomic conditions, these leaders have discovered that the political logic that animates these legacies cannot be completely reinvented. President Khatami, for example, has redefined the ideology of the Islamic left in a more liberal direction. But he cannot easily expunge from this ideology the calculated nativism that gave it such force. Similarly, while President Wahid has tried to push the long-standing practice of elite competition in a more pluralistic direction, the well ingrained but destructive habit of viewing politics as a game of political one upmanship has endured.[82] In short, in both Indonesia and Iran, we have vivid examples of the shared scripts and routines that have received attention from new institutionalist scholars. What I have done is to show how such scripts and habits can be studied through a dynamic comparative lens that does not reduce them to reified structures that predetermine political outcomes.

Third, this article implicitly challenges the idea that the democratization in the Islamic polities hinges on forging a culturally authentic interpretation of democracy, one that will reflect a long-standing consensus as to what it means to be a Muslim. This notion not only exaggerates the extent to which such a consensus actually exists, but also underrates the impact of globalization in shaping the ideologies and programs of leaders such as Khatami, Soroush, and Wahid. These postmodern Islamists do not advocate a coherent synthesis of religion and politics. Instead, they offer ideological amalgams of contending symbols and traditions, some of which are indigenous, while others have been absorbed from the West. This does *not* mean that local cultural traditions are necessarily antagonistic to democracy. On the contrary, liberals such as Soroush and Wahid have turned to local forms of Islamic mysticism to defend pluralism. But their goal has not been to democratize Islam, but rather to get it out of politics. Indeed, the paradoxical fact is that Soroush and Wahid have invoked religious traditionalism and mystical spiritualism as symbolic bulwarks against the modernist ideologies of populists such as Iran's Shariati and Indonesia's Rais, both of whose world views were largely shaped during their years of graduate studies in Western universities.

[82] As Rais put it in May 1998, "I am going to play my own game . . . can play a good [game] with Gus Dur and Mega. . . ." See "Amien Rais on Abdurrahman-Wahid Megawati Coalition," *Kupan Pos Pupang*, 14 July 1998 in *FBIS East Asia*, 24 July 1998.

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This is not to say that the amalgams espoused by Wahid, Soroush, or Khatami must necessarily promote pluralism. By their very nature, such hybrids invite competing and even contradictory rationalizations for political action. The multiple imagination of Wahid, for example, contains both a modern notion of authority that speaks to the aspirations of the urban middle class and a traditional ethos that speaks to the patrimonialist worldview of rural, Javanese Muslims. While the grafting of these two logics has often encouraged pluralism, it has at times pulled Wahid in an autocratic direction. For example, his tendency to unilaterally issue orders to his ministers—a habit that reflects the patrimonialist ethos of a *kiai* (rural religious teacher)[83]—may be welcomed by his traditional followers, but it is resented by his more modern colleagues in secular and Muslim political parties.

Wahid's autocratic habits eventually led to a confrontation with the Majles in spring of 2001 when, following two financial scandals that touched his administration, he refused the DPR's calls for a full accounting of his actions. Antagonized by a president whose judgment may have been impaired by the effects of a stroke, Wahid's opponents initiated impeachment procedures even though the 1989 constitution stipulates that the president is not accountable to either house or parliament. That Wahid's competitors, including Megawati herself, were ready to manipulate constitutional procedures to attain power, and that Wahid in turn was prepared to block such efforts by threatening to impose a state of emergency, reminds us that dissonant political sysems are always double-edged swords. Their institutions—and the leaders they bequeath—encourage bargaining, competition, and even ideological pluralism, but they also promote political habits that can be deeply sectarian and often authoritarian.

The varied and often fragile outcomes that arise from this dissonant logic may be a far cry from competitive democracy, but they are preferable to the stifling politics that predominates in harmonic states. These states institutionalize a vision of authority and a dominant political practice that is the very antithesis of dissonant politics. Rather than promote multiple paths, they institutionalize path dependence by absorbing competing Islamic institutions and ideas and by championing the notion that the state is the sole vehicle by which the Islamic community can realize its shared identity and history. This dynamic not only narrows the space for path innovation and regime-opposition accommodation; by its very nature, it also invites counter-hegemonic movements whose ultimate goal is to compel the state to reassert its mission as the vehicle of cultural conformity. Faced by such counter-hegemonic movements and lacking alliance partners who can mobilize organized support for genuine power sharing, the leaders of harmonic states are likely to face two bad choices: to crush their competitors, or absorb the latter's message by encouraging greater Islamization.

Nearly all leaders have grappled with the paradoxical consequences that ensue when harmonic states are so successful at stifling alternatives that re-

[83] See "In Search of Magic Power From Kiai," *Gatra*, Number 39, VI, 12 August 2000. (http://www.gatra.com/−VI/39/LPT2-39.html).

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formers are easily convinced that sticking to old paths makes more sense than creating new ones. The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Malaysia have all contended with the beguiling legacy of harmonic institutionalization by repressing Islamic competitors while trying to control or monopolize the Islamic sphere. As for Algeria, its sad experience demonstrates how difficult it is to forge new institutional and ideological paths *ex post facto.* When in 1988 the former president of Algeria, Chadli Benjedid, initiated dramatic political reforms, he soon faced a mass movement whose crusade for a unified Islamic state echoed the National Liberation Front's (FLN) own hegemonic project. By insisting that the state recapture its historical mission as the *sole* vehicle by which the Algerian people expressed its authentic identity, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) acted as the "son" of the FLN.[84] Moreover, Benjedid's efforts to promote an Islamic alternative to the FIS also failed, in large measure because the alternative—the Hamas party—had little popular support and did not provide a genuinely pluralistic alternative to the counter-hegemonic ideology of the FIS.[85] Under such polarized conditions, which played right into the hands of hardliners in the military, hopes for political accommodation were doomed almost from the start.[86]

This unhappy outcome has little to do with Islam or the legacy of "Arab" or "Islamic" authoritarianism. The Arab nationalist ideologies propounded by Egypt's Nasser, or the leaders of the Ba'ath Party in Syria, were as much influenced by the West as they were by Islamic ideals. In short, symbolic contradictions are hardly absent in harmonic states. What counts is whether such contradictions are explicitly recognized and how they are institutionalized. Many harmonic states are as divided by ethno-religious identities or ideologies as other Third World societies. Yet, there is all the difference in the world between Syria or Iraq, states that—in Iliya Harik's evocative words—suffered "the imposition of uniformity on a pluralistic reality" by ethnic minorities who used the ecumenical language of Arab nationalism to defend particularistic interests; and Lebanon or Indonesia, states whose leaders allowed competing sociocultural groups to sink institutional roots in society at some distance from the state.[87] Whether by design or default, this dissonant pattern created possibilities for ideological innovations and accommodations that were not readily available to the leaders of harmonic states.*

[84] See Lahouari Addi, "L'utopie Islamiste," *L'impasse du Populisme, L'Algerie et la Democratie* (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1994), 143–65.

[85] See Hilmi Mahmud Qa'ud, *Al-Nizam al-Askari fi al-Jaza'ir* [The Military Apparatus in Algeria] (Cairo: Dar al-Itisam, 1993), 59.

[86] See Abed Charef, *Algerie Le Grand Dérapage* (Editions de l'aube, 1994). The Hamas party in Algeria had no relationship to Hamas in Palestine.

[87] Iliya Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (July 1972): 310.

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

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The Earned Income Tax Credit: Knowledge Is Money

KATHERIN ROSS PHILLIPS

The federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the largest cash transfer program for low-income parents in the United States.[1] The refundable tax credit supplements wages and offsets taxes paid by low-income workers. Research suggests that the EITC has not only been effective in moving families over the poverty line, but has also encouraged work among single mothers.[2] Recipients use money from the EITC for investments in education and savings as well as to help pay for daily living expenses and bills.[3]

The EITC is administered through the federal income tax system. To receive the credit, low-income workers must file a tax return, even if they are other-

[1] Nonadministrative program costs for the EITC were $30.8 billion for tax year 1998. Of that amount, $26.3 billion was refunded to recipients; the remainder went to offset taxes owed Internal Revenue Service, *Statistics of Income Bulletin* (Spring 2000): see table 2. The combined expenditure of state and federal governments on cash assistance under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) was $14.6 billion in fiscal year 1998. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources, Administration for Children and Families, "Expenditures in the TANF Program in Fiscal Year 1999." (http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofs/data/q499/hilites.htm), 5 October 2000.

[2] Nada Eissa and Hilary Williamson Hoynes, "The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Labor Supply of Married Couples," Working Paper 6856 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998); Bruce D. Meyer and Dan T. Rosenbaum, "Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers," Working Paper 7363 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1999); Kathryn Porter, Wendell Primus, Lynette Rawlings, and Esther Rosenbaum, *Strengths of the Safety Net: How the EITC, Social Security and other Government Programs Affect Poverty* (Washington DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1998).

[3] Timothy Smeeding, Katherin Ross Phillips, and Michael O'Connor, "The EITC: Expectation, Knowledge, Use, and Economic and Social Mobility," *National Tax Journal* 53 (December 2000): 1187–1209, and unpublished data from the NSAF.

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wise exempt from doing so. Therefore, knowledge of the EITC is essential if all eligible, low-income parents are to receive the credit. Furthermore, the EITC can only influence the labor supply of low-income parents who know about the program.[4] Although the federal government and many advocacy groups have designed outreach programs to increase EITC participation, relatively little is known about whether potentially eligible recipients are aware of the EITC.

Using data from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families (NSAF), this article examines demographic differences in knowledge about the EITC among parents across four divisions: (1) income and welfare participation; (2) marriage and education; (3) race, ethnicity and citizenship; and (4) state of residence.[5] Nearly two-thirds of all parents have heard of the EITC and just under 30 percent of parents have received the credit at some time. Low-income Hispanic parents are much less likely to know about the program than are low-income non-Hispanic parents of any race. Among low-income parents who know about the EITC, Hispanics are also less likely to have ever received the tax credit. Past welfare participants are more likely than current recipients or parents who have never received welfare to know about the program. Interestingly, living in a state with a state-level EITC program is not associated with a greater likelihood that low-income parents know about the national program, or that they receive the EITC. Before presenting these results in more detail, this article briefly reviews the legislative history of the EITC and explains the current program parameters.

The Earned Income Tax Credit: Program Parameters

The EITC program was implemented in 1975 to help offset the Social Security payroll taxes paid by low-income working parents and to encourage parents to work. Over the past twenty-five years, the EITC has grown dramatically through a large increase in benefits and expanded eligibility. In 1998, nonadministrative program costs for the EITC were $30.8 billion.[6] During that year, the EITC was responsible for lifting more children out of poverty than any other means-tested or social insurance program.[7]

Historically, the federal EITC has enjoyed political support from both parties. The program was implemented under a Republican administration, and it

[4] Some tax filers who rely on paid preparers may actually receive the credit without "knowing" about the program. For the 1998 tax year, significantly more EITC returns were filed with the assistance of a paid preparer (61.7 percent) than returns not claiming the EITC (53.3 percent). See Internal Revenue Service, unpublished analytical table B for the 1998 tax year, Washington, DC, 2000.

[5] The NSAF is nationally representative of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population under age 65 and their families. For more information about the survey, see Pat Dean Brick, Genevieve Kenney, Robin McCullough-Harlin, Shruti Rajan, Fritz Scheuren, and Kevin Wang, "Survey Methods and Data Reliability," Assessing the New Federalism Methodology Report No. 1 (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 1999).

[6] Internal Revenue Service, *Statistics of Income Bulletin*, table 2.

[7] Porter et al. *Strengths of the Safety Net*, 20.

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FIGURE 1
Maximum EITC for Different Family Types, 1975–2000 (in year 2000 dollars)



Source: Urban Institute calculations from data in the Green Book and from the Joint Committee on Taxation. Maximum Credit amounts were converted to 2000 dollars using the CPI-U available for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

was expanded during each subsequent presidency.[8] The three largest expansions of the federal EITC occurred in 1986, 1990, and 1993, during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. Figure 1 shows the maximum refundable tax credit under the EITC program from 1975 to 2000 in constant dollars. Initially, the EITC was available only to working families with children and, until 1990, the credit was not adjusted for family size. Thus, the bars for families with one child and families with two or more children are the same for the first fifteen years shown in Figure 1.

From 1975 through 1986, the size of the refundable credit did not keep pace with inflation. The Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, however, increased the size of the EITC credit, expanded the range of income over which a tax filer could receive the EITC, and indexed the credit for inflation. The 1986 modifications to the EITC were designed in part to eliminate the growing tax burden and diminishing wages faced by low-income workers.[9] The effects of the TRA on the real value of the maximum credit are apparent in Figure 1.

Among other changes to the EITC program, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990 increased the size of the EITC credit and separated the

[8] See Dennis J. Ventry, "The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969–99," *National Tax Journal* 53 (December 2000): 983–1026 for an interesting discussion of the political history of the EITC program.

[9] Ibid., 1003.

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FIGURE 2
Earned Income Tax Credit, 2000



Source: Urban Institute calculations from data from the Joint Committee on Taxation.

credit into two schedules—one for families with one child and another for families with two or more children. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 further increased the size of the credit and added a third EITC schedule for low-income workers with no children. The combination of the changes from the two OBRAs in the early 1990s resulted in a near tripling of the cost of the program.

Currently, the EITC is available only to low-income tax filing units (individuals or families) with earnings. The size of the EITC depends on the number of children in the tax filer's family and the level of family earnings. The EITC initially rises by as much as 40 cents for each additional dollar of earnings. During this phase-in range, the credit would be more than 2 dollars per hour for a minimum wage worker with two children. After the phase-in range, the EITC becomes a flat credit. Tax filers in the plateau range receive the maximum EITC. Benefits begin to phase out around the poverty thresholds for one adult families. For workers in the phase-out range, the EITC diminishes by up to 21 cents with each additional dollar earned.

Figure 2 shows the three EITC schedules for tax year 2000. The maximum credit for a working family with two children was $3,888. Families with two children and incomes between $9,720 and $12,690 could claim this maximum credit, and families with two children and incomes up to $31,152 were eligible for some EITC benefit. For comparison, the federal poverty level (FPL) in 2000 for a family of three with two children was $13,874. A single mother of two children

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who worked full-time at a minimum wage job would have earned $10,712 in 2000. With no additional earnings, this family would have been poor. If they received the EITC, the credit would increase their income by more than 36 percent—to $14,600—and move the family out of poverty.

The federal EITC is refundable; therefore, workers who have no tax liability can receive the full value of the credit. Because many poor workers are exempt from paying income taxes, the refundable nature of the EITC greatly enhances its ability to reduce poverty. In 2000, the income thresholds for tax filing ranged from $7,200 for a single tax filer to $12,950 for married filing jointly units. Heads of household were exempt from filing if their incomes were below $9,250.[10] For low-income workers who are required to pay taxes, the EITC helps to offset their tax burden. If the amount of the EITC exceeds the amount of income tax owed, the difference is refunded to the tax filer.

Low-income workers have two options for receiving the EITC: they can file a tax return with a schedule EIC at the end of the tax year or they can apply to receive a portion of the credit in their paychecks throughout the year. Very few workers take advantage of the advance payment option.[11] Low-income workers who do not file an income tax return will not receive any benefit from the program. Furthermore, low-income workers who do file a return, but do not claim the EITC on their return, might not receive the credit.[12]

Knowledge about the EITC: Demographic Differences

The remaining sections of this article explore demographic differences in knowledge about the EITC and receipt of the credit. Knowledge about the program is important for at least three reasons. First, knowledge about the EITC can increase program participation. Because many low-income workers are exempt from paying income taxes, they may not file a tax return. By not filing, these workers will not receive the EITC for which they are eligible. Second, according to economic theory, the EITC should encourage new entrants into the workforce as well as possibly increase the work effort among some current workers. The work-rewarding component of the EITC has helped the program maintain its relative popularity among policy makers. However, the EITC can only influence the behavior of persons who know about the program and under-

[10] Thresholds were obtained from the IRS website: http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/ind_info/ruf.html, 28 February 2001.

[11] Less than 1 percent of all EITC participants use the advanced payment option. See John Karl Sholz, "The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Compliance, and Antipoverty Effectiveness," *National Tax Journal* 47 (March 1994): 63–87.

[12] The IRS used to compute the EITC for low-income earners who appeared eligible for the credit but did not claim it. As of 1992, however, low-income tax filers must complete at least a portion of the schedule EIC in order to receive the EITC. Tax filers who appear to be eligible for the credit, but do not claim it, will receive a notice from the IRS. To receive the credit, nonclaimants must file an amended return with the schedule EIC. See Sholz, "The Earned Income Tax Credit."

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stand the program's parameters. Finally, knowledge about the program and its ability to "make work pay" can help improve its political and public appeal.

Data for the analyses are from the 1999 National Survey of America's Families (NSAF). The NSAF is nationally representative of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population under age 65 and their families. The 1999 NSAF included survey questions designed to measure knowledge about and receipt of the tax credit. Specifically, the NSAF asked:

1) Workers with low incomes can sometimes get benefits from the government in a tax refund or added to their paycheck. The program is called the Earned Income Tax Credit. Have you heard about the program?
2) Have you ever received the Earned Income Tax Credit? (This question was asked only of respondents who heard of the program.)

In households with children, the NSAF interviews the person who is most knowledgeable about each randomly selected child in the household. Throughout this article the term "parent" refers to the subset of most knowledgeable adults of the sampled children who are also parents. If the parent who knows the most about a child is not familiar with the family's finances, researchers' use of this sample may understate knowledge about the EITC.

Income and Welfare Participation

Nationally nearly two-thirds (65.9 percent) of all parents know about the EITC (Table 1). Given that the EITC is targeted to low-income adults, it is reasonable to assume that low-income parents are as knowledgeable about the program as higher-income parents. The first column in Table 1 shows this is not always the case. The knowledge difference between parents with incomes above 200 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) and parents whose incomes are near the FPL is not statistically significant.[13] However, very poor parents—those with incomes below 50 percent of the FPL—are significantly less likely than higher-income parents to know about the EITC (54.6 percent compared with 66.9 percent). Very poor parents are less likely to have worked during the last year and, therefore, less likely to be eligible for the EITC.

Parents who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or Food Stamps in the past, but who are no longer participating in the programs, are very likely to know about the EITC program. Across all parents, past AFDC/TANF participants are significantly more likely to know about the program (82.9 percent) than either current participants (61.6 percent) or parents who never received AFDC/TANF benefits (63.7 percent). The same pattern holds for Food Stamp participation. Among those who have heard about the EITC program, 78.9 percent of past

[13] The income thresholds used in this analysis are based on the FPL; the monetary value of the EITC, if received, is not included in the income status calculation.

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TABLE 1

Percent of Parents at Various Income and Program Receipt Levels Who Heard of and Who Ever Received the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1999

	Heard of the EITC	*Ever Received the EITC (parents who have heard of the EITC)*	*Ever Received the EITC (all parents)*
U.S. Average	65.9	45.1	29.5
Family Income as Percent of Federal Poverty Level			
Less than 50%	54.6**	49.0**	26.6*
50%–100%	65.7	68.6**	44.8**
100%–150%	64.5	75.0**	48.0**
150%–200%	68.3	69.6**	47.1**
Greater than 200%[a]	66.9	32.7	21.7
TAN/AFDC Use			
Current	61.6	54.2**	33.3**
Past	82.9**	78.9**	65.3**
Never[a]	63.7	38.5	24.3
Food Stamp Use			
Current	66.7	62.2**	41.3**
Past	77.7**	75.1**	58.1**
Never[a]	62.3	31.6	19.4

Source: Urban Institute calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America's Families.
** significantly different from comparison group at .01 level.
* significantly different from comparison at .05 level.
[a] Base category for statistical comparisons.

AFDC/TANF participants and 75.1 percent of past Food Stamp participants have received the EITC.

Not surprisingly, parents with incomes between 50 and 200 percent of the FPL are significantly more likely than higher-income parents to have ever received the EITC. The second column of Table 1 shows that three-fourths of parents with incomes just over the FPL who have heard about the EITC have received program benefits. Although knowledge of the program spills over into the higher-income group of parents, receipt of the benefit is limited to low-income workers. Hence, the remainder of this article focuses on parents with incomes below 200 percent of the FPL.[14]

Marriage and Education

Past research has found differential effects of the EITC on the labor supply of parents depending on their marital status: the EITC is related to increases in work effort among single mothers and, to a lesser extent, decreases in work ef-

[14] The sample is not restricted to workers. The EITC was designed to encourage new entrants into the workforce, but the program can only influence the labor supply decisions of low-income adults who know about the credit. Additional analyses, with the sample restricted to low-income workers, yielded the same pattern of results.

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TABLE 2

Percent of Low-Income Parents (Income below 200 percent of FPL) with Various Characteristics Who Heard of and Who Ever Received The Earned Income Tax Credit, 1999

	Heard of the EITC	*Ever Received the EITC (parents who have heard of the EITC)*	*Ever Received the EITC (all parents)*
U.S. Average	64.2	67.8	43.2
Marital Status			
Married[a]	59.3	65.9	38.5
Widowed	63.3	71.3	45.1
Divorced/separated	73.3**	73.0	53.4**
Never married	67.7**	68.7	46.3
Cohabitors	63.3	63.6	40.1
Education			
Less than high school	44.4**	60.1**	26.5**
High school graduate[a]	69.3	71.8	49.5
Some college	79.9**	69.1	55.0*
College+	68.5	60.1**	40.7

Source: Urban Institute calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America's Families.
** significantly different from comparison group at .01 level.
* significantly different from comparison at .05 level.
[a] Base category for statistical comparisons.

fort among married mothers.[15] Interestingly, knowledge about the EITC also differs by marital status. Married low-income parents are less likely than non-married low-income parents to know about or receive the EITC (Table 2). Among low-income parents who have heard of the program, divorced/separated parents are the most likely to have received the tax credit.

Low-income parents with some college education are the most likely to know about the EITC and to have ever received the credit (79.9 percent). In contrast, less than half of low-income parents who did not finish high school know about the program (44.4 percent), and less than a third have ever received benefits from the program (26.5 percent). When we look only at low-income parents who know about the program, those who did not graduate from high school are no less likely to have received the credit than low-income parents who graduated from college. However, both of these groups of low-income parents are significantly less likely to have received the credit than high school graduates (Table 2, column 2).

Race, Ethnicity, and Citizenship

Low-income Hispanic parents are much less likely to know about or receive the EITC than low-income non-Hispanic parents of any race. Most low-income

[15] Eissa and Hoynes, "The Earned Income Tax Credit," 3; and Meyer and Rosenbaum, "Welfare," 4.

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TABLE 3

Percent of Low-Income Parents (Income below 200 percent of FPL) Who Heard of and Who Ever Received the Earned Income Tax Credit By Ethnicity, Citizenship, and Interview Language, 1999

	Heard of the EITC	*Ever Received the EITC (parents who have heard of the EITC)*	*Ever Received the EITC (all parents)*
Native Born U.S. Citizen	73.2	69.4	50.5
Non-Hispanic	75.7	69.3	52.2
Hispanic	53.2**	69.4	36.5**
Naturalized U.S. Citizen	37.9	61.3	22.9
Non-Hispanic	48.5	63.1	30.1
Hispanic	29.6**	59.1	17.3*
Not a U.S. Citizen	21.6	42.8	9.1
Non-Hispanic	47.2	63.3	29.7
Hispanic	16.5**	31.3*	5.1**
English Interview	71.7	69.2	49.3
Non-Hispanic	74.2	69.1	51.0
Hispanic	53.6**	70.3	37.2**
Spanish Interview	15.4	26.1	3.9
Non-Hispanic	na	na	na
Hispanic	15.4	27.0	4.1

Source: Urban Institute calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America's Families.
** significantly different from non-Hispanics within category at .01 level.
* significantly different from non-Hispanics within category at .05 level.

parents know about the EITC program (64.2 percent), and a large portion have received the credit at some time (43.2 percent). More than three-quarters of low-income, white non-Hispanic parents have heard of the tax credit (75.9 percent), and more than half have received the credit (53.1 percent). Low-income, black non-Hispanic parents have similar knowledge and receipt rates (72.7 percent and 48.0 percent, respectively). In contrast, fewer than one in three Hispanic low-income parents know about the program (32.0 percent), and fewer than one in five have ever received the credit (18.4 percent). Among low-income parents who know about the program, the ethnic difference in EITC receipt is somewhat smaller, but still statistically significant.

To better illustrate the ethnic difference, Table 3 shows the percent of low-income parents who know about and who have ever received the EITC by citizenship status, ethnicity, and language of the NSAF interview. Among low-income immigrants, naturalized citizens are significantly more likely to know about the EITC than are noncitizens (37.9 percent compared with 21.6 percent). Both groups are much less likely to know about the tax credit than are low-income parents who were born in the United States (73.2 percent). These knowledge differences translate into differences in receipt rates. More than half of native low-income parents have received the EITC compared with 22.9 per-

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cent of naturalized citizens and 9.1 percent of noncitizens. Among low-income parents who know about the EITC program, receipt rates of U.S.-born and naturalized citizens are not statistically different.

Regardless of their citizenship status, Hispanic low-income parents are less likely to know about or to have ever received the EITC. However, when we take knowledge of the program among U.S. citizens into account, the receipt rates of Hispanic low-income parents do not differ statistically from the receipt rates of non-Hispanic low-income parents (column 2 of Table 3).

The ethnic difference in knowledge about the program might arise from a language barrier. Although the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) publication about the EITC is available in Spanish, the notice that the IRS sends out to potentially eligible tax filers who did not claim the credit is available only in English. The bottom half of Table 3 shows that low-income parents who had the NSAF administered in Spanish are significantly less likely to know about the EITC program than low-income parents who took the survey in English (15.4 percent compared with 71.7 percent). Even among low-income parents who had the survey administered in English, Hispanic parents are still much less likely to know about the EITC or to have ever received the credit than non-Hispanic parents (53.6 percent compared with 74.2 percent for knowledge, and 37.2 percent compared with 51.0 percent for receipt).[16]

State of Residence

In 1999, eleven states supplemented the federal EITC with their own earned income credit program. The sampling strategy of the NSAF allows us to examine knowledge of the EITC in thirteen states—five of which had a state-level EITC in 1999.[17] Given the large ethnic differences in knowledge about the program, Table 4 analyzes the state-level estimates separately for Hispanics and non-Hispanics. States with earned income credit programs are in bold and italicized in Table 4.

Although there is substantial variation among the states in the percent of low-income parents who know about the EITC, this variation does not seem to be associated with having a state-level earned income credit. For example, compared to the percentage of low-income non-Hispanic parents who know about the EITC nationwide (73.7 percent), the percentages are higher in two of the states that have earned income credits (Colorado, 85.7 percent and Min-

[16] The results of multivariate analyses that are not shown here confirm that Hispanic parents, regardless of their citizenship status, language, education, and other characteristics are much less likely than non-Hispanic, white low-income parents to either know about or to have ever received the EITC.

[17] Because the survey was in the field during 1999, Table 4 identifies states that had a earned income credit as of that year. Colorado enacted their earned income credit during 1999; the other states enacted their credits in 1998 or earlier. For information about state earned income credits, see Nicholas Johnson, *A Hand Up: How State Earned Income Tax Credits Help Working Families Escape Poverty* (Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1999).

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TABLE 4

Low-Income Parents (Income below 200 Percent of FPL) Who Heard of and Who Ever Received the EITC, by Ethnicity and State, 1999

	Non-Hispanic Low-Income Parents			*Hispanic Low-Income Parents*		
	Heard of the EITC (%)	*Ever Received the EITC (of parents who have heard of the EITC) (%)*	*Ever Received the EITC (all parents) (%)*	*Heard of the EITC (%)*	*Ever Received the EITC (of parents who have heard of the EITC) (%)*	*Ever Received the EITC (all parents) (%)*
U.S. Average	73.7	69.0	50.6	32.0	58.5	18.4
Alabama	73.0	73.8	53.5	na	na	na
California	58.5**	54.7**	31.9**	24.3**	na	13.7**
Colorado^	85.7**	63.5	54.3	47.0**	60.0	28.0
Florida	69.4	68.8	47.4	27.7	na	15.3
Massachusetts^	65.9*	68.1	44.0	29.2	na	17.6
Michigan	72.6	67.0	48.0	na	na	na
Minnesota^	79.8**	65.8	51.9	na	na	na
Mississippi	68.9	72.7	49.6	na	na	na
New Jersey	53.3**	68.2	35.9**	26.1	na	14.9
New York^	66.1**	65.5	42.9**	32.0	na	17.2
Texas	77.2	69.2	53.4	40.9**	62.7	25.5**
Washington	83.1**	70.4	58.3**	39.1	na	29.9*
Wisconsin^	77.9	70.4	54.3	45.9**	na	26.9

Source: Urban Institute calculations of the 1999 National Survey of America's Families.

** significantly different from the national average at .01 level.

* significantly different from the national average at .05 level.

^ Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin had state-level EITCs in place in 1999. Colorado enacted a state EITC in 1999.

"na" indicates that the sample size was too small to analyze.

nesota, 79.8 percent) and lower in two other states that have earned income credits (Massachusetts, 65.9 percent and New York, 66.1 percent). While there are many differences between the states listed in Table 4, urbanization and immigration are two potential factors that might help explain the state differences in future analyses.

Conclusion

For the majority of its twenty-five-year history, the federal EITC has enjoyed political support from both parties. While eligibility for and spending on other social programs was reduced during the 1990s, the size of the EITC program grew. During the current (2001–2002) session of Congress, policy makers have been calling for both additional expansions and new retrenchments of the EITC program. Before adjusting the parameters of the program, it would be helpful for policy makers to know whom the EITC benefits and who may lack the knowledge required to fully participate in the program.

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A primary reason for the EITC's popularity among politicians and the public is the perception that the tax credit rewards work. However, for the EITC to meet its goals of encouraging and rewarding work among low-income adults, it is very important that those eligible know about the tax credit and its benefits. Almost two out of three parents have heard about the EITC, and parents with incomes near the poverty line and past welfare participants are among the most likely to know about the program. These results suggest that knowledge about the EITC is fairly well targeted toward currently eligible parents.

Specific subgroups of the population, however, are less likely to know about the EITC program. Low-income Hispanic parents are less than half as likely as low-income non-Hispanic parents to have heard of the tax credit. In addition, very poor parents—those who are the least likely to have worked recently—are less likely than higher-income parents to know about the program. Furthermore, although the EITC can help provide an effective bridge from welfare and Food Stamp participation toward economic self-sufficiency, current welfare and Food Stamp participants are less likely to know about the program than are former recipients.

Demographic differences in knowledge about the EITC program can translate into differential receipt patterns among eligible low-income workers. The receipt rates presented in the above tables demonstrate this outcome for parents and suggest populations that policy makers, government officials, and advocates should target in their EITC outreach programs.*

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Rethinking Media Politics and Public Opinion: Reactions to the Clinton-Lewinsky Scandal

REGINA G. LAWRENCE
W. LANCE BENNETT

In one of the great political ironies of modern times, Bill Clinton weathered a year-long sexual and obstruction of justice scandal and became only the second president in U.S. history to be impeached, while maintaining some of the most impressive public approval ratings of any modern president. In a phenomenon at first curious and then truly remarkable, public support for Clinton's performance steadfastly held in the mid-60 percent range and occasionally surpassed 70 percent in some polls even as the House of Representatives voted to impeach him and the Senate conducted an impeachment trial. This public response was not well predicted by dominant models of public opinion and political communication, leading to considerable scholarly head-scratching. Ultimately, many political scientists have drawn two conclusions: the media coverage of the scandal did not matter to public opinion nearly as much as nonmedia influences; and the public responded to the scandal in relatively thoughtless ways, relying on simple heuristics like the state of the economy to decide whether the president should be impeached.

For example, writing in the early months of the scandal, public opinion scholar John Zaller argued that the public's continued support for Clinton in the face of the Monica Lewinsky story could be accounted for by reference to three a priori variables not subject to media influence: peace (the lack of serious

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international threats to the United States), prosperity (the strong state of the economy), and Clinton's moderate policy positions.[1] We dub this the 3Ps model. In Zaller's interpretation, the heavily-covered Lewinsky spectacle did not affect public opinion in any significant way, and media cues mattered far less than people's heuristic assessments of how Clinton's policies had benefited them by providing peace and prosperity. Zaller dismissed the importance of mediated political communication altogether, since the most obvious media "cues" did not trigger the expected response in the most obvious dependent variable. Since the highly negative media coverage filled with attacks on Clinton by other political elites in the early weeks of the scandal appeared to have lowered Clinton's approval ratings only slightly and temporarily, Zaller reasoned, media coverage did not affect public opinion. Zaller's argument has been joined by other scholars, such as Gary Jacobson, who argued in the pages of *Political Science Quarterly*, "The simplest explanation for Clinton's continuing support is probably the most compelling: to borrow the watchword from his 1992 campaign, 'the economy stupid.'"[2]

These scholarly arguments, though more sophisticated, resonate with a common argument found in popular discourse as well: the public would have reacted differently to the scandal if the economy had been in bad shape. It became common wisdom among Republican supporters of impeachment and among many pundits that the economy was a major factor, if not the major factor, bolstering Clinton's approval ratings and depressing public support for impeachment.[3] Popular discourse also echoed another theme raised by Zaller: the public paid little attention to the over-heated Lewinsky story except as an entertaining and titillating diversion.[4] Largely fueled by a focus on Clinton's steady approval ratings in the face of highly-sensationalized media coverage of the Lewinsky story, the view arose in both academic circles and popular discourse that any political significance the scandal may have had was outweighed by its sheer entertainment value as a drama of sex and power in the Oval Office. In this view, the Lewinsky scandal was just one more example of the growth of "sensationalized news" that pundits, some journalists, and many scholars increasingly bemoan.[5]

[1] John Zaller, "Monica Lewinsky's Contribution to Political Science," *PS* 31 (June 1998): 182–88.

[2] Gary Jacobson, "Impeachment Politics in the 1998 Congressional Elections," *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (Spring 1999): 46.

[3] Republican leaders also questioned the validity of the polls, which showed steady majorities in opposition to impeachment. See David E. Rosenbaum, "G.O.P. Says It Ignores Critical Polls on Inquiry," *New York Times*, 27 September 1998.

[4] See, for example, Neal Gabler, *Life the Movie: How Entertainment Conquered Reality* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).

[5] Critiques of sensationalized coverage of the Lewinsky scandal have been made by Gabler, *Life the Movie*; Jim Lehrer, "Blurring the Lines Hurts Journalism," *Nieman Reports* (Summer 1999) 60–1; and Samuel Popkin, "When the People Decline to Be Spun," *New York Times*, 10 November 1999, among others. For an opposing view, see Michael Gartner, "How the Monica Story Played in Mid-America," *Columbia Journalism Review* (May/June 1999): 34–6; and Public Agenda, "Journalists Give Press High Grade for Scandal Coverage," (http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/cjrpolls/cjroct.htm), 15 December 1998.

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In response to these common arguments about the minimal significance of political communication during the Lewinsky scandal, we argue for an expanded conception of media politics and a richer conceptualization of public opinion. We suggest that the notion of media effects needs to be expanded to include broader evidence of media influences and public political engagement, and that the public (or some publics) should be given credit for some degree of critical engagement with the scandal story. In this effort, we follow the work of other scholars who have explored how individuals process news information to construct the "common knowledge" beneath the surface of public opinion,[6] how publics may engage in deliberative responses to news stories in ways that go beyond the expression of simple opinions,[7] and how public responses to major political events may stem from different publics' competing interpretations of what those events really mean.[8] We seek to develop these broader notions of mediated political engagement and show how they can illuminate aspects of public opinion left unexplained by simpler attitude-change models of media politics. We begin with a discussion of the conceptual grounds for this expanded view and then review some empirical evidence for it.

Thinking About How Monica Mattered

The conventional model of political communication, exemplified in the studies cited above, implies that media spectacles like the Lewinsky scandal contain little of substance for the public or for the scholar if they do not result in clear and significant shifts in simple indicators like presidential approval ratings. This way of thinking about the significance of the Lewinsky scandal and media politics more generally can be challenged on several grounds.

First, Zaller, Jacobson, and other observers are surely correct that external factors such as the state of the nation's economy shaped public responses to the scandal, particularly on the dimension of presidential approval. But generalizing from this single, simple causal relationship to mass-mediated politics overall risks considerable distortion in our thinking about how publics actually process information in the news. A broader review of public opinion data from throughout the scandal suggests other dynamics not so easily captured by simpler models. Moreover, we agree with Zaller that the tradition of political communication studies focusing on the "poorly informed, psychologically driven, and 'mass mediated' [nature of] public opinion" has not readily accepted that the public "is capable of recognizing and focusing on its own conception of what

[6] Doris A. Graber, *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1988); W. Russell Neuman, Marion R. Just, and Ann N. Crigler, *Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of Political Meaning* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

[7] William Gamson, *Talking Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Benjamin Page, *Who Deliberates?* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[8] Virginia Sapiro and Joe Soss, "Spectacular Politics, Dramatic Interpretations: Multiple Meanings in the Thomas/Hill Hearings," *Political Communication* 16 (July-September 1999): 285–314.

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matters."[9] In this case, however, "what matters" included what occurred inside the news drama, not just the state of the economy. It appears that the public—or more accurately, various publics—monitored ongoing events in the Lewinsky scandal and related them to a range of issues on which their opinions continued to develop. The public's categorization of the Lewinsky affair as a private rather than a public matter, the majority public's ambivalence about the concept of "moral leadership," the different symbolic constructions of Bill Clinton's character by different subgroups, and the majority's declining approval of the Republican leadership all indicate that something more than simple economy- or policy-based heuristics guided public opinion. The opinions expressed in polls show some level of engagement with themes and developments in the news.

Empirically, public reactions to the Lewinsky/impeachment scandal invite us to build a richer conceptualization of mass-mediated public opinion. The Lewinsky case suggests that public opinion is best understood not simply as a stimulus-response process in which elite and media cues are either accepted or rejected by the public, but as a dynamic process in which various publics construct understandings of news events and political issues based in large part on (but not limited to) information, narratives, and symbols provided by political elites and the media. In cases like the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, "what matters" extends beyond simple self-interested decisional heuristics and automatic affective responses to include symbolic constructions and collective sense-making of the political world. This collective sense-making includes the categorizing and defining of actors, issues, and events; the interaction of media symbols with personal and social identities; and the collective construction of and response to news narratives, not just to free-floating cues.

Expanding our conception of political communication in the Lewinsky scandal also offers normative payoffs. Consider, for example, a troubling flip side to the normative implications of a 1-P economy-based analysis of public opinion. Both the House and Senate debates over impeachment reveal that when public opinion is labeled as motivated by good economic times, it becomes easier for politicians to dismiss it. It is harder to dismiss public opinion if it can be shown that the public was engaged with the extensive mainstream media discourse on privacy, lying, kinds of lying, presidential responsibilities to the public, and other important issues evoked by the unfolding scandal.

While pundits and scholars alike have been reluctant to attribute much serious deliberation to the general public during the highly-sensationalized scandal, it is possible that the relentless media focus on the Lewinsky story, dysfunctional as it was in one sense, also created conditions for the public to engage with and even to deliberate—however imperfectly—about substantive issues at the heart of the story. This quasi-deliberation was likely aided by the fact that the issues the scandal raised were not so much technical or legal questions

[9] Zaller, "Monica Lewinsky's Contribution," 186.

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(despite the legalistic turn taken by much of the impeachment proceedings) as they were moral and normative questions: Should the president have sexual relations with a younger employee, even if fully consensual? Does a president's sexual behavior tell us how he will govern? Should the president be forced to publicly disclose his marital infidelity? Would having sex in the Oval Office, denying it to the public, and then encouraging others to conceal it from the legal system constitute grounds for impeachment? These kinds of questions are arguably less prone to mechanistic elite and media cueing than the technical, legal, or public policy questions that surround so many opinion situations, precisely because they are questions for which publics can more readily develop independent standards of judgment.[10]

Thus, public reactions to the Lewinsky scandal may have involved more engagement and deliberation, or at least more meaning-making, than standard approaches to public opinion might suggest. For example, the issue of whether the relationship between Clinton and Lewinsky involved consenting sex or sexual harassment warrants consideration as an important political judgment. The sexual politics of the situation provided a particular context in which people decided a variety of issues directly related to the scandal, from the question of what was appropriately a public or a private matter, to the seriousness of presidential lying under oath and to the American people, to the ultimate questions of presidential approval and impeachment. These dimensions of public opinion are overlooked when we focus simply on freestanding, a priori factors like peace, policy performance, and prosperity, which in turn obscure whatever public deliberation may have occurred during the scandal.

Making Sense of Monica

At first glance, the empirical record suggests that the 3Ps model provides a parsimonious explanation for Clinton's consistently high approval ratings during the course of the scandal. (See Figure 1.) But other opinion data from across 1998 complicate that parsimonious picture. As is also indicated in Figure 1, for example, when the Pew Center for the People and the Press first asked respondents in late January 1998 whether Clinton should be impeached if he had "lie[d] under oath about having an affair with Monica Lewinsky," contingent support for impeachment was rather high (50 percent), even as Clinton was riding a wave of rising popularity following his State of the Union speech. Support for that proposition dropped to 40 percent by late March and to 31 percent by late July as new developments in the story waned and public attention lagged, but jumped again to 42 percent in early September after Clinton, in a televised address, admitted lying to the American public. These shifts occurred even as approval ratings for Clinton remained more stable. Responses such as these cannot be accounted for by a model of media-independent judgment.

[10] See Daniel Yankelovich, *Coming to Public Judgment* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), chap. 4.

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FIGURE 1
Clinton Approval Rating and Support for Impeachment



Note: ◆ Gallup; ■ NYT/CBS; △ Pew; × Support for impeachment if Clinton lied under oath*; ✳ Support for impeachment if Clinton encouraged Monica Lewinsky to lie*.

Source: Data are based on data reported by the Pew Center for the People and the Press, the *New York Times*/CBS poll, and the Gallup poll. Only one data point is omitted here: Pew measured an approval rating for Clinton of 55 percent on 19–20 September, before Clinton's videotaped grand jury testimony was released; after the videotape was released, Pew measured an approval rating of 62 percent, as shown here.

*Percent agreeing that Clinton should be impeached in these circumstances, according to Pew Center polls.

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In exploring the public opinion record, we have discovered at least four phenomena that indicate how the public (or segments of it) interacted with developments in the media spectacle to arrive at particular conceptions of what mattered in the Lewinsky story: the majority public's categorization of the Lewinsky affair as a private matter; the public's ambivalence about the concept of moral leadership, different subgroups' differing assessments of Clinton's character, and public evaluations of key characters in the story from Kenneth Starr to the Republican leadership. In some cases, we note that engagement with new information occurred, but as the new information proved implausible or insufficient to upset existing understandings, opinion returned to pre-event levels. In other cases, particularly with regard to judging the Republican party and its capacity to deal with other policy issues, developments in the news narrative resulted in significant changes in opinion.[11]

The Public/Private Distinction: Finding A Deliberative Guideline

We begin with the observation, which we are hardly alone in noting, that the majority public's categorization of the scandal as a private matter appears to have been crucial to Clinton's steadily high approval ratings; it also appears to have contributed to the limited public support for impeaching Clinton and to the steady decline in the approval ratings of Republicans. This categorization emerged fairly quickly after the scandal first surfaced and remained throughout the following year, and it may reflect a rather independent judgment on the part of the public against media hype. But the public-private distinction that became so important to how the majority public made sense of the Lewinsky allegations was not completely impervious to information, cues, and narrative developments publicized by the media. Indeed, it drew in important ways on the particulars of the story itself and on the media environment.

That the public-private distinction shaped public responses to the scandal seems clear. As Molly Sonner and Clyde Wilcox observe, "For many Americans, Clinton's affair with Lewinsky was a private matter of importance only to them and Hillary Clinton."[12] This judgment arose early in the scandal. Writ-

[11] The analysis presented here utilizes polling data from four sources: The *New York Times*/CBS poll, the *Los Angeles Times* poll, the Gallup poll, and polls conducted by The Pew Center for the People and the Press. All four organizations conducted extensive polling throughout the year-long Lewinsky/impeachment scandal and in many cases repeated particular questions often enough to yield useful comparisons across time. Much of the Pew Center data analyzed here was obtained directly from the Center's private archives, though some is available from the Center's on-line archives (www.people-press.org/content.htm); Pew Center data has been cited to those archives when possible. Data from the *Los Angeles Times* polls (http://www.latimes.com/news/timespoll/stats/HTML/archive1.htm#1998) and the Gallup poll (www.gallup.com) were gathered from their extensive on-line poll archives. Data from the *New York Times*/CBS polls were gathered from the Nexis database.

[12] Molly W. Sonner and Clyde Wilcox, "Forgiving and Forgetting: Public Support for Bill Clinton During the Lewinsky Scandal," *PS* 32 (September 1999): 554–557. See also Molly W. Sonner and Clyde Wilcox, "The Paradoxes of Clinton's Popularity" in Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, eds., *The Clinton Scandal and the Future of American Government* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000).

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ing in the *Washington Post* in March 1998, Kathleen Hall Jamieson observed that a majority of the public had drawn "a clear distinction between private and public character; between the personal and the presidential."[13] Jamieson cited a Harris Poll from 25 February 1998 showing 80 percent agreement with the proposition that "in judging Clinton, we should focus on how the country is doing and his policies, and not on his private life." The common logic behind this public/private distinction appeared time and again across different kinds of poll questions throughout the scandal—a remarkably robust phenomenon.

For example, of the plurality of 41 percent of respondents to a *Los Angeles Times* poll in September 1998 who said Congress should "drop the matter" rather than impeach or censure Clinton, 35 percent, the largest group of open-ended responses by far, said it should be dropped because it was a private family matter. The second-largest group of responses said that the matter should be dropped because "lots of people have affairs and lie about it." The third-largest group, 10 percent, said it should be dropped because Clinton was an effective president.[14] In August 1998, the Pew Center asked people who believed the Clinton-Lewinsky relationship was wrong *why* it was wrong. Sixty-three percent rejected the response, "because Clinton is the president, not an ordinary citizen," thus apparently rejecting the notion that a higher standard of morality and public disclosure of sexual behavior should be imposed on a president than on private citizens. Pew also asked people in September, "In your opinion, how can we best avoid things like the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal in the future: by electing a president with high moral character or by making sure that a president's private life remains private?" Sixty percent chose the latter.

This public/private distinction, as Jamieson suggested, did not simply indicate that private feelings about a president's character may be displaced by substantive judgments about a president's favorable policy performance, as a 3Ps model might suggest. Rather, the "clear line between public and private conduct" may have operated as a standard of public morality that the public applied to judgments about the behavior of the press and Clinton's opponents as well. It is quite possible, in other words, that the majority, or segments of it, concluded that the president's affair with Monica Lewinsky was not a public matter and that by extension it should not have dominated the news and consumed the energies of the nation's leaders. Where the public drew the line between public and private appears to have been influenced by a widespread belief that Clinton's misbehavior was not uncommon among those in public life, but merely unusual in having been made public.[15]

[13] Kathleen Hall Jamieson, "That Clear Line Between Public and Private Conduct," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 30 March 1998, 21.

[14] *Los Angeles Times* poll #417, 15 November 1998.

[15] See, for example, The Gallup Organization, "Public Generally Tolerant of Presidential Extramarital Affairs," (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr980306.asp), 6 March 1998; Sonner and Wilcox, "Forgiving and Forgetting," 557.

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The public/private categorization has been interpreted by some scholars as simply a case of large-scale motivated reasoning based on good economic times. According to Jacobson, "the Clinton administration's performance on things that directly affect people's lives, especially the economy, was so strong that most people resolved whatever cognitive dissonance the scandal provoked by maintaining a sharp public/private distinction."[16] Another version of this argument is that the public/private concept merely reflected partisanship or voter loyalty among a public that, having given Clinton their vote in 1996, was unwilling to revise its opinion of him. One study has documented some motivated reasoning in a sample of respondents to one survey, finding that "those who liked Clinton [already] were able to avoid the psychologically uncomfortable position of supporting his resignation, even if certain that he had the affair with Lewinsky, simply by discounting the importance of the events."[17] Broader survey data also suggest that Democrats and those who voted for Clinton in 1996 were more likely than Republicans or non-Clinton voters to invoke the public/private distinction.

Partisanship certainly played a role in overall public reaction to the scandal. Unsurprisingly, Democrats continued to support Clinton more readily throughout the scandal than did Republicans or Independents. Partisanship alone cannot explain Clinton's very high approval ratings throughout the scandal, however, since the percentage who continued to express approval of Clinton's job performance far outnumbered the percentage of solid Democrats in the population. It is also clear that Clinton succeeded in holding the support of those who had voted for him. Pew Center polls, for example, show over 85 percent of those who voted for Clinton in 1996 continued to approve of his performance in office by September 1998. Given that Clinton won only 49 percent of the popular vote in 1996, however, voter loyalty also cannot fully explain his strong majority support throughout the scandal. Similarly, while some data suggest that motivated reasoning was at work among "Clinton enthusiasts" who were strongly supportive of the president,[18] those data may not explain as well the response of that all-important strata of Independents, swing voters, and others who were not otherwise Clinton enthusiasts—people upon whom Clinton's persistently high approval ratings crucially depended.

More importantly, explanations that put partisanship, voter loyalty, and motivated reasoning first beg the central question upon which the entire scandal turned: Was Clinton's behavior deserving of resignation, let alone impeachment? Only if one assumes that Clinton clearly, objectively deserved resignation or impeachment, or even seriously impaired approval ratings, can this argument for motivated reasoning be sustained; only if one assumes that these outcomes were unavoidable can it be contended that the public "avoided"

[16] Jacobson, "Impeachment Politics," 46.

[17] Mark Fischle, "Mass Response to the Lewinsky Scandal: Motivated Reasoning or Bayesian Updating," *Political Psychology* 21 (no. 1, 2000): 155.

[18] Fischle, "Mass Response."

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them.[19] In contrast to this scholarly picture of clear meanings and clearly deserved outcomes of the scandal, the key questions at the heart of the scandal were how to characterize Clinton's behavior and what punishment that behavior deserved, questions for which there were several different but reasonable answers.

Thus, though some motivated reasoning was probably occurring, it is equally possible that constructing the public/private distinction was one way that some publics engaged with the media spectacle as they decided the appropriateness of impeaching a president on the basis (largely) of his sexual behavior—a dynamic not captured by simpler, more mechanistic models of public opinion. In addition to determining heuristically if their personal feelings about Clinton's behavior outweighed the benefits they gained from his presidency, people may also have asked a normative question of whether or not his sexual behavior was the public's business and should be the basis for impeachment—a normative decision quite plausibly reflected in the robust and persistent public/private distinction reviewed above.

Moreover, though it emerged early in the scandal and drew upon extra-media factors such as a cultural common sense about the sex lives and honesty of public officials, the public/private distinction did not take shape independently of the media environment. The White House and Clinton's allies encouraged the "private" categorization in a variety of ways. Clinton encouraged the public to place the Lewinsky scandal in the private category, for example, by his careful rhetorical performance in his 1998 State of the Union address, delivered just days after the Lewinsky allegations first surfaced. Despite the intensely negative media coverage during that period, the public responded favorably to Clinton's speech—a phenomenon Zaller attributes to public support for the careful, moderate policy proposals and policy accomplishments that Clinton highlighted in his speech.[20]

While the public clearly reacted positively to Clinton's policy positions (not surprisingly, since all had undoubtedly been extensively poll-tested), it also appears that they responded to Clinton's rhetorical performance of his symbolic, ritualized role as president. Clinton chose in that speech not to remind the public of the Lewinsky allegations—not to mix his public role with his private behavior—and worked hard to appear presidential. His rhetorical performance arguably influenced public opinion as much as his recital of policy positions and accomplishments. Some evidence for this proposition is found in the *Los Angeles Times* poll, which found that three-fourths of the people who had

[19] This assumption that Clinton objectively deserved to lose political power because of the Lewinsky matter seemingly underlies Fishcle's argument. For example, Clinton supporters "expended a great deal of energy processing [the] evidence in such as way as to 'construct seemingly reasonable justifications' for the things they believed and wanted to continue to believe: namely, that Clinton was, and is, a good leader." See Fischle, "Mass Response," 151.

[20] This observation is supported by other data as well; see, for example, the *Los Angeles Times* poll #406, 15 November 1998.

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watched the speech rated it as "good" or "excellent," and that two-thirds reported that it "kept my attention and I didn't think about the allegations against him."[21] Moreover, as Zaller's data indicate, media coverage of the president improved after the speech.[22] Thus, Clinton's rhetorical decision to take the high road by addressing policy questions rather than his political problems or his opponents' motives may have helped people sustain the policy considerations on which, according to the conventional wisdom, his approval depended. In contrast, Clinton's approval ratings dropped and support for impeachment and approval of Republican congressional leaders grew when, in his August televised "apology" to the nation, he engaged in a spirited attack on his political enemies. Other administration efforts to shape public perceptions of the scandal cannot be discounted as an important part of the media environment in which public perceptions of the scandal took shape.[23] These include public statements of support by Mrs. Clinton, Al Gore, and Madeleine Albright; suggestions to reporters that Lewinsky and Linda Tripp were not credible and that Kenneth Starr's investigation was partisan; attacks on the journalistic standards of major news organizations; and appearances by key administration officials on political talk shows.

Thus, the public/private distinction may not have been as impervious to developments in the news as a 3Ps model suggests. The news was replete with references to the Lewinsky story as an essentially private matter. One small but suggestive indication of the prevalence of media cues about the private nature of the story is the number of references to "private life" and "private matter" in the *New York Times* early coverage of the story. In January 1998 (the same time period that Zaller examines in his analysis of negative media coverage of the scandal), the *Times* published forty-eight stories that mentioned both "Lewinsky" and "private." While most of these (53 percent) were innocuous references to things like private meetings, private-sector jobs, and private investigators, a significant proportion (37 percent) were direct descriptions of the Lewinsky story as a "private matter" or "private affair" or euphemistic references to Clinton's "private life." Only two stories directly challenged the notion that this "private matter" was irrelevant to Clinton's public job performance. This prevalence of the private category also fed in circular fashion from the public to the media to the public again, as several early news stories reported poll findings and interviews in which members of the public claimed that the scandal was a private matter that should not preoccupy the public or the press.

One counterfactual condition might have changed where people drew the clear line between public and private, however. While counterfactuals alone cannot serve as conclusive evidence, of course, they can suggest alternative theories and hypotheses that lie outside simpler models of public opinion. What

[21] Ibid.

[22] Zaller, "Monica Lewinsky's Contribution," 183.

[23] Howard Kurtz, *Spin Cycle* (New York: Free Press, 1998).

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if, as Jamieson suggested, the sex between Clinton and Lewinsky had not been consensual but was persuasively shown to have been the result of harassment on the part of the president toward an employee? Such a circumstance could have invited the recategorization of Clinton's behavior as public. A variety of possible developments in the news narrative could have encouraged the public to recategorize the affair, which in turn could have touched off a very different media and opinion dynamic. Key presidential support groups may have removed their endorsements for Clinton, different legal charges may have been developed, and a different application of the public/private norm may have resulted in different patterns in approval ratings and support for impeachment. If the story line had developed differently, in other words, it may have been harder for scholars to conclude that media spectacle doesn't matter to presidential approval in times of peace and prosperity.

Suggestive evidence on this point can be found in responses to the *New York Times*/CBS poll, which asked respondents at several points in time if the Lewinsky situation constituted more of a public or a private matter.[24] There were only two statistically significant drops below the steady 60 percent of "private" responses, both of which occurred after major developments in the Lewinsky story. The first occurred in March, after former White House employee Kathleen Willey made public on *60 Minutes* her allegations of sexual harassment. This event was a candidate for the kind of counterfactual that Jamieson suggested. It became the object of a great deal of media spin both from the White House and Kenneth Starr's office, which leaked news of subpoenas of Willey's friends and suggestions that a pattern of harassment was more characteristic of Clinton than the consensual sex in the Lewinsky case. The August release of the Starr report, with its graphic details of Clinton and Lewinsky's Oval Office trysts, triggered another media frenzy fueled in part by Republican spin attempting to frame the affair as a public issue. On both of these occasions, the percentage of respondents saying the Lewinsky matter was more of a private than a public matter dropped to below 60 percent, though still comprising solid majorities of the public.

Viewed through the traditional political communication lens, these fluctuations may look merely like temporary and meaningless divots. Viewed through the lens of public meaning-making, however, they suggest that some publics temporarily redrew the line between public and private in response to developments in the Lewinsky narrative. The majority public, nevertheless, apparently was not persuaded that Lewinsky or Willey had been sexually harassed, nor that having sex in the Oval Office made it a public matter. These judgments were made not by ignoring the media spectacle but by attending to

[24] The *New York Times* did not consistently report the exact wording of these poll questions, though most appear to have asked respondents whether the Lewinsky situation was "a private matter having to do with Clinton's personal life" or "a public matter having to do with his job as President." Some *New York Times*/ CBS polls asked respondents whether the situation was "more" a matter of one or the other, rather than offering a simple either/or choice.

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it, as shown by changes in the public's assessments of the facts of the Lewinsky story. Pew polls taken in February and July, for example, recorded an 18 percent increase in those who believed that it was either "definitely" or "probably" true that Clinton had sex with Lewinsky (51 percent in February, 70 percent in July). There was a 17 point increase (49–66 percent) in belief that Clinton lied about the affair, and an 8 point increase (40–48) in the percentage who believed Clinton participated in the effort to get Lewinsky to lie. Despite the waning of public attention to the Lewinsky story over time,[25] it seems that some publics attended closely enough to the charges and countercharges circulating in the media to continue updating their understandings of the facts of the case. This attentiveness was also suggested by the fluctuations noted below in levels of support for congressional Republicans across the scandal. What worked to Clinton's advantage was how little these updated understandings prompted the majority to redraw the clear line between public and private.

Ambivalence about Moral Leadership

The primary strategy employed by Republican leaders to try to overcome the majority public's conviction that the Lewinsky affair was not a public matter was to argue that the president should be impeached not because of any private, immoral behavior but for public, illegal behavior. The House managers of the impeachment trial struggled to reframe the impeachment issue by emphasizing that the impeachment was not about sex but about perjury and obstruction of justice. Clinton's opponents simultaneously tried to persuade the public that Clinton's behavior in the Oval Office and in the deponent's chair automatically constituted public not private behavior, by virtue of his being president. As part of this second effort, they raised questions about Clinton's ability to provide "moral leadership"—a notion that could perhaps bridge the public versus private categories of behavior that the majority public had separated. In its more cynical form, the logic of this argument suggested that even if Clinton had not done anything bad enough to be impeached, he had lost his capacity to inspire confidence and therefore should leave office one way or another. As a more serious proposition, this notion suggested that personal morality is a key to the president's ability to lead; presumably, to mobilize a nation one must be worthy of personal respect.

While clear majorities rejected the notion that all of Clinton's behavior was public simply because he was the president, the public had a more difficult time coming to a judgment about moral leadership. The poll data suggest a public that struggled with the question of how integral personal respectability is to the job of leading a nation. The public ambivalence about moral leadership illustrates further how the public continued to engage with the media environment and to adjust its assessments in response to intensely covered developments in the news.

[25] See The Pew Center for the People, the Press, and Public Policy, "Senate Trial: Little Viewership, Little Impact" (http://www.people-press.org/Jan99rpt.htm), 1 February 1999.

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Again, Clinton's rhetorical performance in his presidential role was a key factor. In a *New York Times* poll taken just before Clinton's 1998 State of the Union Address and just days after the Lewinsky allegations first surfaced, only 35 percent agreed that Clinton set a good moral example for the nation, and 61 percent said he did not. Yet immediately after the speech, 49 percent said the president set a good moral example, while those who said he did not dropped to 47 percent.[26] This shift indicates that the definition of presidential moral leadership was unsettled and that Clinton's rhetorical performance helped to replace considerations of his private sexual conduct—at least temporarily—in many Americans' definition of moral leadership.

The question of Clinton's moral leadership became no more settled throughout the year, but instead remained susceptible to developments in the news. For example, a Pew Center question about whether President Clinton had the "moral standing to lead the country," first asked just after Clinton's televised apology, found that 57 percent of respondents said that he did have the moral standing to lead. Yet this number declined to between 48 and 50 percent by mid-September after the release of the Starr report. Similarly, the *Los Angeles Times* poll asked in January and again in August whether "it is possible for Bill Clinton to behave unethically in his personal life while maintaining integrity in his presidential responsibilities?" In January, 59 percent of respondents said yes, but that number declined to 51 percent in August, when Clinton's televised apology for misleading the nation appeared somewhat too combative and too little contrite. Overall, Americans remained fairly evenly divided over whether Clinton had "the honesty and integrity to serve as president." According to the *Los Angeles Times* poll, the number saying he did hovered around 50 percent from January 1998 to January 1999 (except for one barely statistically significant jump to 54 percent immediately after the 1998 State of the Union), while the number saying he did not increased slightly from 41 percent to 46 percent.

While these judgments of Clinton varied in response to unfolding events, most people continued to maintain in response to other poll questions that the president's private behavior was not relevant to public life or to their own lives, thus refusing to use private morality directly to redraw the public/private line. For example, majorities resoundingly downplayed the importance of moral respectability to the job of being president as well as the importance of the president as a role model.[27]

Thus it appears that even as the majority rejected the claim that Clinton's "private" behavior affected his "public" presidential role, they remained ambivalent about the importance of moral leadership and open to new develop-

[26] Marjorie Connelly, "Confidence Grows in Clinton's Ability to Remain Effective," *New York Times*, 29 January 1998.

[27] James Bennet, "Despite Intern, President Stays in Good Graces," *New York Times*, 24 February 1998; Pew Center, "White House Scandal Has Families Talking" (http://www.people-press.org/parentrpt.htm), 15 November 1998.

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ments in the news. As "moral leadership" is the sort of concept that occupies moral philosophers, it is hardly surprising that publics did not resolve the issue once and for all time. Rather, the public ambivalence about moral leadership illustrates that even while Clinton's approval ratings held steady, segments of the public continued to engage with developments in the Lewinsky narrative and to construct the meaning of the story. And just as the majority public's apparent certainty about the public/private distinction worked to Clinton's advantage, so too did public uncertainty about the Republicans' notion of moral leadership.

Social Identity and the Personal Bill Clinton

The public/private distinction that was so crucial to interpreting the majority's continued support for Clinton was not constructed in the same way by various subgroups. Different segments of the public related to the scandal on a symbolic as a well as a material level, and different groups' assessments of the scandal were based on their different interpretations of the characters in the news narrative and of the narrative itself. This should not be surprising, given the findings of numerous scholars regarding the importance of the symbolic and social identification dimensions of public opinion,[28] and given the public's ability to construct their own narratives from the raw materials of the news and assign their own meanings to news stories. As Virginia Sapiro and Joe Soss observed of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings, for example, "heightened media coverage and public attentiveness" during high-profile political spectacles "produce a . . . formidable tide of political information that can facilitate [considerable] diversity in perceptions, emotions, and attitudes."[29]

One example of the symbolic dimensions of public opinion may be found in the fact that African Americans were consistently more supportive of Clinton throughout the scandal than were whites. Though black support for Clinton was doubtlessly intertwined with traditionally strong Democratic partisanship among blacks, the evidence suggests that black support for Clinton extended beyond simple party identification or policy-based heuristics and did not simply reflect economic gains enjoyed by that group during Clinton's presidency. For example, a late August 1998 Pew Center poll that measured a whopping 94 percent approval rating for Clinton among African Americans also found no differences between blacks and whites regarding satisfaction with the way things were going in the country. Among white respondents who reported that they approved of Clinton's job performance though not of Clinton as a person, a plurality of 35 percent said the economy was their reason for approving of Clin-

[28] See, for example, David O. Sears, "Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory" in Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire, eds., *Explorations in Political Psychology*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 113–149. Zaller, however, explicitly dismisses the symbolic dimensions of public reaction in "Monica Lewinsky's Contribution," 186.

[29] See Sapiro and Soss, "Spectacular Politics," 287.

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ton's job performance; among blacks, however, only 4 percent offered this reason. Equal proportions of whites and blacks mentioned approval of Clinton's domestic policies, further signaling that policy-based heuristics were not the only basis for black support.

More important than policy-based heuristics appear to have been differences in the ways that black Americans made sense of the Lewinsky scandal: blacks were more likely to approve of Clinton personally throughout the scandal and much more likely to see the proceedings against him as unfair. Whether or not black Americans saw Clinton as the nation's "first black president," as Toni Morrison argued in the pages of the *New Yorker*,[30] they generally saw him as a much more sympathetic character than did whites. For example, in early February 1998 the Pew Center asked respondents whether the Lewinsky allegations had "reduced your respect for Bill Clinton as a person." Only 10 percent of blacks said "yes," while 83 percent said "no" (compared with 38 percent and 58 percent, respectively, for white respondents). Similarly, in September the Pew Center asked whether Clinton's televised testimony had made respondents more or less sympathetic to Clinton as a person: 53 percent of blacks, compared with 24 percent of whites, said they had become more sympathetic, while only 18 percent of blacks said they had become less sympathetic, compared with 42 percent of whites.

Moreover, certain symbolism at the core of the Lewinsky story might explain deeper levels of African-American support for Clinton, for many blacks may have seen in Clinton's travails a reflection of their own experiences with the American criminal justice system. As one observer put it, "black Americans identify with Clinton's fight against Starr because they see the president as someone who is being pursued by a law enforcement official who is determined to find something incriminating."[31] The available surveys suggest that black Americans were significantly more likely than whites to blame Clinton's political enemies for the Lewinsky scandal. The *New York Times*/CBS poll, for example, showed that between January and September 1998, the percentage of blacks that "blame Bill Clinton's enemies for the current situation" declined from 81 to 55 percent. Nevertheless, blacks were much more likely than whites to take this view, since the respective figures for whites were 45 and 32 percent. Similarly, in August 1998, the Pew Center asked respondents what had caused the impeachment controversy in the first place: Clinton's own wrong behavior or his political enemies trying to hurt him. One-half of whites said Clinton's behavior was to blame, but two-thirds of blacks blamed Clinton's political enemies.

Race was not the only factor producing different constructions of the Lewinsky scandal. A striking divide is also evident in reactions of lower- and higher-income groups to the Lewinsky scandal. The Pew Center surveys show a gener-

[30] Quoted in Richard Cohen, "A Shoe Must Drop," *Washington Post*, 26 November 1998.

[31] David Bositis of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, quoted in Sam Fulwood III, "Blacks See Familiar Persecution in Clinton Plight," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 September 1998.

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TABLE 1

Support for President Clinton Across Income Groups, August 1998 (percentages)

Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bill Clinton is handling his job as president?

	75K+	50K–75K	30K–50K	20K–30K	<20K
Approve	59.0	58.2	60.7	67.4	69.3
Disapprove	34.7	37.9	31.1	23.6	19.1
Don't Know/Refused	6.3	3.9	8.2	8.9	11.6

If there were conclusive proof that President Clinton encouraged Monica Lewinsky to lie under oath about their relationship, do you think he should be impeached and removed from office, or not?

	75K+	50K–75K	30K–50K	20K–30K	<20K
Yes, should be impeached	45.6	52.5	48.0	43.0	35.5
No, should not	49.9	46.8	47.0	52.4	54.8
Don't know	4.4	0.7	5.0	4.5	9.7

Which of these best describes you?

	75K+	50K–75K	30K–50K	20K–30K	<20K
Like Clinton presonally/ Don't like policies	19.3	24.4	27.5	42.6	47.3
Don't like Clinton personally/Like policies	41.5	45.2	40.0	33.1	25.7
Don't like Clinton personally/Don't like policies	37.4	28.6	26.6	20.3	18.8

Source: Based on a survey conducted by the Pew Center for the People and the Press, 21–24 August 1998.

ally negative relationship between the income level of respondents and their approval of Clinton as president: low-income groups were more likely to approve of Clinton's performance in office and less likely to think he should be impeached. As shown in Table 1, Clinton's August approval ratings ranged from 59 percent among the highest income groups to 69 percent among the lowest. The income gap repeated itself on the question of impeachment; note that the highest income group was statistically nearly indistinguishable in its levels of support for and opposition to impeaching Clinton if it became clear that he had encouraged Monica Lewinsky to lie under oath. By contrast, nearly twenty points separate the majority "no" from the minority "yes" on the same question at the lower end of the income range.

A 3Ps' explanation for this divide would posit that low-income groups were more supportive of Clinton because they were more likely to believe they had benefited from his policies. This explanation is less persuasive in light of the final item in Table 1, however, which provides further evidence that public opinions were not simply driven by such heuristics. Pew asked respondents to choose among the following statements: "I like Bill Clinton personally and I

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like his policies"; "I don't like Bill Clinton personally but I like his policies"; and "I don't like Bill Clinton personally and I don't like his policies." Here again, sharp differences were clear among income groups. While only 19 percent of the highest-income group and 24 percent of the next-highest group agreed that they liked Bill Clinton personally and liked his policies, 43 and 47 percent of the two lowest-income groups liked both. The inverse relationship held as well: 76 percent of the two highest-income groups said they disliked Clinton personally compared with 53 percent of those earning between $20,000 and $30,000 and 44 percent of those earning less than $20,000.[32]

These findings suggest that approval of Clinton was strongly associated with different groups' assessments of Clinton as a person. Thus, an alternative to a simple "it's the economy, stupid" explanation is that for many minority and lower-income Americans, Bill Clinton represented something of a sympathetic character despite the sexual scandal—indeed, that he may have become more sympathetic for some groups because of it. Poorer Americans and black Americans apparently reacted to the Lewinsky scandal in part based on their symbolic understanding of Clinton as a person, signaling not just policy differences among different groups, but their different constructions of the central characters in the Lewinsky narrative. Perhaps Clinton's symbolic profile as "The Man From Hope"—a poor child who rose to the White House—mattered more to poorer Americans than did his sexual behavior, for example. It is worth noting that this greater willingness to approve of Clinton personally among these groups could reflect their greater Democratic partisanship. But partisanship alone does not appear to explain the very high percentage among these groups (over two-thirds) that continued to like both Clinton *and* his policies; in the same survey, only 57 percent of Democrats overall reported that they liked both.

These data suggest that the symbolic dimensions of media politics for various subgroups can coexist with seemingly clear trends in aggregated, individual-level opinion. Public opinion polls throughout 1998 measured a decline in approval for President Clinton "as a person," even as approval for the job he was doing as president remained relatively steady. While these findings seem to support the notion that individuals utilized common decision heuristics, the subgroup data presented here suggest that symbolic constructions of the Lewinsky narrative, which were linked with particular social identities, also played an important role. At the very least, these examples suggest that there were symbolic as well as material dimensions of public reactions to the Lewinsky impeachment scandal.

Characters, Motives, and the Decline of the Republicans

Few aspects of the scandal appear to have attracted more attention than its colorful cast of characters. Monica Lewinsky was not alone in becoming a

[32] Similar differences were recorded among whites and blacks: 28 percent of whites said they liked both Bill Clinton and his policies, versus 77 percent of blacks. And while 38 percent of whites said they

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household name but was joined, most notably, by Kenneth Starr and Linda Tripp—a trio of characters whose motivations the public viewed dimly.[33] In this company, Clinton fared rather well. As Gallup reported in March 1998, "Clinton's favorability rating . . . is well over twice as high as those of the other major participants in the developments of the last eight weeks, including [Kathleen] Willey, Lewinsky, [Paula] Jones and Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr."[34] Clinton may have been buoyed not only by a general sense that everyone close to the scandal became tarnished by it, but also by the public's belief that the motives of these other characters were far from pure.

Moreover, the public's assessment of the other characters in the drama may have had greater effect on dependent variables that have been less thoroughly analyzed than Clinton's approval ratings. One study has indicated that the strongest predictor of Clinton's approval ratings was peoples' assessment of the economy, but the strongest predictor of peoples' opposition to impeachment was their attitude toward Kenneth Starr.[35] This finding suggests that there were two sets of considerations (the economy vs. Ken Starr) shaping opinion on two distinct questions (approval of Clinton's job performance vs. supporting his impeachment). It reminds us that responses to the standard "approval" question were not necessarily good measurements of peoples' assessments of the Lewinsky scandal itself. It further suggests the possibility that "Ken Starr" became a symbolic proxy for a constellation of doubts the public had about the fairness and propriety of the impeachment proceedings.

This narrative or dramaturgical aspect of the Lewinsky scandal is entirely overlooked in traditional approaches to political communication and public opinion. But we believe it is crucial to understanding how the public made sense of the scandal, precisely because the media do not simply provide the public with free-floating, disembodied bits of information but arrange that information into stories.[36] These stories embody narratives of how events happen, why they occur, and what they mean, as well as socially-constructed symbols representing who is involved, what they are up to, and what is at stake. A crucial aspect of the Lewinsky narrative, it appears, was the same basic ingredient of any compelling

liked Clinton's policies but not Clinton personally, only 18 percent of blacks divided their approval in this way.

[33] See The Gallup Organization, "Clinton's Options in Grand Jury Testimony Appear Limited," (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr980815.asp), 15 August 1998. See also Sonner and Wilcox, "Forgiving and Forgetting," 556.

[34] The Gallup Organization, "Public Views Willey Charges as Little Different from Those of Other Women" (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr980320.asp), 20 March 1998.

[35] Carol L. Silva, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, and Richard A. Waterman, "The Economy, the Independent Counsel, and the Politics of Impeachment" (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, 2–5 September 1999).

[36] W. Lance Bennett, *News: The Politics of Illusion*, 3d ed. (New York: Longman, 1996); Robert Darnton, "Writing News and Telling Stories," 2 (*Daedalus* 1975): 175–194; Itzhak Roeh, "Journalism as Storytelling, Coverage as Narrative," *American Behavioral Scientist* 33 (November-December 1989: 162–68.

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story: the motives of the key characters. The public did not simply egoistically weigh the personal benefits of keeping Clinton in office but also assessed the motivations driving Tripp, Starr, and the Republican leadership. And again, public assessments did not arise independently of the media environment, but were shaped in complex ways by media messages and plot developments.

Hillary Clinton's allegation in January 1998 that the Lewinsky story reflected a "right-wing conspiracy" against her husband, for example, was widely reported in the news. Though often pooh-poohed by elite journalists and pundits, the allegation was more widely accepted by the American public. Surprisingly, perhaps, 51 percent of respondents in a national *Los Angeles Times* poll said they agreed with Mrs. Clinton's claim; when asked the more general question of whether "the allegations against Bill Clinton have more to do with partisan politics or with getting at the truth," 58 percent named partisan politics as the cause, versus 32 percent who chose the other option.[37] This attitude remained throughout the year, according the *New York Times*/CBS poll, which found the belief that Kenneth Starr's investigation was partisan increasing from 47 percent in January to 60 percent in August and 64 percent in September.

The impression of partisanship was also acute in public assessments of the role played by Republicans and Democrats in Congress. In September, 50 percent of respondents told the *Los Angeles Times* that "Congress will primarily act in a partisan political manner when considering the charges" against Clinton, while 42 percent (primarily self-identified Republicans) said Congress would act "in a fair and balanced manner."[38] By December, on the eve of the House impeachment vote, 71 percent of respondents to a Pew Center poll said that Republican efforts to impeach Clinton were motivated by political reasons rather than by the importance of the allegations against him; 61 percent also said that the Democrats were defending Clinton not because they believed the charges against him were not serious enough to warrant impeachment, but for political reasons.

When all was said and done, the Republicans were the big losers in public esteem. Not only did public approval of the party and its leadership decline, this disapproval began to transfer to ratings of the party's ability to handle various policy questions. Democrats caught up with Republicans in public confidence in their ability to manage traditional Republican issues such as taxes and crime.[39] By early in 1999, as the Senate vote on impeachment loomed, almost

[37] *Los Angeles Times* poll #417, 15 November 1998. A Gallup poll conducted at the same time gave people different choices and, therefore, offered a slightly different picture. Gallup asked whether the controversy involving Clinton and Lewinsky was "mostly the result of a right wing conspiracy which is out to get Bill Clinton" or "mostly the result of Clinton's own behavior." Given these choices, 44 percent blamed a conspiracy, while 46 percent blamed Clinton's own behavior. Frank Newport and Alec Gallup, "Clinton's Popularity Paradox" (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr980131a.asp), 15 November 1998.

[38] *Los Angeles Times* poll #417, 15 November 1998.

[39] Richard L. Berke and Janet Elder, "Damaged by Trial, Senate's Standing Sinks in Public's Eye," *New York Times*, 3 February 1999.

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half (47 percent) of those asked by the Pew Center why they were not following the trial more closely said "because the trial will have no impact on their assessment of Clinton," while 41 percent said, according to Pew, that "the partisan nature of the trial is a reason for tuning it out."[40]

Thus, public reactions to the scandal were strongly influenced by perceptions of partisan motivation on the part of politicians—a point on which many studies of "extra-media" influences on mass opinion during the scandal have converged.[41] It is important to bear in mind once again, however, that these perceptions were based at least in part on media coverage. The evidence suggests that the majority interpreted the Lewinsky news saturating the airwaves, tabloids, and internet sites as a story largely originating from and pushed by partisan sources (though helped mightily by Clinton's own behavior) for partisan reasons. As one study has suggested, media attention to the partisan aspects of the scandal may have produced a backlash effect, actually boosting Clinton's approval ratings.[42] Not only did partisanship operate as an extramedia variable, but public understandings of what was partisan about the scandal drew from and responded to the news narrative.

Conclusion

There is little doubt that a priori, extramedia variables such as peace, prosperity, and Clinton's policy performance did influence public opinion even in the depths of the Lewinsky scandal. A Pew Center poll taken in August 1998 asked respondents, "What makes you approve of the way [Clinton] is handling his job as president?" The open-ended responses were ranked as follows: "handling of the economy" (34 percent), "overall job performance" (25 percent), and "foreign policy" (18 percent). Interestingly, 14 percent of respondents also articulated the public/private distinction, expressed as the view that Clinton's private conduct did not affect his ability to lead. Thus, if we add one more substantive consideration to the explanatory mix—private presidential behavior is not a legitimate basis for evaluating presidential performance—we can fairly well account for the nonvariation in Clinton's approval ratings throughout the scandal.

Based on this evidence alone, it can be argued that in many ways this story ended as it began. The president remained popular. He was more popular near the beginning and the end of the ordeal than at any time before, during, or afterwards. Popular perceptions of politics as an overly partisan game were reinforced. If there was an opinion shift of any great magnitude, it involved the

[40] Pew Center "Senate Trial."

[41] See Jacobson, "Impeachment Politics"; Sonner and Wilcox, "Forgiving and Forgetting"; and Silva et al., "The Economy."

[42] Dhavan V. Shah, Mark D. Watts, David Domke, and David P. Fan, "Explaining Clinton's Press Coverage and Public Approval: Strategic News, Framing and Cueing, and Opinion Backlash" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association, Acapulco, Mexico, 25–28 May 2000).

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Republicans squandering valuable political capital. Public confidence in the press may have suffered as well, though various surveys have yielded contradictory results on that score.[43]

Yet such explanations, left by themselves, would close the door to understanding more about what was going on between people, politicians, and the press during more than a year of intense preoccupation with a major national decision. To conclude simply that people were not influenced by partisan spin, elite cueing, or press negativity seems an overly restrictive view of what might go by the name of "media politics" in this or any other situation in which media coverage is high in volume and sustained in duration; issues touch upon personal, moral, and normative concerns; and the news narrative becomes a subject of conversation in homes, classrooms, offices, golf courses, and car pools across the country.

It makes sense, therefore, to expand the notion of media politics to include the possibility of sustained public engagement and even some form of public deliberation on issues raised by scandal news. Charting the dynamics of issue engagement reminds us that beneath the rough indicators and simple judgments recorded in opinion polls are meanings that people construct in the process of arriving at opinions on issues. The process of resolving questions about things such as public morals, sexual politics, fairness, and privacy may well be more important to people (and have more effect on their feelings about the events they have experienced in common) than the fragmentary issue or approval shifts that are the objects of so much concern in simpler models of media politics. Moreover, the meanings that people draw from engagement with broader, ongoing narrative themes in media politics seem to be as important to understand as the issue positions that may be derived from simple heuristic calculations based on media-independent factors. To put it bluntly, the 3Ps' model implies that impeachment might have been decided in the public arena in a thumbs up, thumbs down fashion, on the basis of largely extraneous considerations. Not only does this not square descriptively with the data presented here, but it gives the public too little credit for engagement and deliberation about more abstract issues involving public life and democratic governance.*

[43] See "Off with Their Talking Heads," *New York*, 23 November 1998, 27–9; Michael Gartner, "How the Monica Story Played in Mid-America," *Columbia Journalism Review* (May/June 1999): 34–6.

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Radical Change in Israel: A Review Essay

MYRON J. ARONOFF

Few states have undergone more rapid and comprehensive change in the past fifty years than Israel, which evolved from a socialist-inspired mixed, centralized, highly planned, state-centered, protectionist economy to a much more decentralized and internationally-oriented, neoliberal one. From a political culture dominated by a collectivist version of hegemonic Zionism legitimating a Mapai (Labor-led) dominant party system, Israel passed through a phase in which two mass parties vied for power. Once hegemonic, Zionism is now under challenge and in a crisis. A change in the electoral system resulted in the election of the past three prime ministers independent of the parliament (Knesset). This reform intensified the dramatic decline of both mass parties and the concurrent rise of several parties based on identity politics. The substantial increase in the representation of previously marginal groups made the system more inclusive. However, it seriously undermined governability and led to the premature end of the governments of the first two directly elected prime ministers, Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak. Consequently, the Knesset recently restored the traditional parliamentary electoral system. Equally significant constitutional reforms entrenched a bill of rights enabling judicial review by the Supreme Court. The books under review analyze these changes, which many observers define as radical or even revolutionary.

The essays in the collection edited by Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled evaluate aspects of the liberalization of Israel's economy and how this influenced the peace process.[1] Deborah Bernstein compares the unsuccessful joint action by Jewish and Arab workers in three Jewish-owned industries during the British Mandate in Palestine. The workers failed to overcome the intrusion of Is-

[1] Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, eds., *The New Israel: Peacemaking & Liberalization* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000).

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raeli and Palestinian nationalism and their already well entrenched social and economic separation. Michal Frenkel, Yehouda Shenhav, and Hanna Herzog discuss the involvement of industrialists and the owners of capital in influencing the dominant Zionist ideology in the pre-state period. Their analysis adds original insight into previously ignored influences by entrepreneurs on the nascent ideological shifts in Labor away from socialism prior to independence.

Frenkel et al.'s finding supports Dov Khenin's claim that Mapai (Labor) underwent a fundamental change in its class orientation, which transformed it from a workers' party to a party of the middle class as early as the 1950s. Khenin argues that rather than integrate the masses of newcomers who arrived in the early years of the state into the labor market on an equal basis, a deliberate split was created between the veterans who were protected and the newcomers who were made dependent on the bureaucracy and exploited as cheap labor. Khenin's attribution of a conscious policy of exploitation is not well documented and ignores objective differences in levels of education and skills between the respective populations. The paternalism of Mapai's leaders and bureaucratic representatives and their condescension toward the immigrants from Arab lands, however, was clearly a major factor contributing to their loss of dominance.

Aside from Labor's defeat in the 1977 Knesset election, no event more dramatically symbolized the seismic changes in Israel than Labor's 1994 loss of control of the Histadrut (the labor federation) which it had dominated since the powerful organization was founded in 1920. Lev Luis Grinberg and Gershon Shafir give an excellent analysis of the political, economic, organizational, and trade union-related transformations related to the crisis of the Histadrut. They convincingly conclude that this semi-autonomous and quasi-state institution "was the direct victim of the Israeli state's reassertion of autonomy, which began with the 1985 stabilization policy, as part of its economic liberalization policy" (p. 104).

Michael Shalev's pivotal chapter cogently analyzes the role of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Plan of June 1985 in inaugurating the structural shift in the political-economic regime to the present liberalizing one. Shalev explores the policies of privatization of state-owned and Histadrut-owned firms, deregulation (trust-busting), and the radical restructuring of the labor market. He explains the paradox of liberalization: "*states willingly shed power in order to regain it*–it makes sense analytically if we recognize the difference between *power as resources* and *power as autonomy.* Forfeiting resources may be the price which has to be paid for regaining lost autonomy" (p. 148).

David Levi-Faur's comparative analysis of the successful privatization of Israel's telecommunications sector and unsuccessful privatization of the energy sectors contributes concrete evidence of the variability of the process. As a variation on Shalev's theme, he concludes that liberalization and competition do not entail a retreat of the state. "In the new Israel the role of the state in the

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economy is expected to be as important and as critical for the country's development and the welfare of the citizens as it used to be in the past" (p. 186).

The role of important juridical shifts in the transformation of Israel's economic order is the subject of Ran Hirschl's chapter. The constitutional revolution of 1992 provided the Supreme Court authority for the first time to review legislation: the enactment of the two basic laws—Human Dignity and Liberty; and Freedom of Occupation; and the amendment of the Basic Law—The Government. This manifestation of the "Americanization" of Israel's legal culture and others noted by Hirschl is part of the wider process of globalization, which has been widely discussed in the popular media and scholarly journals.[2]

Uri Ram's contribution deals with the crucially important issue of contested Israeli collective identity. While Zionism remains the dominant paradigm for a majority of Jews in Israel, traditional Zionist discourse is under attack from what Ram terms "neo-Zionism" (ethnic-nationalism) on the "right" and "post-Zionism" (political postmodernism) on the "left." Consequently, traditional Zionism is losing its hegemonic or unquestioned status. Ram discusses the "negating-complementarity" of globalization and the local ethnic, religious, and nationalist reactions to it. The competing forms of Israeli identity are more diverse and complicated than Ram presents, and their explanation requires a more refined cultural analysis than he gives. Yet he makes an important contribution by framing the problem in the context of economic change.

The editors' essay on the relation between the globalization of Israeli business and the peace process suggests that while the autonomy of the business community came late, it developed rapidly following the 1985 Emergency Economic Stabilization Plan. Private enterprises were thereafter free from government control to raise capital by issuing securities through the stock exchange. Restrictions on borrowing foreign capital were also significantly relaxed. The editors analyze the role of global allies and political parties in explaining the meshing of economics and politics in the peace process.

The concluding essay by Jonathan Paris analyzes regional cooperation with a focus on the Middle East/North Africa economic summits. After four reasonably successful regional economic summits, progress stalled and then deteriorated. Paris concludes: "The spirit of Casablanca that celebrated the integration of Israel into the Middle East and North Africa region has withered since the change of government in Israel in May 1996" (p. 275). The collapse of the peace process after the Camp David talks led by President Bill Clinton and the escalation of violence that followed thereafter has made the climate for regional cooperation even worse. With the election of Ariel Sharon as prime minister in 2001 and Yasser Arafat's dubious control of the Palestinian Authority, the prospects for peace and regional cooperation appear bleaker than ever. This suggests that despite the importance of economic forces, political factors remain paramount in determining the course of the peace process.

[2] Glenda Abramson and S. Ilan Troen, eds., *The Americanization of Israel*, special issue of *Israel Studies* 5 (Spring 2000).

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One such political factor, the raising of the threshold required to gain parliamentary representation from 1 percent to 1.5 percent of the valid votes cast, which was implemented in the 1992 election, helped return Labor to power. The Labor government was crucial in producing the historic breakthrough at Oslo.[3] The raising of the electoral threshold was part of a major electoral reform adopted in the final session of the twelfth Knesset on 18 March 1992. The most important change mandated separate elections of the prime minister and the members of the Knesset, the implementation of which was delayed until the 1996 elections.

Gideon Doron and Michael Harris in their book analyze the significance of this change in the electoral process.[4] Vested interests of established parties constituted the primary obstacle to changing the system until then and prevented even more comprehensive changes in 1992.

Even when it was clearly in the self-interest of both major parties to promote changes, for example by raising the percentage of the vote needed for a legislative mandate, their fear that the rival party would exploit their willingness to do so to gain the support of minor parties in coalition negotiations prevented cooperation. The lack of political courage on the part of the leadership of both major parties was only overcome when political deadlock led to the disintegration of the unity government of the two major parties formed after the 1988 election. Mounting popular discontent, mobilized by active public movements, demanded major reforms. But the political compromise that resulted, the direct election of the prime minister, combined the worst aspects of the presidential and the parliamentary systems. Doron and Harris evaluate the success of the reform exclusively from the perspective of the aims of those who initiated it: "*the purpose of electoral reform was not to enhance accountability; it was to increase the ability to govern effectively*" (p. 81). Unquestionably, based on this criteria alone, the attempt to increase the legitimacy and power of the prime minister and indirectly the power of his party failed spectacularly. It had the opposite effect.

The parliamentary representation of the two major parties declined after the 1981 election, when they received collectively 95 seats (79 percent of the 120-seat Knesset). The decline dramatically intensified when the direct election was implemented in 1996; Labor and the Likud declined to a total of 66 mandates (55 percent). In the 1999 election they declined further to 45 seats (37 percent). The primary cause for this was split-ticket voting encouraged by the reform. The losses of the major parties were net gains for parties based on identity—immigrants from the former Soviet Union, Arabs, Jews of Middle Eastern

[3] Myron J. Aronoff and Yael S. Aronoff, "Domestic Determinants of Israeli Foreign Policy: The Peace Process from the Declaration of Principles to the Oslo II Interim Agreement" in Robert O. Freedman, ed., *The Middle East and the Peace Process: The Impact of the Oslo Accords* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 11–34.

[4] Gideon Doron and Michael Harris, *Public Policy and Electoral Reform: The Case of Israel* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000).

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background, and religious Jews. Many voters felt they discharged their national interest in their vote for prime minister and expressed more particular identities and interests in their vote for a parliamentary party. "In short, the Israeli electoral reforms of 1992 did not increase the governance capacity; on the contrary, it weakened the Israeli democracy" (p. 86).

Whereas this assessment is clearly valid in terms of the criteria of governance, it ignores another important dimension of democracy—representativeness. Greater inclusion in the political process of previously marginal groups is not an insignificant achievement when evaluating the state of Israeli democracy. The authors also fail to relate the growth of representation and power of these identity parties to the contested nationalisms.[5] They subsume this issue as part of system overload, which they discuss in their evaluation of the government formed by Benjamin Netanyahu, the first directly elected Israeli prime minister (1996–1999). Significantly, both Netanyahu (whose tenure was cut short by more than a year) and his successor Ehud Barak (whose term of office ended after a year and a half of his four-year term) both so alienated key members of their cabinets from their own parties, as well as the public, that they resigned as leaders of their parties and as members of the Knesset.

Doron and Harris draw important lessons about unintended consequences of tinkering with electoral systems, the limitation of legal and structural changes in solving fundamental problems, the truism about the consequences of good intentions, and the limitation of our knowledge. It is surprising that although they discuss the prominent role played by lawyers in the reform movement and as drafters of specific proposals, they offer no explanation for the absence of political scientists in the process. It would have been appropriate for them to have evaluated more thoroughly the relative merits of the choices before the Israeli public. The authors' reticence may help explain why the lawyers were more influential than political scientists in proposing reforms of Israel's electoral system.

The omission of "Jewish" in the subtitle of Ephraim Yuchtman-Ya'ar and Yochanan Peres's book is telling, since their sample is restricted to the Hebrew-speaking Jewish population.[6] Their justification for omitting a sample of Arab citizens ("lack of resources") doesn't explain the misleading subtitle. The absence of the views of Palestinian Israeli Arabs is particularly serious, given the book's focus on the tension between democracy and nationalism. Greater use of surveys by other scholars could have partly compensated for the absence of Arab views in this book. This omission is compounded by the authors' glossing over the tension between Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state as expressed in the contested notion of ethnic democracy. They recognize it "has indisput-

[5] Myron J. Aronoff and Pierre M. Atlas, "The Peace Process and Competing Challenges to the Dominant Zionist Discourse" in Ilan Peleg, ed., *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 41–60.

[6] Ephraim Yuchtman-Ya'ar and Yochanan Peres, *Between Consent and Dissent: Democracy and Peace in the Israeli Mind* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000).

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ably occupied the forefront of the political stage" (p. 81). But they decline to discuss it, "because our overarching question concerns not the evaluation of Israeli democracy as viewed through academic lenses but rather the democratic commitment of ordinary citizens" (p. 28). This does not justify ignoring this central and contested issue.

Based primarily on surveys conducted in 1994 and 1995, they examine the relationship between the dependent variables of tolerance, preference for democracy over alternative values, trust in public institutions, attitudes toward national defense, and sense of personal danger and the independent variables measuring social economic status, ethnic origin, and religiosity. Yuchtman-Ya'ar and Peres's findings generally support earlier surveys and analyses based on qualitative data. The right and the religious sectors are less tolerant than the left and secular sectors; the religious and the ultra-Orthodox have a greater propensity to resort to violence. There is a negative correlation between sense of danger and tolerance and the positive correlation between sense of danger and hawkishness. I have explained how perceived personal and collective insecurity is strongly correlated with the degree of militancy of nationalism in Israel.[7]

The most surprising finding in light of the economic revolution discussed earlier is the continued salience of socialist as an identity for many Israelis, although its contemporary meaning is significantly different from what it was in previous generations. The growth of the Israeli free market may have even strengthened certain aspects of socialism for some individuals and segments of the society. Eighty-five percent of those who identify themselves as socialists—as opposed to 69 percent who identify themselves as capitalists—favor progressive taxation. Self-defined capitalists favor privatization at a higher rate than do socialists—84 percent to 69 percent. There were no significant differences found between the two in applying a tougher policy toward the unemployed. The similarities in positions are as interesting as are the differences between them.

There is a very weak correspondence between the dimensions based on social and economic positions (right-left) and the hawk-dove distinction based on security stances. The latter is four times stronger than the socioeconomic orientation in influencing commitment to democracy. The religious-secular division is the most powerful in explaining the resolution of the tension between democracy and Zionism. A most surprising finding is that the traditionally non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews in the sample are even more nationalistic than the less stringently observant Zionist Orthodox Jews. "The anti-Zionist struggle has become an *antisecular* one" (p. 122). Fortunately, democracy is strongly supported by the majority of secular Israelis who constitute a majority of the population. Unfortunately, it is supported only by a minority of the other categories.

Collectively, these books, which constitute only the tip of the iceberg of recent publications on contemporary Israel by social scientists, offer important in-

[7] Myron J. Aronoff, *Israeli Visions and Divisions: Cultural Change and Political Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989).

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sights into the rapid and extensive change that Israel is currently undergoing. Joel Migdal's creative conceptual analysis of the relationship between state formation, society formation, and the mutually constitutive roles of state and society has broad theoretical implications. Migdal's focus on "*the process of becoming*—the continuing reconstruction of state and society—and the lack of coherence among the state's practices," yields many original insights with broadly comparative significance.[8] For example, his suggestion that the instability of borders creates a pervasive sense of insecurity that may push societies into ethnic self-definitions resulting in increased ethnic conflict helps explain the ethnic conflicts that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. This signals the maturity of Israel studies as it moves away from parochial exceptionalism toward more conceptually sophisticated comparative analyses.

[8] Joel S. Migdal, *Through the Lens of Israel: Explorations in State and Society* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 15.

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Book Reviews

Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party *by Xiaobo Lü. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2000. 368 pp. $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

In 1946, while waging a civil war against the Nationalist party regime on the Chinese mainland, Mao Zedong drafted a Central Committee directive in which he predicted that the Communist party would almost certainly prevail. His logic was simple and straightforward: he and his fellow Communists lived simply and worked hard; the Nationalist officials, by contrast, were corrupt and degenerate, thereby impoverishing the millions who toiled under their yoke. Precisely fifty years later, following Mao's victory and several decades of Communist party rule, Transparency International ranked the People's Republic of China as the fifth most corrupt country in the world, surpassed only by Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

By way of explaining this troubling transition, Lü offers an innovative and compelling account of the organizational development of the Chinese Communist party and the corruption of its elite in the postrevolutionary era. Cadre corruption, according to Lü, is a direct, albeit unintended, consequence of "organizational involution," a long-term process by which a revolutionary party simultaneously adopts and expands the seemingly "modern" structures associated with impersonal and rational bureaucracies. At the same time, the party "refuses and fails to adapt itself to, and be transformed by the routinization and bureaucratization that characterize modern bureaucracy" (p. 22), ultimately suffering the loss of its organizational competence and identity. Unlike devolutionary development, which transforms party cadres into rational, rule-oriented bureaucrats, or an evolutionary process of continuous revolution, which produces disciplined and committed revolutionaries, the involutionary regime "becomes infinitely patrimonial" and "produces disillusioned, status-conscious, and undisciplined cadres" whose behavior in many ways mirrors that of the pre-revolutionary, traditional local officials whose power they have usurped (pp. 22–23).

The precise nature of this causal link is not uniformly clear. The postrevolutionary party has not consistently eschewed bureaucratization and rationalization, but has done so intermittently. Did involution slow and corruption de-

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cline during periods when the party embraced the goals of administrative modernization and rationalization? The author concludes that corruption in the post-Mao era "is more pervasive, serious and regime-threatening than in previous periods" (p. 235), despite the party's rejection of "permanent revolution" in favor of bureaucratization.

The genius of this study lies in its well-written and lucid history of the post-revolutionary period, the product of Lü's thoughtful and highly synthetic research. Drawing upon an impressive array of primary and secondary source materials, the author provides an engrossing account of the Chinese Communist party in power by focusing on the sporadic and sometimes spasmodic attempts of the ruling elite to control the undesirable practices of rank and file cadres. Skillfully interweaving his analysis of institutional developments and policy shifts emanating from the upper echelons of the party with richly detailed accounts of how local cadres frequently attempted to circumvent and evade central control, Lü succeeds in creating a highly readable narrative of the administrative challenges of the postrevolutionary party in power. He demonstrates persuasively that the wide variety of bureaucratic malpractices he describes are the unanticipated responses of local cadres to policies originally drafted by central leaders with a very different set of goals in mind. Widespread corrupt practices ranging from embezzlement of public funds (*nuoyong gongkuan*) to official profiteering (*guandao*) are convincingly linked to the party's periodic politicization and depoliticization of party/state organizations.

Most current work on political corruption is shaped by either a rational-choice or political economy perspective; Lü's approach is influenced instead by post-Weberian organizational theory and is a most welcome contribution to the field.

PATRICIA M. THORNTON
Trinity College

The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan *by Haider K. Nizamani. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2000. 176 pp. $59.95.*

South Asia is becoming a nuclearized subcontinent. Both India and Pakistan are crafting nuclear doctrines, testing new delivery systems, and almost certainly deploying nuclear forces and command and control structures. *The Roots of Rhetoric* applies "discourse analysis" to gain new insights into the development and direction of domestic debate over nuclear issues in South Asia. It provides a useful historical overview and valuable bibliographic reference to internal debates in India and Pakistan. Its larger points, however, are obscured by methodological limitations.

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The author uses discourse analysis, derived from George Orwell's *1984* and from critical theory approaches to analyze the nature and development of the nuclear debate in both India and Pakistan from 1947 to the present. This interesting approach identifies fundamental shifts in emphasis and justification for the nuclear programs by leading authorities in both states. The discussion of Pakistan, in particular, is intriguing, given the lack of sources on that country's nuclear debate and program. The evolution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's thoughts on the importance of nuclear weapons and their eventual cooptation by the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq provides valuable insights into Pakistani policy. More research in this area is clearly worthwhile.

The two chapters on India are somewhat less useful, particularly when compared to George Perkovich's *India's Nuclear Bomb*, a far more exhaustive analysis of the Indian nuclear debate. The author makes questionable assumptions; the assertion that Jawaharlal Nehru's nuclear program was entirely peaceful, for example, does not explain his continued interest in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The author also focuses almost exclusively on India's nuclear development as a response to the regional conflict with Pakistan, dismissing arguments that it is a necessary counterweight to Chinese nuclear capability. As this perception was presented as an official reason for India's nuclear tests in 1998, it probably deserves more attention.

Two more substantive methodological criticisms emerge from a careful reading of the book. The author deliberately refrains from examining the works of nonresident analysts of either country, arguing that they do not influence the domestic debate. This is clearly incorrect. Nonresident analysts such as Brahma Chellaney, Bharat Karnad, and Raja Mohan clearly influenced the domestic nuclear discourse in India—so much so that they were appointed to the National Security Council Advisory Board in 1998–1999 to help draft India's 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine. Omitting these and other sources risks severely misinterpreting the evolution of Indian nuclear discourse in the late 1980s and 1990s—a crucial period in Indian nuclear development.

Additionally, for an author so concerned with the power of words and ideas, Nizamani proves surprisingly contemptuous of other ideas. His use of the phrase "nukespeak" to discuss the arguments of nuclear proponents in the subcontinent (p. 15) clearly indicates his feelings about the worthiness and veracity of their arguments. If the power of words is so real that it can shape and skew issues of war and peace, the author should be more careful and objective in his own choice of terms. He condemns existing approaches as "security orientalism," which is evidence of an inappropriate "us/them" approach (pp. 9–10), but utilizes instead, perhaps unconsciously, a "nuclear orientalism" that dismisses any validity behind more traditional notions of security-based analysis. The result is an uneven book that makes only a modest contribution to existing literature.

TIMOTHY D. HOYT
Georgetown University

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Cuba's Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World *by H. Michael Erisman. Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2000. 271 pp. $49.95.*

This book describes the history of Cuba's international relations, principally during the years since the 1959 revolution. It features two empirical chapters on Cuba's foreign relations from 1959 to the mid-1980s and two other empirical chapters covering subsequent years to the end of the 1990s. The author also provides an abbreviated history of Cuban affairs prior to the 1959 revolution and a helpful account of the principal perspectives employed prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union to understand Cuba's then significant international role. The book's title somewhat mischaracterizes its content, because only about half of the book covers the post-Soviet world.

Erisman makes two principal contributions. First, he develops the proposition, found in his earlier work, that the Cuban government's approach to foreign policy since 1959 is best understood in terms of "counterdependency." "The government assigns top priority to cultivating the capacity to prevent exogenous penetration of its decision-making processes and thereby reduce its vulnerability to external power centers" (p. 42). A counterdependency strategy has two principal aspects. Through the diversification of international relationships, it seeks to create political and economic space for the Cuban government's actions at home and abroad. And through assertive international bargaining, a counterdependency strategy seeks to influence the milieu well beyond Cuba's boundaries and obtain resources to sustain Cuba's sovereignty and foster its domestic development. Erisman is probably right that this view provides a general guide to the Cuban government's policy since 1959; it well translates the diffuse but vibrant nationalism of Cuban leaders into more concrete behaviors. Second, Erisman provides a narrative chronology of Cuba's international experience during four decades. Although he relies principally on secondary sources to cover this well-trod ground, his survey is accessible and comprehensive.

The book is short on explanation, however. It remains unclear why Cuba acts as it does in circumstances more specific than those suggested by counterdependency preferences or responses to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The text portrays Cuban foreign policy generally as reasonable, coherent, and responsible. Whether that is the case would require greater analytical work to assess, test, and account for varying interpretations of the Cuban government's international behavior. This book does not undertake that task.

The author also underestimates the Cuban government's responsibility for some of its own misfortunes. The extensive and informative discussion of Cuban international economic travails never comes to grips with one of its causes—the Cuban government's persistently ineffective macroeconomic and microeconomic policies. The valuable account of various limited successes of Cuban foreign policy in the 1990s does not explain why Cuban leaders impeded the further improvement of relations with the European Union and Canada and why

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they got into disputes with Latin American governments that ordinarily had correct relations with Cuba. As the 1990s ended, Cuba had quarreled publicly with several (Argentina, Canada, Mexico, and Spain) of its key economic partners.

Finally, there are opportunities missed. Every mention of the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay emphasizes U.S.–Cuban conflict. It fails to note the confidence-building measures developed around the base between the U.S. and Cuban armed forces in the 1990s. Moreover, the author does not discuss U.S.–Cuban counter-drug traffic cooperation, developed also in the 1990s. Had the author focused more on these topics, he would have shed light on the often-hidden but noteworthy bilateral collaboration that the United States and Cuba developed during the 1990s. That, indeed, marks a post-Soviet world in the Caribbean.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America *by Merilee S. Grindle. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 269 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

Across the Latin American region, reformers have been calling for decentralization as the solution for countries' struggles to extend democratization and increase efficiency. In this timely, well-researched, and clearly written book, Merilee S. Grindle examines the politics of the "audacious reforms" that have brought about significant devolution of power from traditionally highly-centralized governments in three Latin American countries: Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina. In all cases, the very existence of such reforms presents a paradox: why would politicians promote reforms that limit their power? But Grindle is not just satisfied with answering that paradox; she delves further into questions of institutional reform by also asking how the choices of institutional reform are made, as well as what impact such reforms have on the political process. She breaks new ground in three ways. First, she expands the democratization literature by turning her attention from the politics of economic reform to the politics of political reform. Second, she deepens research on political institutions by focusing on the creation rather than the evolution of institutions. Third, she uses her case study materials to assess two dominant theoretical approaches whose use is highly debated in comparative politics today: economic (rational choice) vs. sociological/ historical (comparative institutionalism).

After Chapter 1 explains the book's purpose, Chapter 2 develops alternative hypotheses generated by the two theories to answer each question about the inception, choice, and consequences of institutional reform. To fully address the second two questions, Grindle also includes the "new institutionalism" approach, developed to address the failure of rational choice to explain

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institutional development. Although both branches of this approach (based on "transaction costs" or "principle-agent problems") draw on assumptions of rational action, the first finds more of a role for historical development ("path dependency") than the second. In the next six chapters, Grindle tests her hypotheses. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the 1989 Venezuelan decentralization reform, which provided for the election of governors and mayors as well as the option of voting by name instead of party-list. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the 1993 Bolivian Law for Popular Participation, which established 311 municipalities, mayoral and city municipal council elections, and mandated 20 percent of government revenue for local governments' development projects. Chapters 7 and 8 turn to the 1994 Argentine constitutional reform, which included the election of the mayor of the capital city, Buenos Aires. They also examine the city's plans for management decentralization. In these chapters Grindle relies primarily on case-study methods, drawing on a wide range of sources including interviews with three of the four presidents who promoted the reforms. Chapter 9 provides a summary conclusion.

What Grindle concludes is that comparative institutionalism's more historical, contextual perspective seems to hold up well when she examines the causes of reform and some of its consequences. However, the new institutionalism, particularly its less path-dependent variant, is more useful in understanding reform choice. Grindle makes explicit that these reforms were not chosen ultimately because of the pressure of traditional interest groups or their historical conflicts, but they emerged from the work of elite design teams assembled by presidents with short- and longer-term horizons. Thus, Grindle ends by making a clear case for the importance of political agency in reorienting democratic institutions away from dysfunctional centralization: "Aspiring or actual politicians can take heart that statecraft clearly matters in the history of countries, that individuals can make a difference" (p. 218). However, she does not follow these conclusions to their ultimate impact on democracy: what are the consequences of having elites and their chosen advisers as the effective agents in democratizing societies?

ELISABETH JAY FRIEDMAN
Barnard College,
Columbia University

Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth *by Mark Ensalaco. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. 280 pp. $45.00.*

General and former dictator August Pinochet was detained in Great Britain in 1998 on an arrest warrant issued by Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón, but he was sent back to his native Chile when he was determined to be physically unfit to stand trial. Shortly after arriving, he was forced to address warrants issued by

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Chilean judges for crimes, such as kidnapping, that were not covered under the amnesty law passed during his dictatorship. His lawyers continue to press for his release on the grounds of his ill health. Human rights are now being employed to protect the man who, during his dictatorship (1973–1989), dismissed human rights activity as communist and foreign intervention. The case has captured the attention of the world, but few are familiar with the history of the Chilean dictatorship and fewer still with the history of human rights organizations in Chile.

Mark Ensalaco's *Chile Under Pinochet* is an excellent narrative, which introduces the brutality of the Chilean regime under Pinochet and the courageous attempts of various human rights organizations to resist that government. Ensalaco does not, as he expresses in his preface, introduce any evidence that is not already available. He does, however, make a tremendous amount of evidence available to an English-speaking audience, and his use of narrative makes the text accessible to lay people. This book is especially valuable to the informed reader because of the considerable attention that the Pinochet trial has captured in the last three years.

The author intends to write "a case study of repression in an authoritarian regime" as well as a book "about the human rights movement that emerged in Chile in reaction to the repression" (p. xi). Ensalaco lays out some comparative information about authoritarian regimes in Latin America during the cold war and about the processes of democratization. But the book is more a narrative of the repression that took place during an authoritarian regime than a case study from which more general propositions can be made. Such propositions would require more analysis of the unique aspects of the repression and the distinctly liberal character of the authoritarian regime of Pinochet.

The book is more successful in explaining the growth of the human rights movement, and it provides an excellent narrative of the resistance of various sectors of the Chilean population to the repression imposed by the dictatorship. It gives special attention to the growth of organizations in civil society, sponsored by the Catholic Church and others, and to the various techniques employed by these groups to limit the arbitrariness of the regime.

The book might be criticized for underestimating the role of international pressure groups, but this would miss the point. Ensalaco recognizes the importance of the international environment, but he correctly concentrates on domestic dynamics. He is aware of the role of the UN and the efforts of the Carter administration and others in the international community. But the story presented is one of the Chilean human rights movement. The evidence of domestic activity and the importance of the data compiled by Chilean sources is essential in defeating the claim that human rights activity was internationally sponsored as a campaign to undermine the Pinochet government.

Ensalaco does an admirable job of maintaining a balanced analysis of assessing responsibility for the violence in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s. He avoids the temptation, to which other writers on similar subjects succumb, to

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lay all of the blame on the dictatorship, and he is very careful to explain how efforts of an increasingly radicalized left exacerbated and justified (in the regime's opinion) the repression imposed by the government.

TONY SPANAKOS
Manhattanville College,
Princeton University

The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil *by Barry Ames. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2001. 331 pp. $59.50.*

Barry Ames has produced an outstanding piece of scholarship. Theoretically inspired by a blend of soft rational-choice theory and historical institutionalism and supported by an impressive amount of data, the book describes and explains in great detail the workings of the main links in Brazil's policy process since the country redemocratized in the mid-1980s. First, the author maps the politics of legislative elections with a focus on the incentives generated by the lower chamber's electoral system, open-list proportional representation. He then proceeds to analyze the key aspects of the legislative arena, namely, legislators' motivations, presidential coalition-building strategies, party discipline, and interparty negotiations.

The first part is by far the best. Unlike Anglo-American, single-member plurality systems, Brazil's electoral system is very complicated. It allocates seats to parties in proportion to the percentage of the votes the parties obtain. The seats are contested in districts whose design coincides with the geography of the states of the federation. Districts are multimember, with their magnitude varying with the size of the states' electorate. Despite being a proportional representation system, Brazil's open-list variant allows voters either to cast a ballot for a party label or for an individual candidate. The winning candidates of each party list are the top vote getters. If a party wins five seats, the five top vote getters are each entitled to a seat.

In principle, Brazilian congressional candidates should seek votes anywhere in their states. As elegantly demonstrated by Ames, in actuality, geography, social and economic structures, career patterns, and history provide for a variety of campaign strategies, which in turn generate different spatial patterns of vote distribution. Using data on the municipal performance of candidates, Ames shows that such patterns are four: a scattered distribution of votes in key municipalities combined with a low share of total vote in these municipalities; a scattered distribution of votes with a high share of total vote; a concentrated distribution of votes with a low share of total vote; and a concentrated distribution of votes and a high share of total vote.

The purchase power afforded by Ames's spatial taxonomy and its sophisticated empirical implementation lie in the ability to unveil congress members'

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constituency characteristics under the complexity of open-list proportional representation. Ames is the first author to do so in a most rigorous and systematic manner.

Having identified members' constituency characteristics, Ames sets out to pin down their motivations and predict their legislative behavior. Electoral competition under open-list proportional representation produces pork-oriented legislators, who have little concern with national issues and drive hard bargains with the president to bring the pork home. Brazilian national parties are, therefore, loosely disciplined. Loose party discipline, compounded with presidentialism and federalism, contributes to a wide dispersion of political power. This is at the root of the country's governability crisis, marked by a perversely sticky status quo, which locks the majority of the population in poverty.

Two key questions are left unanswered by Ames's analysis. Some students of Brazilian politics have shown that party discipline has actually increased over the last decade. Furthermore, in the late 1990s Brazil's pork-hungry congress members supported an ambitious privatization program that curtailed many of their patronage sources. Ames provides no clue as to what gave rise to such welcome developments.

All in all, this book will become a landmark in the field of Brazilian and Latin American political institutions. It should also provide useful reference points for those concerned with patterns of electoral competition and governance in contemporary democracies.

OCTAVIO AMORIM NETO
Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro

Secret Dialogues: Church-State Relations, Torture, and Social Justice in Authoritarian Brazil *by Kenneth P. Serbin. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 312 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

Political scientists owe a tremendous debt to historians like Kenneth Serbin. The historians engage in the painstaking work—collecting and reading the documents and conducting the interviews—necessary to analyze events in the past without which we could not properly make conclusions about current political processes. Political scientists too rarely delve into the archives and so rely on historians' accounts to inform their work. Serbin's detailed account of the sometimes secret relationship between the church and the military regimes in Brazil is careful, well written, detailed, and illuminating.

The principal purpose of this book is to report on the secret dialogue between church and state that was known as the Bipartite Commission, which met between 1970 and 1974. Serbin explains that the conventional wisdom that held that the church was a morally grounded actor operating in total isolation from the increasingly brutal military regimes is undermined by the existence of this

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series of meetings in which bishops and generals discussed subversion, torture, and the role of the military in civil society. The opportunity for this book came about with the release of crucial archives, including the papers of General Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy, head of the military contingent in the Bipartite, as well as the more recently released archives of the former political police of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo and of two national-level agencies dealing with state security and "social order." What remains missing are the church's own papers on the bipartite, an intriguing omission given that the church's reputation from the period is stellar when compared with that of the generals cum torturers.

Serbin, an assistant professor of history at the University of San Diego, details the history of church-state relations and the evolution of the bipartite. He assumes a certain "man-makes-history" approach, delving into deep detail about particular individuals in both institutions, in particular General Muricy and Candido Mendes, a layman who represented the church. Serbin's accounts of these and other men's influence in shaping events and dialogue are convincing, both because they are cogently argued and backed with evidence, and because they are juxtaposed with descriptions of more general trends in church and military ideology and activities. Serbin is not afraid to spend whole chapters on case studies, in this instance about specific instances of torture and murder. The effect is to put faces and lives to the statistics concerning the victims of the military governments' antisubversive campaigns. One cannot provide too many accounts of this horror, and Serbin's selections and accounts are fully appropriate and revealing not only about individuals' lives, but about Brazilian social and political history as well.

Flaws in the book are a product of any detailed analysis of a specific piece of history. Serbin is unable to reach reliable conclusions about the relative impact of the bipartite on the ending of the repression, torture, and authoritarianism in Brazil. His conclusion makes its most important statement about the ineffectiveness of the bipartite on improving human rights. But the book cannot engage in an analysis of the myriad factors at the individual, domestic, and regional level that brought about an end to military rule. This means that Serbin's conclusions are mostly limited to the bipartite's impact on the church, the armed forces, and "the study of recent Brazilian history" (p. 221). Nonspecialists in those exact areas of inquiry might wish for a more complete analysis that would place Serbin's findings in a larger context. It is to Serbin's credit that he does not overreach and arrive at conclusions that his research cannot sustain. Some might feel that the author goes too easy on the generals. Yet Serbin's book in no way makes excuses for the atrocities. It treats the torturers as real people, an approach that offers understanding of the process that brings about human rights abuses, rather than as monolithic monsters beyond our comprehension. Serbin's account offers few neat answers to the horrors of Brazil's worst authoritarian years, but it meticulously documents an important part of them.

JEANNE A. K. HEY
Miami University, Ohio

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After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia *by Daniel S. Treisman. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 280 pp. Cloth, $57.50; paper, $21.95.*

In the early 1990s, Russia's disintegration was viewed as conceivable, if not imminent. Regional governments were en masse taking over functions and resources of the feeble federal center, frequently in violation of the federal law. Instead of cracking down on transgressors, the center yielded to the threat of regional rebellion, accommodating wayward provinces by various concessions, such as ad hoc tax breaks, transfers from the federal budgets, and other means of selective fiscal appeasement. Analysts routinely blamed the Russian government for its inability to stick to rules in intergovernmental relations, tolerating erosion of the constitutional foundations of the country and risking Russia's eventual demise.

Why nonetheless has Russia managed to avoid the fate of other postcommunist federations and survived in one piece (perhaps except the breakaway Chechnya) through the period of turmoil? Daniel Treisman in *After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia* challenges the common wisdom by crediting exactly the much criticized laxity of the center's policies toward regions with preventing a break-up of the country. While others feared that discretion supplanting fiscal rules could lead to "contagion" of regional noncompliance, Treisman argues that, on the contrary, ". . . by using subsidies and tax breaks to selectively accommodate those regions most prone to . . . protest . . . , the center managed to defuse crises . . . before they could spread" (p. 22).

Tresiman's argument can be summarized as follows. First, there is economy of scale in regional noncompliance: the more subnational units defy the federal government, the less punitive resources "per rebel" the latter has and the more likely the challenge will go unpunished. It is therefore essential for the center to stop the spread of defiance early on. Second, incentives for regional revolt aggregate external and internal motives: the first are strategic expectations of gains from central appeasement, while the second reflect latent "mobilizational potential" of the region, that is, willingness of the local population to support anticenter policies. Third, such regional potentials aren't fully known to the center, and the latter views early signs of an approaching revolt as credible evidence of high propensity to rebel. Finally, by defusing impending protest of such regions, the center suppresses incentives of other provinces to challenge the federal government opportunistically—that is, without sufficiently strong internal reasons. When true rebels are bought off by preemptive fiscal concessions, those less determined fear isolation and refrain from challenging the center.

The book draws from a vast body of empirical evidence comprising fiscal and electoral statistics, regional political strategies, etc. to test this theory. Regression analyses indeed lend support to the fiscal appeasement conjecture. However, Treisman's model does not fully pass the test of logical consistency. The author assumes that signs of discontent shown by a region could credibly

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signal high innate propensity to defy the center. As a result, not only such actions bring no punishment, but instead earn fiscal rewards which preempt larger scale protests. The violent conflict in Chechnya is viewed by the author as an exception that supports the rule—the very decision to start the war was arguably prompted by successful consolidation of the rest of the Russian Federation by hitherto pliant policies. The problem with this reasoning is that to be credible, signals have to entail costs; otherwise they become cheap talk. If, for example, there is a nontrivial likelihood of punitive sanctions triggered by signaling, then the willingness to bear such cost reveals a high protest potential. Otherwise, all regions should quickly learn the game and start sending fake signals. Overall, Treisman's volume is a valuable, even if controversial contribution to the growing literature of economics and politics of decentralized government in Russia.

LEONID POLISHCHUK
University of Maryland, College Park

Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia *by Robert G. Moser. Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 2001. 191 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

This timely book covers electoral politics of what the author terms the "Second Russian Republic"—the period of President Boris Yeltsin's rule beginning in 1993 with introduction of his presidential constitution and ending with his resignation on 31 December 1999, when Vladimir Putin officially assumed the reign. Installation of President Putin in office has brought a massive institutional overhaul marking the end of the institutional regime.

The author in particular focuses on the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections and addresses diverse issues of party development and representation through the prism of election laws' influence. On the Russian material, he explores connections between election laws and multiparties, women representation, representation of ethnic minorities, role of the presidency, and consequences of election laws for the ideological make-up of elected bodies. Approaching the electoral system in Russia as a creature of human design, the author concludes that chosen electoral rules are well suited for the country's successful democratic development.

The book's main theoretical and methodological statement is that a disconnected, mixed electoral system where proportional representation is applied to electing half of the legislature, the rest being chosen by plurality in single-member constituencies, provides an appropriate environment for a controlled comparison of electoral institutional effects. It then considers the Russian case and concludes that the electoral rules' effects, for the most part, are not what the institutional literature suggests they should be. This frames a puzzle. The au-

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thor's answer to it is that the reason for the discrepancy is weak preexisting institutionalization of parties.

This reviewer's preference is to view party institutionalization in the context of a democratic transition as a dependent rather than intervening variable and to consider an alternative hypothesis that strategic connection exists between the two tiers that modifies behavior via the compound incentives to politicians. The author acknowledges the possibility of alternative explanations, such as when the existence of one tier changes participants' motivation in the other but does not go in that direction.

The author's point of view, though, is well-presented, and he takes the reader on a fascinating journey into the intricate mechanics of the Russian electoral politics of the first half of the last decade. The book offers food for thought to scholars across the discipline. Thus, it seeks "to establish Russia as an exception to Duverger's Law" (p. 54), showing that the single-member-district (SMD) tier does not exhibit any tendency toward two-parties, while proportional representation (PR) limits the number of parties. Other findings include the counterintuitive institutional impact on representation of women, where "SMD elections were friendlier to women candidates than PR ones by a margin of more than two to one in 1995" (p. 65). Meanwhile, the same was not the case for representation of ethnic minorities. Though much more successful than women as a group, minority representation was obtained approximately evenly from both electoral tiers. The author offers a compelling argument that, compared to women, "greater integration non-Russians enjoy in elite power structures in Russia" (p. 89) accounts for their insider status in parties and, therefore, access to high positions on electoral lists and overall better electoral chances. Unlike the parliamentary SMD, the book finds that the 1996 presidential election "had a significant constraining effect on the number of candidates" (p. 96). Also a comparison of the two parliamentary tiers leads to a conclusion that their combination produced a more representative parliament: "the PR tier has polarized the Duma between two ideological extremes," "the SMD tier has elected many more centrist deputies" (pp. 128–129).

The book strikes a good balance of institutional theory, data analysis, and substantive immersion and beyond its scholarly value is a good reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in comparative politics and East European or Russian studies.

OLGA SHVETSOVA
Washington University

Work Without Wages: Russia's Nonpayment Crisis *by Padma Desai and Todd Idson. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 2001. 258 pp. $29.95.*

For almost a decade, stories of unpaid wages have been a side note in discussions of contemporary Russia's macroeconomic crisis. Economists and political

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scientists have focused more on government debt, tax debt, and interenterprise debt, mentioning only in passing the debt to millions of ordinary Russians living below the poverty line. When ordinary Russians are mentioned, it is usually because of a colorful but rare act of protest over wage debt, like sitting down on railroad tracks or committing suicide, rather than as part of a deep analysis of the nonpayment crisis. The gap in coverage is unfortunate, since unpaid wages have been one of the biggest problems of Russia's political and economic transition and one of the most difficult to understand. Fortunately, Padma Desai and Todd Idson fill this gap with this book, which chronicles the history of the wage crisis and offers insights into its causes and implications.

We learn from Desai and Idson that certain workers have been hit hardest by wage nonpayment, especially women and other low wage workers in poor regions and poor industries. Nonpayment has thus been a regressive tax and partly responsible for the increase in poverty in Russia from the mid- to late-1990s. How have Russians survived this terrible situation? The answer, according to Desai and Idson, is by taking second jobs or working for pay informally, growing food for personal consumption or for sale, exhausting savings, selling personal property, and relying on intrafamily transfers from parents, children, or other family members in more fortunate circumstances. Wage debts to military personnel, pensioners, and coal miners have been particularly vexing, and Desai and Idson tell us how wage nonpayment is entangled in even more complex economic problems facing these specific groups.

Some if not all of this information may be known by now, but we have Desai and Idson to thank for bringing the information together in an easily accessible volume. Their conclusions are based on data from the 1994–1998 rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, which consists of national household samples. They also rely heavily on the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* to recreate the history of the nonpayment crisis. Some readers might wish that these two sources were supplemented with other data, such as government statistics or elite interviews; but most likely, additional sources would not contribute much and might clutter the story with necessary digressions on the biases of each interviewee and statistic.

Desai and Idson explore the wage crisis from many different angles, including the effects on women, failed enforcement of bankruptcy laws, managerial decision making, and the use of barter payments in lieu of wages. Consequently, the book may feel redundant in some places. However, the book's organization also proves useful because each angle sheds light on some controversial issue, like that barter has not been as common a payment substitute as the conventional wisdom suggests nor has it compensated for the devastating effects of arrears.

Work Without Wages is mostly a descriptive account of the wage crisis. The book is not placed in the context of a wider, generalizable political or economic puzzle, perhaps because the phenomenon of withholding wages instead of firing workers or declaring bankruptcy is relatively new and unique to postcommu-

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nist transition. Readers looking for a short answer to when and why wage withholding might happen in a transitional political and economic system may be dissatisfied. As a descriptive account, however, *Work Without Wages* is quite thorough and very useful. The arrears crisis is highly complicated, and Desai and Idson do a good job of covering its many dimensions.

DEBRA JAVELINE
Rice University

Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition *by Roman Solchanyk. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. 256 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

The relationship between Kiev and Moscow is commonly taken to be central to the geopolitical environment of both the post-Soviet space and of Europe more generally. It has attracted the scrutiny of numerous writers. Solchanyk's work provides a detailed perspective on events from 1990–1999, while arguing that the relationship needs to be understood as a "two-way street" (p. 2), affecting state and nation-building projects in both Ukraine and Russia.

The title, however, is a bit of a misnomer. The focus is clearly on Ukraine. The first three chapters provide some historical background and document the period of the collapse of the USSR. These chapters establish Solchanyk's main point, namely that Ukraine is so wrapped up in Russian mythology that Russians cannot comprehend or understand an independent Ukrainian state that seeks to deny any "special relationship" with Moscow. Moreover, he makes clear that Ukraine's decision to leave the USSR was central to the collapse, noting that efforts to preserve the union ended only when Ukraine opted against them. Later chapters highlight the economic, security, political, regional, and ethnic problems of the postcommunist period in Ukraine itself, with one chapter devoted to Ukraine's relations with the West. In these, Solchanyk makes another central argument: Ukraine has chosen the European (read: non-Russian) path. Moreover, he argues that Ukraine has been a "relative success," (p. 81) at least compared to most other former Soviet republics. The book closes with two chapters on Crimea, analyzing the problems there from both a domestic and international perspective.

The book's strongest point is its research, relying primarily on the Ukrainian and Russian press. Solchanyk moves back and forth between the two, presenting the perspectives of key players on both sides. However, this strength also reveals the book's weakness. While much time is spent establishing what happened and who said what, there is less effort to analyze or explain the events. For example, we learn that both Ukrainian presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, abandoned their pro-Moscow, communist past to engage in nation-building efforts and forge ties with the West; but one does not under-

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stand why this occurred. Little effort is made to account for Ukraine's immense economic difficulties. Numerous public opinion surveys are discussed, but no effort is made to uncover the causes or explanations for such attitudes. Often, Solchanyk will acknowledge that the issues are complex and multifaceted, but he does little to untangle competing explanatory factors.

One can also quibble with the analysis that is presented. Solchanyk argues that Ukraine faces a stark either/or choice: the West or Russia. He also implies that the choice of the West has been made, even though survey evidence shows that this is not the choice of most Ukrainians. However, Ukraine has done very little concrete to adhere to Western standards, it is unclear if the West will have Ukraine as a partner, and it is very uncertain that Ukraine really has crossed a Rubicon in both its foreign and domestic policies. These problems are thrown into greater relief by the present crisis in Ukraine, in which Kuchma stands accused of ordering the disappearance of a journalist and of falsifying election results, among other things. These actions, documented on audiotape, are more akin to what we would expect of Aleksandr Lukashenka of Belarus. They belie Solchanyk's assertions of Kuchma as a reformer and could easily push Ukraine away from the West, if not closer to Russia. Moreover, Solchanyk also tries to play down the regional divisions besetting the country, even though one sees in the surveys he presents a clear polarization on such basic questions as valuing the country's independence as well as political ideology.

In short, while the book does an admirable job of discussing the issues surrounding the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, it lacks the depth to draw rigorous, convincing conclusions.

PAUL KUBICEK
Oakland University

Political Will and Personal Belief: The Decline and Fall of Soviet Communism *by Paul Hollander. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. 368 pp. $35.00.*

Scholarly explanations for the demise of the Soviet Union have proliferated in the decade since 1991, at least partially compensating for the notorious failure of the discipline to have predicted or anticipated the fall. Paul Hollander's valuable contribution to this expanding literature shifts the focus away from the objective, particularly economic, failings of the system toward subjective assessments of Soviet communism. Hollander contends that the disillusionment of elites, produced as individuals inevitably encountered the lies, injustice, and crimes of the regime, was the catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet order.

To provide support for his thesis, Hollander draws upon autobiographical accounts published by former insiders over the last fifty years to explain the reasons for their disaffection. He controls for significant differences in individ-

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ual career paths by dividing his subjects into five different categories: defectors and exiles, reformers, high-level functionaries, East European leaders, and members of the internal security forces. After offering fairly detailed accounts of the life experiences of individuals in each category, Hollander develops a general depiction of the typical path to disillusionment found within each group.

Through this careful mode of analysis, Hollander demonstrates that the paths to disenchantment with communism were remarkably similar across his categories. For the subjects in each group, early loyalty to the communist order was gradually undermined by personal experiences that revealed the sharp disjunction between the reality of life and the ideals and beliefs of Marxist–Leninist ideology. These experiences were diverse: first-hand observations of the massive waste of resources, poor quality of finished goods, and similar evidence of the inefficiency of socialist production; encounters with poverty-stricken or malnourished citizens; knowledge of elite privilege and corruption; and the arrest, imprisonment, and execution of relatives or friends. Repeated exposure to overwhelming evidence of the shortcomings of the system made it impossible for rational beings to convincingly justify the disparity between reality and socialist promises and produced a cognitive dissonance so great as to move many individuals from a stance of unquestioning loyalty to much more critical postures. These new stances ranged from masked moral repugnance to reformism, from private dissent to open dissidence and opposition.

In the conclusion, the author rests a larger theory of the Soviet collapse on this carefully constructed depiction of the process of elite disillusionment. It was not declining economic performance alone that led to the decision to implement reform, Hollander contends. Rather, it was the interaction between objective economic performance and elite disillusionment with the moral failings of the regime which inspired *perestroika.* Once launched, reform progressively unveiled horrors of the past and harsh realities of the present, and thus widened and accelerated the process of disenchantment. Members of the elite who had been only moderately critical moved toward reformism, and reformers were transformed into radicals. This rapid erosion of elite support in the late 1980s, coupled with mass mobilization from below, destroyed the legitimacy of the Soviet order and precipitated its lurch toward destruction.

The central weakness of the study, as with so many other studies of communist and postcommunist politics, is the absence of a developed theoretical framework. As a result, the research does not contribute to the accumulation of scientific knowledge nor does it have direct implications for the major debates in comparative politics.

Nevertheless, the author opens a promising path of inquiry that may lead to theoretical innovation. The emphasis on the role of elite perceptions and evaluations is a refreshing departure from the typical structural, deterministic explanations of communism's demise. Hollander makes a compelling case for including human beings and their experiences in the account of communism's collapse. Moreover, by convincingly connecting political decisions to individual

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normative evaluations, Hollander draws attention to the significance of moral cognition, a phenomenon that has been largely neglected in contemporary political science.

JUDITH KULLBERG
University of Michigan

Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower *edited by Robert J. Guttman. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 267 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

For all that has been written about the European Union—creating a suitable institutional architecture and fostering a sense of being European in the populations of the fifteen member states—there are few publications that collect both the viewpoints of commentators and Europeans themselves. *Europe in the New Century* aims to address this gap in the literature by providing what could be seen as a unique perspective on the future of Europe. Although it could be accused of being simply an exercise in crystal ball gazing, Robert J. Guttman's collection of the opinions of commentators specializing in various areas of the European experience is enlightening and engaging. His concluding chapters comprise visions from selected "typical" Europeans in each of the member states and from leaders in business and government.

The book is divided into four parts. After a brief foreword by Romano Prodi, and an introduction by the editor, the book goes on to cover the areas of politics, foreign policy, the European marketplace, and personal visions. The politics section provides a number of perspectives from Solange Villes's institutional approach to Leif Beck Fallesen's discussion of the redefinition of the nation state. Of particular note is Reginald Dale's chapter on "Differing Views on a United Europe," which describes the search for European unity from an historical and cultural perspective including an interesting view on the role of France in the integration process and its historical precedents in Duc de Sully's seventeenth-century proposal for a Grand Design.

The second part of the volume gives visions of Europe's foreign policy and is interesting for its breadth of coverage. Here we have chapters on Asia, the Middle East and Russia. Chris Patten contributes a broader chapter on the European Union and the world. Part Three gives us our third chapter by Lionel Barber, this time on "The Euro," two chapters by Bruce Barnard, and a vision of job creation by Susan Ladika, who writes, "what works for one country may not work for another because each is shaped by its own history and traditions" (p. 185). This is obvious but worth reiteration nevertheless. If there is a criticism to be made of the volume, it is that the number of contributors could have been greater. Given that the editor has been so careful to provide a wide range of viewpoints in the final section, it is slightly incongruous that not every chapter

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in the first three parts is written by a different author, rigorous though these authors may be.

In the final section, however, this text finds its particular strength. Angelika Papantoniou reflects on the lack of strength that she perceives in the European Parliament. Belen Viudal Villasur writes of the experience of Spain from a Spaniard's view as being "peripheral, southern, and Mediterranean" (p. 207). No less enlightening are the visions of Europe's leaders such as Mary Robinson, who emphasizes that within the European Union "small countries can play a disproportionately active and proactive role" (p. 227). Peter Mitterbauer perceives the big question in Europe's future to be: "What political system is governing Europe?" (p. 214).

What this volume provides is something that academics sometimes forget: the European Union (EU) fundamentally affects the day to day lives of Europeans. As such, as Inglies Strick notes (p. 205), "[t]he future of the EU will depend on the citizens of the European countries."

ALISON M. S. WATSON
University of St. Andrews

A Rising Middle Power? German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989–1999 *by Max Otte. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. 324 pp. $49.95.*

As the cold war came to an end in Europe between 1989 and 1991, many observers asked how the foreign policy of newly reunified Germany would change. Some, notably scholars of the realist school, anticipated a renewal of German assertiveness in response to the country's increased freedom of action. Others, more impressed by the seemingly profound changes that the postwar era had wrought in German political institutions and society, expected no fundamental departures in Germany's external relations.

Now, more than a decade after the opening of the Berlin Wall, a growing number of works offer answers to that question based on the record of German foreign policy during the intervening years. Making extensive use of primary sources, Max Otte seeks to contribute to this literature by analyzing how Germany has responded to "the changes that radically transformed the country's external security environment within two short years" (p. 3). After identifying the core elements of the country's foreign policy doctrine between 1949 and 1990, he examines the subsequent course of German behavior in three important areas: military missions abroad, European integration, and NATO enlargement.

Otte offers what he terms a "realist" interpretation of post–cold war German policy, but one with an original twist. For Otte, in essence, the early realist commentators were wrong for the right reasons. Germany remains oriented to-

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ward the status quo, not out of any inherent disposition but because it lacks the resources to pursue any other policy.

This conclusion follows largely from the author's analysis of German power and influence. Contrary to common assumptions and assertions, he finds that Germany's power capabilities have changed relatively little since 1989 and that the country has in fact passed its economic peak. At the same time, the basic structure of vulnerabilities that Germany faces, especially its dependence on the United States for military security and on the European Union for its economic well-being, remains the same.

Otte's argument, although provocative, ultimately suffers from several weaknesses. To begin, his description of the realist perspective is insufficiently developed. As a result, he fails to recognize important differences within the realist camp and to identify exactly where his approach fits in. Certainly, many self-styled realists would not be comfortable with Otte's version, which has little trouble accommodating Germany's heavy reliance on international institutions and even the country's unique degree of willingness to cede national sovereignty. The argument runs perilously close to becoming nonfalsifiable.

A related problem is Otte's failure to engage alternative explanations. Although he briefly describes institutionalism and constructivism in the introductory chapter, he makes no further reference to these contending perspectives. More seriously, he does not address explicitly the domestic theories of foreign policy that emphasize such factors as political institutions, culture, and interest groups that are commonplace in the literature. At a minimum, these approaches would seem necessary to account for phenomena such as the enduring reluctance of many Germans to participate in military missions abroad and their dogged preservation of the draft.

The book also contains seemingly contradictory characterizations that require clarification. In one place, we read that Germany's external security environment was radically transformed, that reunification made Germany by far the most powerful state in Europe, and that important aspects of German policy have undergone considerable, even radical, change. Elsewhere we are told that Germany's basic security calculus is the same, that Germany's relative power has not changed significantly, and that Germany remains a pillar of the status quo.

Consequently, it is all the more unfortunate that the book lacks a conclusion. Instead, it ends with what is essentially an epilogue concerning the policies pursued by the center-left government that took office in 1998. Although this chapter lends support to the overall argument, it does not perform the important task of integrating all the rich empirical material contained in the preceding pages.

JOHN S. DUFFIELD
University of Georgia

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War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East *edited by Steven Heydemann. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000. 379 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $24.95.*

Heterogeneous settings have configured the Middle East's political landscape. Topography, geology, demography, and location comprise the skeletal outline. Control of scarce water sources and little cultivable land historically defined class, power, and poverty. Family, tribe, clan, community, village, and an occasional major urban area evolved as core organizational units. For centuries, religious leaders, military elements, and the autocratic ruler shared and competed for power. The emergence and jealousies of three monotheistic religions with dozens of respective off-shoots spiced the spiritual environment. Short stays and prolonged occupations by foreigners deposited all sorts of legacies. In the last 150 years, nationalism, individualism, consumerism, materialism, technological innovation, and globalization added modern structures and deviations to the region's historic framework. A burgeoning middle class, widening ascriptive rather than prescriptive status, an increasingly critical media, building self-determination and the changing kaleidoscope make up the Middle East today.

Heydemann is correct that there is a "need to expand the knowledge base about war as a social and political process in the Middle East" (p. 26). But in the broader context of how the Middle East came to this moment, this book's contents do not place the impact of wars in an historical context, nor do the eleven excellent essays fully describe the impact of wars on institutions in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the book's coverage is narrow in both time period and geographic reach.

Sandwiched between Heydemann's qualitatively fine, but narrow, introductory justification for assembling the book and Roger Owen's sterling conclusion, "The Cumulative Impact of Middle Eastern Wars," there are macro- and microfocused chapters dealing with war and the political economy in Lebanon, Ba'athist Iraq, Israel and the 1967 war; Palestinian and PLO political institutions; the memory of Egyptian peasants, state-building in Syria, Lebanon and Syria before World War I; war and food supply in early Transjordan and state-market relations in the Middle East prior to 1945.

The essays are excellently researched and coherently written, but topically they do not hang together. The volume would have benefited from at least five additional chapters. A comparative chapter enumerating the various kinds of wars that have pock-marked the Middle Eastern landscape would have provided a useful introduction; long- and short-term confrontations for dynastic control or regime legitimation; identifying longer civil wars, rebellions, and revolts within areas or regions against local authorities; analyzing foreign aggression perpetrated on Middle Eastern peoples; and resource conflicts fought over control of land, oil, water.

Since the military has played such an instrumental role as an agent of political and social change in the Middle East over the last hundred years, a chapter

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on the contributions of this class to regional and domestic social change, institutional growth, and retardation would have been instructive. A chapter on Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's choice to use war as a diplomatic tool to open up the Egyptian economy, turn toward the United States, and face away from the Soviet Union is in itself a novel look at how wars have affected social change in the region. The social and institutional impacts of Syria's quarter-century hegemonic presence in Lebanon remains a relatively untold story. A chapter about the social and institutional consequences of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict in 1990–1991 would have been instructive about how territorial and resource jealousies affect social change. No other war since World War I, save for the several Arab-Israeli wars, has had such a dramatic and drawn-out effect on the political and social direction of the Middle East.

Assembling an excellent edited volume is an almost impossible task. There is merit to Heydemann's effort to discuss the impact of war on institutions and social change in the Middle East. It is a notable beginning; much more needs to be written on the topic.

KENNETH W. STEIN
Emory University

The Uncertain Friendship: The U.S. and Israel from Roosevelt to Kennedy *by Herbert Druks. Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing, 2000. 272 pp. $65.00.*

Few would question America's commitment to Israel's security. It is thus easy to forget that this relationship was not always so certain. Herbert Druks reminds us of the tenuous nature of the U.S.–Israel relationship in the early years of the Jewish state. The tone of the book is decidedly sympathetic to Israel. The author repeatedly laments the reluctance of the United States to assist first the Zionist leadership and then the Israeli government as it struggled to establish a refuge for Jewish immigrants and to survive in a hostile regional environment. Druks presents a traditional view of Israel as the victim of Arab aggression and American indifference.

Druks is critical of each president's tendency to prioritize cold war considerations, relations with Arab states, and access to oil over support for Israel. Not only did Franklin D. Roosevelt go along with the British policy of largely closing off Jewish immigration to Palestine from 1939–1945, he also closed the gates of the United States to Jewish immigration. Even President Harry Truman—who recognized the state of Israel against the advice of his State Department advisers—failed in Druks's view to support Israel fully, because he refused to sell it arms. The Eisenhower administration marked "a low point in Israel's relations with the United States" (p. 153). Dwight Eisenhower not only forced Israel to retreat in the 1956 Suez war, but he also refused to sell it arms.

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According to Druks, "Neither Eisenhower, nor Dulles, nor any of the Eisenhower team seemed to appreciate Israel's peril" (p. 177). Only with John F. Kennedy, the first U.S. President to sell Israel weapons and the first to establish a "new and 'special relationship' with Israel" (p. 223), do we see a shift in U.S. policy.

While Druks provides a detailed account of U.S.–Israeli relations, the book lacks an overarching analytic framework or argument. It might have been useful, for example, if the author had examined in more depth the elements that drive the relationship, such as global, regional, and domestic factors. At times Druks refers to these factors, but he never sorts out how and why they influence the relationship at particular times. For example, at one point Druks ends his critique of the U.S. position toward Jewish immigration by stating, "The Jews learned that power politics was the main commodity of the international arena" (p. 79). One might ask, if global and power constraints drove U.S. policy, then why did Truman take such a different approach from Roosevelt's? Druks attempts to analyze Truman's decision to recognize Israel by considering a variety of factors, including support from Congress, Russia's role in the Middle East, and the 1948 election. In the end, however, Druks argues that Truman's desire to reassert control over his foreign policy advisers who opposed recognition may have been the decisive factor. But Druks starts the next chapter by saying that Truman only recognized Israel once he realized that Russia might do it first.

Another weakness is the slightly uneven nature of the book, with many chapters diverging from the central theme of U.S.–Israeli relations to chronicle general developments in regional politics. The transitional Kennedy years also get short shrift, with one brief chapter as compared to the three or four chapters devoted to the other presidencies.

Still, Druks provides an account of a period that receives less attention than the post-1967 American Mideast diplomacy. His portrayal of American Zionists and their divided positions toward the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state is particularly interesting, foreshadowing many of the later tensions between the American Jewish community and the Israeli leadership. The book suggests that some aspects of the "uncertain" relationship still remain.

DALIA DASSA KAYE
The George Washington University

A Grand Delusion: America's Descent Into Vietnam *by Robert Mann. Princeton, Basic Books, 2001. 768 pp. $35.00.*

It takes a brave person to write yet another 700-plus page survey of the Vietnam War. Over the past three decades, so much has been written about this

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conflict, particularly from the American side, that it is worth wondering what's left to say. But Robert Mann has proved that in history, there is never a last word. His book offers a vivid and well-written account of Vietnam as it played out in American politics, focusing particularly on the often-neglected role of the U.S. Congress. He tells the grim tale of Vietnam not from the viewpoint of GIs in the Mekong Delta or the military planners in the Pentagon, but from the perspective of those Washington power brokers who worked in the short corridor between Capitol Hill and the White House.

As a former Senate staff aide and an accomplished historian, Mann is well suited for this task. His specialty is politics, and by describing how Vietnam was perceived as a political issue that plagued presidents from Harry Truman to Gerald Ford, he provides a fresh interpretation in many areas of this well-known story. Mann argues that from the time of Truman on, political leaders were strapped by several "delusions" about Vietnam, driven primarily by two historical lessons: the well-known "Munich syndrome" showing the consequences of appeasement, and the belief that Korea and China proved the costs of not standing up to communists. He blames what one might call these "delusional lessons" squarely on politics—detailing how the Republicans manipulated these events to beat up Truman in the early 1950s and left every successive president to run in fear of them. Vietnam became the place to prove one's anti-communist credentials; and the perceived consequences of losing Vietnam to communism made any withdrawal or negotiating concession political suicide. Mann convincingly shows how this imperative drove six presidents steadily, and in his view inexorably, into this tragic conflict.

But if one is talking politics, it's impossible not to discuss Congress, and here Mann sheds significant new light. Most of what we have known about the congressional role in Vietnam comes from biographies of key players and accounts of pivotal moments like the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Finally, someone has given us a comprehensive survey. From the perspective of a scholar like Mann—who clearly believes in the importance of an active congressional role in foreign policy—what he uncovers is not altogether favorable.

The portrait Mann sketches of Congress is one of cowardice and culpability. For most of the war, a vast majority of Congress supported military action with few reservations, but even those who dissented did little to hinder escalation. Mann provides great detail of the impassionate, at times eloquently expressed concerns of congressional leaders like Senators Mike Mansfield, J. William Fulbright, Frank Church, George McGovern, Wayne Morse, and others; but few had the courage to use their senatorial powers to act against the president's Vietnam policies. Time and again, they argued with the president privately, only to support him publicly. They too were worried about the political costs of "appeasing" communism and did not want to be blamed for weakening the president. When such leaders finally spoke out and took action in the late 1960s, it was too late.

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Mann hopes that this story shows the importance of maintaining "informed support of Congress and the American people" in foreign policy (p. 731). But what one actually learns from this book is how well informed many influential members of Congress were about Vietnam. For many on Capitol Hill, the problem was not lack of knowledge or information, but the absence of courage to take political risks and act on conviction.

DEREK CHOLLET
The George Washington University

Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy *by Gordon R. Mitchell. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 2000. 390 pp. Paper, $24.95.*

Gordon R. Mitchell employs a rhetorical perspective to examine the political and technical controversies shadowing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program from Star Wars to the present. His goal is to expose the dynamics of what he calls "strategic deception," which has characterized this program from the beginning, and to examine the consequences of such deception not only for American defense policy but for the entire political system.

To get at this issue, Mitchell studies three episodes of strategic deception. These occurred during the cold war (the Strategic Defense Initiative), the Pacific Gulf War (the Patriot missile controversy), and peacetime (Theater High Altitude Area Defense). Each provides a cautionary tale about the distorting effects of strategic deception. SDI offers evidence of the deceptive practices surrounding "experimental design and timing, reportage and spin of test results, local controversy containment, and global controversy containment" used by missile defense advocates (p. 70). The Patriot case shows how the role of secrecy and deception about the wartime effectiveness of the Patriot missile spilled over into the postwar debate on missile defense, ultimately distorting the appropriations process. Finally, Mitchell details various theater missile defense (TMD) controversies where scientists, in an ironic reversal of the tactics used to inflate performance assessments for SDI, tried to deflate missile performance evaluations so that the system complied with the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. These manipulations ultimately undermined trust in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as a source of information, both domestically and internationally.

Each of these cases is instructive in itself, but it is their cumulative effect that is most compelling. Particularly valuable is Mitchell's effort to link the excesses of SDI to those of the other BMD and TMD programs. In all these cases, deceptive practices occurred at every level of the process: scientific, technical, advisory, and informing Congress and the public. Mitchell provides numerous examples of falsifying data, exaggerating performance, and spinning experi-

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mental results so that the data matched political objectives, as scientists deceived politicians and politicians deceived Congress and the people. Over the course of the narrative, two practices stand out. One is employing the tools of secrecy, including classification, security clearance review, and black budget spending, to protect deception. The other is the use of claims of scientific "objectivity" to dampen controversy and the reverse ploy, where those who find scientific research damaging to their interests support counter-research to provoke controversy and prevent consensus.

The consequences of such practices are, according to Mitchell, far reaching and potentially damaging to both national security and democratic values. Moreover, as he points out, employing "certain rhetorical strategies . . . shapes the expectations and interpretations governing subsequent discourse." Thus in the Patriot case, the Clinton administration's continuation of a deception campaign exaggerating Patriot effectiveness started under President George Bush led to "an inexorable march toward NMD [National Missile Defense] deployment—deployment that the Clinton administration worked feverishly to block from 1992 to 1998" (pp. 240–243).

The reference to rhetorical strategies raises the question of the effectiveness of using rhetoric as a tool for analyzing policy. Mitchell already employs traditional scholarly research strategies to good effect. What can a rhetorical methodology possibly add? When the subject is strategic deception, it seems, a good deal. Mitchell uses rhetoric to analyze how scientific facts are used for persuasive ends "by examining public texts that cite the [scientific] facts in support of political claims." This permits him to show "how the interplay between fact and claim enhances" the appeal of the argument (pp. 14, 19, 278). For Mitchell's methodology, see pp. 20–22. In other words, he uses a language technique to analyze the effects of deceptive language. This approach also has the advantage of circumventing some of the problems of using public documents to analyze policy. Here, such documents themselves constitute the evidence.

The book is fairly well written, although sometimes repetitious, has a useful glossary of defense acronyms and abbreviations, and a good index. Its main stylistic problem is the lengthy textual footnotes, which are so numerous as to constitute almost a parallel book (almost 20 pages of notes for 24 pages of text in Chapter 1). While sometimes informative, they are too often distracting, making it difficult to follow the argument. The book's other virtues, however, make persistence worthwhile.

BARBARA FARNHAM
Columbia University

Globalization: A Critical Introduction *by Jan Aart Scholte, New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000. 361 pp. $65.00.*

In the short span of a decade, globalization has been used so frequently to describe so many disparate phenomena that the term has been stripped of mean-

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ing. What one person finds important about globalization is often deemed irrelevant to another. The normative debates often overwhelm positive analyses. From this starting point, any attempt to craft a general textbook on the subject is bound to disappoint some observers. One must, therefore, marvel at how Jan Scholte's book clarifies what has become an inherently fuzzy area of study. He takes careful aim at the globalization phenomenon and does an admirable job of cataloging and analyzing the various arguments made about it. The result is a textbook that will be useful for students and even more useful for instructors.

Scholte's key analytic step is to propose a clear definition of globalization as deterritorialization, such that "social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances, and territorial borders" (p. 16). This definition is somewhat narrower than most given, but it is useful for two reasons. First, it shows that globalization is not the cause of every significant event of the past ten years. Scholte is able to demonstrate that there are preexisting sociopolitical structures that have been strengthened by globalization. Second, this definition also allows the author to point out what differentiates the current era from previous eras of economic integration.

Armed with this definition, the book looks to see how globalization has affected international production, governance, and community. In terms of production, capitalism has benefited greatly from globalization. Governance has shifted some power from sovereign states to other governance structures, but it has not displaced bureaucracies as the locus of public administration. And while nationalism has benefited from globalization, so have more cosmopolitan forms of identity. None of this is particularly shocking (Karl Marx made the point about capitalism and globalization over 150 years ago), but the clarity that Scholte brings to the table is refreshing.

Another virtue of the book is Scholte's decision to devote the final section of the book—and only the final section—to the normative ramifications of globalization. Too many books are consumed by this debate, overlooking important analytical points. Scholte is critical of globalization's effects on democracy, inequality, and security. However, that criticism does not get in the way of the author's cogent points on globalization's effects on governance or economics.

As warned, no book like this can completely escape criticism. While Scholte's definition of globalization is useful, it also has a post hoc flavor to it. He also fails to examine the extent to which previous eras—particularly medieval Europe—share the deterritorialization of the current era. This makes it difficult to compare the current era of globalization with previous epochs.

There is also some silliness and exaggeration in these pages. A chapter on how globalization affects the sociology of knowledge—and whether globalization has promoted a new aesthetics—seems a bit loopy. His claim that the traditional sovereignty of "exercis[ing] ultimate, complete, absolute, and singular rule over a country" is dead (p. 136) would surprise the leaders of Cuba, Saudi Arabia, or Turkmenistan. While Scholte provides decent empirical support for

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most of the book, at times assertion takes over, such as his claim that globalization is crippling the welfare state.

As for Scholte's policy recommendations, they rest on the nebulous concept of "human security." His suggestions, including enhanced global governance structures, North–South redistribution, and trilateral partnerships between business, government, and civil society, read like a melange of corporatism and the proposed New International Economic Order of the 1970s. They do not reflect the care taken with the other sections of the book. These are minor quibbles with an impressive accomplishment. This is a valuable primer on the various dimensions of globalization.

DANIEL W. DREZNER
University of Chicago

International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline *by D. S. L. Jarvis. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 2000. 288 pp. $34.95.*

In this uneven and always provocative book, D. S. L. Jarvis attempts a series of near Herculean tasks: to provide a "baedeker" (p. x) to postmodern thought and its place within epistemological debates in International Relations theory, to critically evaluate postmodern approaches to international politics, and, finally, to defend the discipline against the excesses of what he calls "subversive or deconstructive postmodernism" (p. 65). The result is a polemic in the best and worst senses of the word.

In what is easily the strongest section of the book, Jarvis shows how International Relations lacks deep historical roots or a well-defined set of intellectual problems. He argues that, both because of this paucity of disciplinary history and because of the postwar intellectual milieu in which International Relations developed, "empirical theory became the foundation stone on which all international political theory would be constructed" (p. 42). These insights help explain why so many debates in International Relations have come to pivot around epistemological and methodological questions, and why postmodernism might constitute a particularly strong threat to the coherence of International Relations as a common academic project.

Jarvis's attempt to make sense of postmodernism is far less successful. As he correctly notes, postmodernism is less a coherent body of thought than an intellectual movement critical of the basis and continued relevance of the Enlightenment project and, among other things, its supposed faith in reason, truth, universal value, and progress. In keeping with the rule of social science that all typologies not involving a 2×2 matrix must have three elements, Jarvis discusses "technological or productionist postmodernism," "critical postmodernism," and "subversive-deconstructive postmodernism" (pp. 65–66).

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The first category of postmodern thought contains those scholars who believe that contemporary technological, economic, and social developments are moving human societies out of the modern era and into postmodernity. This form of postmodernism focuses on diagnosing and understanding these changes.

I confess that I cannot entirely tell the difference between Jarvis's second and third categories of postmodernism. While both share many of the same commitments and intellectual pedigrees, Jarvis argues that the former "tend to be concerned with methodological issues . . . and their project sympathetic to epistemology, grand narratives, and foundationalist-objective thought," while the latter is more concerned with "negation and resistance" and its posture is "anti-epistemological and targets Cartesian-Kantian epistemology and the notion of philosophical foundations in theory and knowledge" (p. 66). But this distinction largely breaks down in his attempt to explicate the intellectual content and history of critical postmodernism, and I am unsure, for example, how it is possible to be for or against epistemology.

My sense is that the important distinction for Jarvis is between postmodernists who attempt to theorize the "real world" of international politics and those who deny a distinction between academic international political theory and international politics itself. Such theorists are frequently content to pretend that the former is the same as the latter. Here, Jarvis makes some extremely cogent points, but also engages in the kinds of overgeneralizations and ad hominem attacks he attributes to subversive postmodernists.

In these respects, Jarvis's book suffers from the same problems as many postmodernist works: Jarvis makes no systematic attempt to explain key intellectual trajectories in postmodern thought and the logic behind them, let alone to carefully define much of the postmodern jargon he uses. As a result, people who have already taken sides on the issue of postmodernism in International Relations will find much to love or hate (or, at least, to ponder); but the uninitiated are likely to find yet another entry in a confusing, frequently vitriolic, and ongoing war of words.

DANIEL H. NEXON
Columbia University

Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence *by James W. Davis, Jr. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 222 pp. $36.00.*

James Davis's important and persuasive new book addresses the previously under-theorized issue of promises and assurances in international relations. Drawing on Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's work on prospect theory, Davis constructs a comprehensive theory of influence, which incorporates context into the conditions under which threats or promises are most effective in

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deterring opponents. The central argument claims that threats are most effective in deterring a leader who is making a decision in a domain of gains; in other words, threats succeed when adversaries seek opportunistic gains. On the other hand, promises and assurances work best when leaders are operating in a domain of losses, out of fear or insecurity. One important insight that derives from this theoretical distinction illuminates the question of why threats sometimes backfire: they escalate conflicts when rendered against a leader making a decision in a risk-seeking domain of losses.

Davis claims three central goals for the book. The first defines promises in a distinct way and examines how they relate to threats and assurances. The second integrates these tactics into a broader theory of influence. Lastly, he applies his ideas to a series of case studies. Davis succeeds admirably in all three areas.

First, he writes that "[p]romises are contingent improvements in the target's value position relative to a baseline of expectations" (p. 14). He goes on to disentangle different types of promises, characterizing rewards as either private or shared, and discussing the role of costs, credibility, and motivations in assessing the utility of promises. In addition, he categorizes rewards into concessions or compensations and notes the distinctions between them.

Second, Davis incorporates his definitions of promises into a broader theory of influence based on prospect theory. Prospect theory is a descriptive model of decision making under conditions of risk. It argues that individuals are more likely to be risk averse in a domain of losses and more likely to be risk seeking in a domain of gains. Davis creatively applies this model to the use of threats and promises in international influence. His application contextualizes the situations under which threats or promises might be most effective in deterring opponents.

Last, Davis undertakes an extensive and impressive series of case studies in German political and diplomatic history from 1848–1914. These cases include the first and second Schleswig-Holstein crises; the Austro-Prussian war; the Franco-Prussian war; the War-in-Sight crisis of 1875; the German quest for colonies in Africa and the Anglo-German rivalry over the Upper Nile and the resolution that involved the British promise of Heligoland to the Germans; the first and second Moroccan crises; and the July crisis of 1914. In each case, Davis carefully outlines the history of the event, the decisional frame of the central decision maker (gains or losses), and the baseline of expectations from which these actors were operating. He then discusses the reaction of the other powers and whether they tried to threaten or assure Germany into compliance, and then examines the outcomes across cases. While sensitive to the difficulties of applying this model ex ante, Davis's case work strongly supports his model.

Additional maps would have aided understanding and interpretation, especially in the fourth chapter on early Prussian ambitions. Regardless, Davis's application constitutes a real contribution to the literatures on prospect theory in political science, international influence, the limitations of deterrence theory,

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and German diplomatic history. Anyone with a serious interest in these topics will be well served by this substantive debut.

ROSE MCDERMOTT
Cornell University

Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution *by Avery Goldstein. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2000. 356 pp. $49.50.*

This book is not a comprehensive study of security issues in the twenty-first century, as the title suggests. Essentially, it is a semitheoretical survey of the security policies of three middle powers—China, France and Britain—during the last half of the twentieth century, with an argument that their common experiences form a useful template for predicting the future role of nuclear weapons, including proliferation. The three case studies are superbly done, and the theoretical framework for analyzing them is interesting; but the projection into the future falls well short of its aim.

Goldstein's core thesis is that the choices and experiences of these three states during the cold war better reflected continuities in international politics than did relations between the superpowers. The continuities are an anarchic system, self-interested state-actors and the availability of nuclear weapons, although the effects of these factors were modified somewhat by the nonrecurring factor of bipolarity. Bipolarity and anarchy presented these middle powers with conflicting structural imperatives: bipolarity dictated their dependence on one or the other of the superpowers; anarchy raised doubts about the reliability of this protection. Self-reliance through conventional deterrence and defense was not possible because of the overwhelming conventional strength of the Soviet Union. Acquiring their own nuclear weapons resolved the dilemma: it hedged against abandonment by allies and provided robust security at an affordable price.

Opting for independent nuclear arsenals, which were bound to be weaker than those of their opponents, created problems of credibility. The three powers finessed this difficulty by two implicit doctrinal innovations, which Goldstein, following Devin Hagerty and Edward Rhodes, labels "first-strike uncertainty" and the "contingently unsafe actor." If France, say, worried that its deterrent might not survive a Russian first strike, it could reflect that an absolute certainty of its survival was not necessary; it was sufficient that the Russians be uncertain about the probable success of their blow. Given the enormous cost of failure, they would not attack if they saw any probability of failure, however low. The notion of the contingently unsafe actor dealt with the irrationality of a defender's nuclear retaliation to either a nuclear or conventional attack. Although it would have been irrational for France, Britain, or China to initiate

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nuclear war in response to a Soviet attack, the Soviets had to consider that in a crisis rational heads might not prevail or that the defender's weapons might be fired accidentally. This idea was an adaptation of Thomas Schelling's "threat that leaves something to chance." The two concepts together relaxed the need for invulnerable forces and for threats that could only be rationally executed.

The book is weakest in its claim that the nuclear choices of these three states will be repeated by others in the future, since they will reflect the same systemic continuities, such as anarchy and nuclear technology. The British, French, and Chinese decisions for nuclear weapons, as the author readily admits, were also influenced strongly by a transient factor: structural bipolarity. Bipolarity meant that they faced an opponent of overwhelming power and depended on an ally with incentives to abandon them in a crunch. Thus they had the strongest possible motives to acquire their own nuclear deterrents. It is hard to see how their experiences can be usefully employed to predict choices of other states in a future multipolar (or unipolar) system where the nuclear incentives are likely to be weaker. If anything, a model based on their situations would overpredict future proliferation. This reasoning seems at odds with Goldstein's argument that the emergence of a multipolar system will encourage proliferation.

Goldstein concludes that "the number of nuclear states will continue to grow" although "slowly." He professes "tempered optimism" about this: nuclear weapons "will continue to contribute to the peacefulness of international politics." Nuclear deterrence will remain at the core of international politics among the great powers and will "remain an attractive option" for less powerful states.

Despite the questionable link between cases and prognostications, there is much of value in this book, both empirically and theoretically. The case studies (especially the one on China) are thoroughly researched and clearly presented. The theory that informs both the cases and the futurizing, though hardly original in its components, is more so in their combination. A formalization of the theory of first strike uncertainty in an appendix is especially lucid and useful.

GLENN H. SNYDER
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The Federal Appointments Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis *by Michael J. Gerhardt. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2001. 400 pp. $37.95.*

Michael J. Gerhardt, a law professor, has written a book that will be of great interest to students of American politics. In what only can be described as a scholarly tour de force, Gerhardt encompasses the broad sweep of the American experience to provide a detailed and systematic analysis of the process of selecting and confirming judicial and nonjudicial presidential appointments.

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His approach is historical institutionalism by which he moves back and forth in time, providing numerous examples of analytically distinct points concerning patterns or practices. He highlights changes over time but also commonalities. His sources are largely secondary, but he effectively in text and footnotes provides a synthesis of much of the relevant literature from law, history, and political science. This is a remarkable achievement.

The book is organized in three parts, the first of which explores the origins, structure, and evolution of the appointments process. In the second and largest part of the book, evaluating the roles of the major players in the process, Gerhardt has separate chapters not only on the president and Senate but on the nominees, public and interest group participation, and the impact of media and technology on the process. In the last section, devoted to a consideration of reforming the process, there is a chapter on the need for reform and on the future of judicial selection. In the concluding postscript, Gerhardt neatly summarizes the themes of his book. In one telling sentence in that postscript, Gerhardt notes: "The informal arrangements through which the system operates—including senatorial courtesy; logrolling; individual holds; blue slips; consultation between presidents, members of Congress, and other interested parties, including judges; interest group lobbying; strategic leaking by administrations, senators, and interest groups; manipulation of the press; the media's efforts to influence the news; and nominees campaigning—are the sum and substance of the federal appointments process" (p. 338).

It is perhaps inevitable in such an ambitious and broad-sweeping work that minor errors of fact occur. To give some examples: Gerhardt makes the common mistake that suggests that Douglas Ginsburg's nomination to the Supreme Court was sent to the Senate (pp. 73, 109, 111, 176, 196, 239, 244, 383 n. 23) when in fact it was not. Gerhardt misstates the highest rating used by the American Bar Association before 1989 as "excellent" (p. 120) when it was in fact "exceptionally well qualified."

A paragraph devoted to the Bush administration's judicial selection process overstates tensions between the White House and Justice Department (p. 121) and then cites as its source a book published before Bush took office (p. 360, n. 58). Robert Bork is mentioned as having been nominated "in the middle of the summer of 1987" (p. 125), when he was in fact nominated on 1 July, a not insignificant point when the discussion is about presidential timing of nominations. President Dwight Eisenhower is cited as having given "great weight (following Truman's example) to the ratings of the American Bar Association" (p. 130). In fact, Truman agreed to ABA participation toward the end of his administration, when no nominations were made. The Senate vote to defeat Clinton nominee Ronnie White is described as having been "on a largely party-line vote" (p. 141), when in fact it was a strictly party-line vote. President Bill Clinton is mentioned as nominating four African Americans to fill the North Carolina seats on the Fourth Circuit (p. 153) when in fact he nominated three and one Caucasian. As seen in these examples, the errors are minor and do not

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detract substantially from the major contribution Gerhardt has made to our understanding of the process of federal appointments.

SHELDON GOLDMAN
University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Government Works: Why Americans Need the Feds *by Milton J. Esman. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. 196 pp. $26.00.*

This brief book is intended to rebut those current-day conservatives whose mission in life and politics is to attack the bureaucracy, cut budgets, and shrink the government. Attentive students of government will find little new in this volume, but much worth saying and repeating. It might seem obvious that government works much of the time, that many public services are vital and even more are desirable, and that the private sector does not always get it right (current examples range from the Ford Explorer and its tires, to the local nursing home, to the last flight anyone took). But in campaign after campaign, the obvious is often ignored or denied, and government is depicted as the enemy. In Esman's words, "The dominant theme of right wing politics and public discourse during the past quarter century has been an unrelenting campaign to demonize the government . . ." (p. ix).

Government Works is an articulate and well-informed counter-attack, and it deserves wide reading. The book should be read by members of appropriations committees from both sides of the aisle and by candidates for office who have conservative opponents. It should also be read by the opponents. My fear, of course, is that Esman's volume will be read mainly by believers and not by those who need it most. Still, I may send my review copy to President George W. Bush.

Esman makes clear that although hostility to government has been a continuing theme in American history, the antigovernment ideology of recent years has gained strength for several reasons. The Vietnam War was one, Watergate another. Conflicts surrounding civil rights, welfare, energy, and the environment may have encouraged the skepticism of others. Small businesses and large corporations alike believe that minimalist government is in their immediate interest (less regulation, lower taxes). And even American political mythology asserts that government is best which governs least.

In 1980, Ronald Reagan took his antigovernment campaign all the way to the White House and did it so convincingly that twelve years later his Democratic successor, Bill Clinton, famously asserted that the era of big government was over. As if to clinch the point, a clearly antigovernment Republican has followed.

Borrowing from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Esman argues that government growth and shrinkage, government and antigovernment, are cyclic. How long will the antigovernment cycle we are now in continue? Before the election of

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November 2000, Esman predicted a "limited shelf life for the Republican-rightist antigovernment crusade" (p. 57). Yet clearly the crusade's shelf life has not yet expired. Esman's prediction can be checked against the 2004 election outcome, perhaps even the outcome of the 2002 congressional elections. If Esman is right, George W. Bush will be a one-term president.

Esman knows what government is for, and he knows what government can do. The American government should conduct an energetic foreign policy and take an active part in an increasingly complex world. We cannot withdraw, nor can we simply dictate terms. Government must moderate and regulate the excesses of the market place. "The claim that business can practice self regulation, setting and enforcing voluntary standards among the members of particular industries, is indeed fanciful" (p. 69). Government must provide necessary services, and Esman lists them. Government must manage the economy, and it must safeguard the institutions of democracy. Esman is clear that a minimalist government, a shrunken government, cannot perform these essential functions. And he points out clearly that focusing primarily on cutting taxes will starve current programs and frustrate new initiatives, like prescription benefits for Medicare.

Esman makes a strong case for better government, not less government. He thinks, indeed, that we need more. "Despite rightist propaganda of recent years, the United States suffers not from too much, but from too little government" (p. 105). But how to get more and better government? In his final chapter, Esman suggests the elements of a winning strategy, but he is at most suggestive. Those who favor Esman's vision, who see his goal of more and better government as a proper destination, will put down this book still needing a detailed road map, an effective, detailed battle plan. Without careful planning, attractive and energetic progressive candidates, an appealing message, and plentiful resources to defeat antigovernment opponents, minimalism, in the absence of an international or domestic crisis, may enjoy an extended shelf life.

JAMES W. DAVIS
Washington University

Stepping Up to Power: The Political Journey of American Women *by Harriet Woods. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2000. 252 pp. $25.00.*

Harriet Woods's story is in many ways familiar. She came of age during the late 1940s, briefly worked as a reporter for the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, attempted a writing career, and then married and became a suburban homemaker. Quickly experiencing what Betty Friedan described as "the problem without a name," Woods channeled her energies and frustrations into community activism, launching a street repair campaign in her neighborhood and becoming active in the League of Women Voters (LWV). Her motivation for joining the League was similar to that of middle-class homemakers throughout the country

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during the 1950s: she was seeking "intelligent conversation" and a place "where a woman who wasn't welcome in the man's world could build a meaningful world of her own" (p. 20).

Motivated by a liberal concern for American democratic institutions, most notably in the increasingly visible civil rights movement, liberal women like Woods initiated neighborhood projects, lobbied municipal governments and state legislatures, and kept abreast of national and international affairs. These were the women who formed the heart of the feminist "revival" of the 1960s. Woods began her career in public office by serving on her local human relations commission. In 1976, she became the first woman to serve in the Missouri Senate, and in 1982 and 1988 she mounted unsuccessful campaigns for the United States Senate, learning important lessons about women's political strengths and limitations from the campaign and as well from defeat. Between the two campaigns, Woods became the first woman to serve in statewide office as lieutenant governor. By the 1990s, Woods was recognized as one of the most experienced women in American electoral politics (particularly in the Democratic party), and in 1991 she became the executive director of the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC). Under her leadership, the caucus nurtured and trained women all over the country to run for public office.

"Political women in the 1970s," she writes, "faced a dilemma" (p. 58). Their central motivation was to bring a "different voice" to political decisions, but at the same time, if labeled as a "women's candidate," they continued to be marginalized by the male political leadership. Even though issues like the equal rights amendment, and, later, the Anita Hill–Clarence Thomas Senate hearings seemed to draw large numbers of women into political activism, the balance of power, both locally and nationally, continued to lie in the hands of male politicians. Ultimately, despite Woods's optimistic story of "women's progress," her book raises serious questions about just how successful women politicians have been. Woods admits to a continuing frustration both with women's own reluctance to take up the challenge of elective office and with the recalcitrance of political institutions that have remained largely male-dominated. Woods's story is perhaps a bit more optimistic from the point of view of women's issues than from the perspective of electoral politics. Many of the legal and economic inequalities that marked gender differences during the 1950s have disappeared. While Woods would not accept the optimistic view of her female Republican colleagues that "gender problems ended with the passage of antidiscrimination laws," she acknowledges that young women today are entering a public world much changed from her generation (p. 222). Woods's personal story and political career serve as a reminder of how much public life has changed during the last half-century and of what still needs to be done to make the American political arena truly democratic.

SUSAN LEVINE
University of Illinois at Chicago

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Gender and American Politics: Women, Men, and the Political Process
edited by Sue Tolleson-Rinehart and Jyl J. Josephson. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 2000. 262 pp. Cloth, $66.95; paper, $24.95.

Sue Tolleson-Rinehart and Jyl J. Josephson have assembled an exemplary set of research articles probing the impact of gender on American political behavior, institutions, and public policy. While they note in their Introduction that current feminist scholarship is questioning the once-rigid boundaries between the constructs of sex and gender, their approach emphasizes the social construction of gender roles rather than on biological essentialism. The studies explicitly compare differences in political experiences, perceptions, and outcomes for both men and women.

The papers in this collection are strongly empirical in focus, and careful analysis of the evidence produces many surprises and challenges to feminist assumptions. In the first section on political behavior, I especially liked Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter's chapter on "Gender and Political Knowledge." They confirm the usual finding that women know and care less about national and international politics, but they compare men's and women's knowledge on a variety of issues, based on several different surveys, and find that sex differences vary considerably by issue and by locale. Women are in fact more likely to know who local school officials are, and sex differences on issues of particular concern to women (abortion, health care) are insignificant. They further report that the gender gap in political attitudes is considerably larger among the well informed, with knowledgeable men considerably more conservative and knowledgeable.

M. Margaret Conway's chapter on political participation finds that women are still less likely than men to make political contributions or engage in campaigns, but she also suggests differences in participation must consider the cues offered by candidates, parties, or issues, but does not pursue this insight here. The third political-behavior chapter, by Eric Plutzer, uses a unique data source (interviews with patients at an abortion clinic) to test Carol Gilligan's theories of sex differences in moral reasoning. His measures are whether or not a woman chose to tell her co-conceiver of her pregnancy and the reasons she gave for this choice; these in themselves make fascinating reading. His coding of the responses finds evidence of both abstract moral reasoning and the ethic of caring that Gilligan attributed to "women's voice." He concludes that any analysis of ethical reasoning must be placed in context. Whether people value certain rights may say more about the culture than about the reasoning style of the individual, male or female (although I wish Plutzer had been able to examine men's reasoning in context as well).

The four chapters on public policy constitute the strongest section of the book. Each of them compares the impact of gender on policy making and implementation across different policy areas, with diverse and nuanced conclusions. Michael Alvarez and Edward McCaffery tackle the complexities of taxation; as they find, while men and women differ little overall in tax preferences,

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their second-order preferences vary depending on the salience of the issue (much more salient for men) and the balance between taxation and social spending (of much more concern to women). Although their writing is often awkward, they do a good job of clarifying the complexities of the marriage penalty. Taxation of married couples emerges as an ideological issue, with conservatives favoring the single-wage-earner traditional family and liberals more supportive of working women, married or single. Since taxation is more salient to men and to conserving Republicans, tax policy tends to reflect their preferences rather than those of Democrats or working women. The authors recommend further research on how politicians and elites politicize tax issues along gender lines.

Jyl Josephson demonstrates how cutbacks in AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and general assistance reflect the gender norms associated with those programs, and Dorothy McBride Stetson similarly demonstrates the relevance of gender roles for policy making in job training and abortion regulation. Sue Tolleson-Rinehart provides a useful overview of how until quite recently male models dominated medical research and the making of health policy. Women were defined in terms of reproductive capacity rather than as autonomous citizens capable of informed choice. But health policies that affect women are not without controversy, as she demonstrates in her discussion of the medical and political issues surrounding mammograms and the termination of preterm labor.

The concluding section on political institutions is less successful, since all three chapters are quite narrow in focus. Richard Fox looks at gender issues in congressional elections, but other than his brief history of women in Congress there is nothing in this book on the growing number of women as legislators, either on Capitol Hill or in the fifty states. MaryAnne Borrelli offers a succinct comparison of Janet Reno and Madeleine Albright's differing Cabinet roles, but I would have liked to see more on women's leadership roles in the federal executive, or as governors in the states. However, Susan Gluck Mezey's chapter on the judiciary contains an exemplary review of the literature on the impact (or lack thereof) of women judges. As her comparison of the legal records of Sandra Day O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg shows, women judges (even feminist ones) do not necessarily speak for women.

This collection of articles offers a useful review of the literature on gender issues in American politics and presents some intriguing new findings as well. As such, it could serve as a text for both upper-level undergraduate courses and scholars interested in substantive and methodological issues concerning research on gender. The major lack for either audience is a conclusion discussing the implications of these diverse findings and suggesting avenues for future research: When and where is gender most likely to have an impact? How do we account for the observed declines in gender differences in behavior in some areas but not others? What gender issues are most likely to become politically salient for public policy? Feminist theories have contrasted "feminine" policies

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that reinforce traditional gender roles, and "feminist" policies that challenge them: this distinction appears to account for some of the differences observed in the policy chapters, and could perhaps be extended to other areas of political behavior or policy. The tensions between feminist theories and empirical results noted in many of the chapters also merit further discussion.

As Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita Mae Kelly have observed in *Gender Power, Leadership, and Governance*, institutions have gender also, and may thus privilege certain types of roles and experiences. Thus Susan Gluck Mezey found that law school training and the norms of the legal profession may outweigh any impact of gender roles, and Richard Fox similarly argued that masculine norms continue to dominate Congress and election campaigns. The inclusion of more women in such institutions may, therefore, have far less impact than proponents of gender equality have hoped.

SUSAN B. HANSEN
University of Pittsburgh

What Motivates Bureaucrats? Politics and Administration During the Reagan Years *by Marissa Martino Golden. New York, Columbia University Press, 2001. 320 pp. $49.50.*

Although scholars have given a good deal of attention to bureaucratic responsiveness in recent years, leading empirical analyses have ignored what goes on inside of agencies in favor of quantitative analyses that examine the relationship between aggregated inputs and outputs. As a result, we have little direct knowledge of the individual motives and organizational characteristics that make civil servants more or less supportive of their political superiors.

Marissa Martino Golden's study of bureaucratic responsiveness during the Reagan years is a welcome effort to address this limitation in the literature. Based on seventy confidential interviews with officials from four different agencies (the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Food and Nutrition Service, and the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division), Golden explores the behavioral components of responsiveness as well as the attitudes and incentives that determine bureaucrats' willingness to pursue the goals of political appointees. The Reagan administration provides an excellent set of cases for examining these issues, precisely because its efforts to affect policy change via the administrative process were so ambitious.

Golden finds that the civil servants she interviewed were generally responsive. This was due in part to the inducements and sanctions that political executives could use to shape the behavior of their subordinates. Yet Golden's analysis also dispels the notion that bureaucratic behavior can be neatly modeled in terms of self-interest or any other single motive. Thus, an equally-if-not-more

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important determinant of responsiveness was a strong role orientation among bureaucrats that, regardless of their own preferences, it was their duty to comply with any legal directives from the president and his appointees. Given this, Golden suggests that political executives would generally do well to adopt management strategies that place more trust in the loyalty of their subordinates.

At the same time, Golden observes that there were occasional exceptions to the overall pattern of responsiveness she observed. In this regard, her study stands in contrast to the growing number of quantitative analyses that have inferred that agencies are responsive based on correlations between levels of administrative activity (regulatory enforcement, for example) and temporal or local variation in the environment of administration (turnover among politicians, for example). By conceiving of responsiveness in dichotomous terms and by ignoring organizational factors, these efforts typically fail to confront the more interesting questions of how responsive agencies are and of why some are more responsive than others. Golden's study suggests that factors such as professional orientation and organizational culture and history condition the willingness of bureaucrats to deviate from the general norm of compliance with the wishes of their superiors. In the case of the Civil Rights Division, for example, she finds that the natural inclination of lawyers to argue increased the likelihood that careerists would question the directives of political appointees.

What Motivates Bureaucrats? is a conceptually sophisticated and thoroughly researched book that adds substantially to our knowledge of the character and the determinants of administrative responsiveness. Aside from its substantive content, it is clearly organized and very well-written with little if any academic jargon. Given that the analysis is not technical, moreover, the book is as accessible to a lay audience as it is to academics. I would recommend it to anyone who is interested in the role played by bureaucracy in American government.

WILLIAM F. WEST
Texas A&M University

Class and Party in American Politics *by Jeffrey Stonecash. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2000. 192 pp. Paper, $29.50.*

One of the major challenges for students of American political parties is to explain the apparent rise in partisanship and political polarization in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. This development has been particularly puzzling, since it began to occur at precisely the moment when scholars had arrived at a consensus that American parties were in long-term decline as traditional state and local party organizations atrophied, voters became more motivated by single issues and candidate personalities than party affiliation, and television supplanted the parties as the primary intermediary institution between citizens and government. Jeffrey Stonecash's new book is a rare effort to provide a

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plausible answer to the conundrum, and it will be of immediate interest to teachers and students of American government.

Stonecash believes that socioeconomic class has been underestimated as an explanatory factor in recent American party politics. Utilizing data from the National Election Studies since the 1950s, Stonecash's definition of "class" is based on respondents' relative income position rather than self-described class position (p. xiii). Using this definition, Stonecash finds strong evidence that contrary to the widely-assumed arguments regarding the declining importance of class in U.S. politics and the rise of "social" or "postmaterialist" issues, class has become more rather than less significant as a determinant of electoral choice.

The author provides several plausible explanations for this. The electoral realignment in the South and the (lamentably understudied) less drastic realignment in the northern states has made the two American parties more ideologically consistent than they were in the 1950s and also more internally homogeneous in terms of the class base of their electoral support. Democratic support among the less affluent has actually increased. This is partly in response, Stonecash argues, to rising disparities in real incomes between the more and less affluent, and stagnation in the real incomes of working-class Americans over the past two decades. In turn, the two major parties have become more responsive to their respective class bases. Stonecash does not dismiss the significance of issues such as race and abortion in dividing less affluent voters, but he sees them as being significant primarily during the 1970s and less so in the succeeding decades. The author goes on to argue that the electoral situation of the Democratic party is generally less adverse than has been generally assumed. The class realignment has led to growth in Democratic support and electoral success outside the South, which belies the widespread assumption of the Clinton era that the Democrats had to abandon class politics and focus more on economic conservatism to prevail electorally.

This book is well written, well argued, and the author's "rediscovery" of class as an important explanatory variable in current party politics is welcome. Stonecash's efforts to disentangle the electoral impact of class and race from his data are not entirely convincing to this reader, however. He fails to address another factor in electoral polarization—the strong affiliation of powerful, ideologically-oriented national interest groups with candidates of their respective parties from coast to coast. With electoral participation rates still declining, mobilization of the party faithful has become increasingly significant in U.S. politics, and party polarization inevitably results. It is not clear, therefore, that socioeconomic class is the primary factor driving this polarization, and there remain significant class divisions inside each party's electoral coalition. That said, Stonecash's book is a welcome corrective to the too-easy dismissal of the significance of social class in American politics.

NICOL RAE
Florida International University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest

Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 107th Congress *edited by Edward H. Crane and David Boaz. Washington, DC, Cato Institute, 2001. 680 pp. $18.95.*

The Middle East Military Balance 2000–2001: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Studies in International Security *edited by Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001. 450 pp. $37.95.*

Great Debates at the United Nations: An Encyclopedia of Fifty Key Issues, 1945–2001 *by Robert F. Gorman. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2001. 549 pp. $65.00.*

The Almanac of Scottish Politics *by Gerry Hassan and Peter Lynch. Portland, OR, International Specialized Book Services, 2001. 452 pp. $49.95.*

European Foreign Policy: Key Documents *edited by Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith. New York, Routledge, 2001. 512 pp. Cloth, $100.00; paper, $32.95.*

British Political Opinion 1937–2000: The Gallup Polls *edited by Anthony King. Portland, OR, International Specialized Book Services, 2001. 367 pp. $45.95.*

The Political Reference Almanac, 2001–2002 *compiled by Anthony Quain. Arlington, VA, Keynote Publishing Company, 2001. 1040 pp. Paper, $49.95.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

I write to dispute Richard Pious's thesis in "The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Limits of Crisis Management," *PSQ* 116 (Spring 2001). Pious argues it is an "illusion that presidential crisis management can compel an adversary to submit" and that "the art and science of politics and diplomacy, not gamesmanship . . . are the keys to successful resolution of nuclear crises." It appears that beneath a layer of trenchant erudition lies Pious's semantic discomfort with the term "crisis management." With equal cogency, one could posit that President George W. Bush's energy policy implicates ecological and not merely environmental concerns.

Simply put, the purposive act on the part of the Soviet Union in establishing a significant nuclear presence in Cuba created a crisis. In response, President John F. Kennedy acted quickly to handle, control, and contain this threat. He named members of the Executive Committee to bring disparate fields of expertise to the table. The available options of military action—surgical strike or invasion—were explored. The gesture of removing Jupiter missiles from Turkey as well as the imposition of a naval blockade were considered.

Without employing the offending "m" word, the president ordered General Burchinal to place our aircraft on full alert at numerous bases so that the Russians could not mistake our resolve. National interest is served when all possible means are marshalled and arrayed against an adversary. Call it deterrence theory, call it policy analysis, call it statecraft, but Pious exhorts: do not debase the process by calling it crisis management. President Kennedy succeeded by applying the tenet of Kenneth Waltz: "Power may be present when force is not used."

ROGER BRANDWEIN

The Author Replies:

Roger Brandwein's letter confirms President Kennedy's observation that in any operation there is always one individual who doesn't get the word—or in this case, the point. I believe he has missed the point of my article: crisis management failed and political negotiation superceded it and succeeded. This is not a semantic quibble.

RICHARD PIOUS

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To the Editor:

I found Jerome Slater's book review [Spring 2001] very peculiar. He seems to think it is a revelation and a reflection on Ben-Gurion that he and other Zionist leaders aspired to more than the U.N. partition gave them (p. 137). Of course they did—it fell way short of what they understood had been promised by the Balfour Declaration. Slater goes on to say that "much of these territorial goals were realized—at the cost of continuous war with the Palestinians and the Arab world"—but neglects to say that the wars in which Israel acquired and retained territory were all initiated by the Arabs (Israel at this point retains no territory from the two wars it initiated, the 1956 Suez War (initiated with France and Britain) and the invasion of Lebanon).

Sincerely,
BILL GREEN

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

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